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Abstract
Despite regulatory guidelines, unreliable financial reporting exists in organizations,
creating undue financial risk-harm for their stakeholders. Normal accident theory (NAT)
identifies factors in highly complex integrated systems that can have unexpected,
undetected, and uncorrected system failures. High-reliability organization (HRO) theory
constructs promote reliability in complex, integrated systems prone to NAT factors.
Enterprise risk management (ERM) integrates NAT factors and HRO constructs under a
holistic framework to achieve organizational goals and mitigate the potential for
stakeholder risk-harm. Literature on how HRO constructs promote ERM in responsible
integrated financial systems has been limited. The purpose of this qualitative, grounded
theory study was to use HRO constructs to identify and define the psychological factors
involved in the effective ERM of responsible organizational financial reporting.
Standardized, open-ended interviews were used to collect inductive data from a
purposeful sample of 13 reporting agents stratifying different positions in organizations
that have maintained consistent operational success while attenuating stakeholder riskharm. The data were interpreted via transcription, and subsequent iterative open, axial,
and narrative coding. Results showed that elements of culture and leadership found in
the HRO construct of disaster foresightedness and mitigation fostered an internal
environment of successful enterprise reporting risk management to ethically achieve
organizational goals and abate third-party stakeholder risk-harm. The findings will
contribute to positive social change by suggesting an approach for organizations to
optimize strategic objectives while minimizing stakeholders’ financial risk-harm.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Introduction
Organizations possess competing fiscal, legal, ethical, and philanthropic
responsibilities to produce their goals (Carroll, 1991). Stakeholders are collective others
who have varied interests in the organizations (WebFinance, 2016) and can be affected
by organizational leadership decisions (Carroll, 1991). Organizational efforts do not
always lead to positive outcomes, causing stakeholders to incur undue risk (Reason,
1997). For example, the Enron scandal (McLean & Elkind, 2004) showed how
irresponsible financial reporting adversely affected innocent third parties, despite the
existence of measures to detect and mitigate risk.
The Challenger and Columbia space shuttle mishaps and the Exxon Valdez and
British Petroleum oil spills are widely studied cases of high-performing organizations
experiencing exceptionally negative outcomes because of improper risk identification and
mitigation (Gill, Picou, & Ritchie, 2011; Graham et al., 2011; Harrald, Marcus, &
Wallace, 1990; Vaughan, 1990, 2009). Catastrophic failures are events causing
immediate physical, environmental, and fiscal harm, and they can have devastating longterm effects on organizations, their workforces, and even industry as a whole (Reason,
1997). Perrow (1999) studied what he termed normal accidents in high-risk industries
like aerospace and petrochemical, and he deduced that the intensity of catastrophic failure
is dependent upon the structural interactions of organizations’ human and technical
systems. Perrow added that applying the concept of normal accidents to financial systems
was obvious.
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Background
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission
(COSO, 2004) created the enterprise risk management (ERM) framework as a response
to the increasing frequency of business failures in an attempt to reduce the harm from
undue risk experienced by stakeholders. In this study, reduction of third-party risk-harm
through responsible financial reporting was viewed through the lens of high-reliability
organizations (HROs; K. H. Roberts, 1990), which are businesses defined by highly
integrated technical operating systems described in normal accident theory (NAT;
Perrow, 1999). Furthermore, the incubation of system failure events was examined
through man-made disaster (MMD) theory (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997). Each theory is
unique, yet the literature often has referred to the relationship of one or more of them
when discussing risk management (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991; Leveson, Dulac, Marais,
& Carroll, 2009; Müssig, 2009; Pidgeon & O’Leary, 2000; Ramanujam & Goodman,
2003; Scheytt, Soin, Sahlin‐Andersson, & Power, 2006; Taylor-Gooby & Zinn, 2006;
Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2008).
Some organization systems and processes are so highly integrated and tightly
coupled that one slight interruption can reverberate throughout the interdependent
components (Perrow, 1999). Such interruptions can have catastrophic outcomes (Rijpma,
1997). The catastrophic impact of failures is dependent upon the degree of functional
interaction and coupling within operating systems (Leveson et al., 2009). Perrow (1999)
developed NAT for framing the complexities of organizational systems related to
integrated risk. Perrow contended that industries with technological complexities and
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high-risk operations create the potential for inevitable, or normal, accidents. As defined
by NAT, an accident is a failure in one component of the system that causes disruption in
the interaction with another component, resulting in a disruption or a discontinuation of
organizational output (Perrow, 1999).
Perrow did not assert that failures occur frequently in such organizations; rather,
he declared that they are likely to occur because of the high-risk nature of the technical
systems in given industries, such as nuclear power, air transportation, and petrochemical
plants. To achieve and maintain a high level of performance, organizations in these
industries depend upon their tightly coupled and highly integrated technical systems
working without interruption. Perrow suggested that although they are not predisposed to
producing catastrophic physical outcomes, the highly integrated and tightly coupled
nature of financial systems can provide a platform for disasters that result in significant
financial harm or disaster.
Perrow (1999) developed an interaction/coupling chart to frame the potential for
catastrophic events based upon variable levels of interaction ranging from complex to
linear and coupling ranging from tight to loose (see Figure 1). It is widely used to
interpret, analyze, and diagnose potential and actual risk (Weick, 2004). Organizations
with highly complex, interactive, and tightly coupled integrated operations have no room
or slack for trial and error for testing systems, processes, and procedures to ensure
uninterrupted operations; therefore, they require a high degree of initial and continual
reliability to promote safety and minimize risk (Schulman, 1993).
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Figure 1. Interaction/Coupling chart. Reprinted from Normal Accidents: Living with High
Risk Technologies (3rd ed., p. 97), by C. Perrow, 1999, Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press. Copyright 1999 by Princeton University Press. Reprinted with
permission.
Because unexpected, unrecognized, and uncorrected interruptions in highly
integrated systems can produce catastrophic outcomes, the HRO theory was developed to
define the need for “attempting to attain near failure free performance” (LaPorte &
Consolini, 1991, p. 20). Organizations in industries subject to normal accidents are
required to maintain a high level of operating reliability (Weick, 2004). Defined as
HROs, these businesses attempt to attenuate and mitigate accidents by implementing
stringent processes and practices to minimize the risk and maximize the reliability of
their integrated systems (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991; Rijpma, 1997). Organizational
financial systems also contain processes and procedures intended to minimize financial

5
risk and maximize reliable financial reporting (Nobles, Mattison, & Matsumura, 2014;
Wild, 2013).
Despite the implementation of risk management measures intended to achieve the
overarching goal of high levels of system-integrated reliability, human beings can
contribute to the degradation of highly integrated systems, resulting in occasional MMDs
(Pidgeon & O’Leary, 2000; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997). Turner and Pidgeon (1997)
emphasized that despite disasters appearing to be sudden and acute, they often are the
result of human and sociotechnical breakdowns developing during incubation periods, the
passage of time when production appears to occur normally, yet a series of unnoticed or
misunderstood events that conflict with the espoused beliefs of hazard and harm
avoidance are latently culminating into potential disasters.
Risk management has been uniquely discussed in NAT, MMD, and HRO theory.
However, there have been overlapping and related tenets. Empirical discussion of normal
accidents in industries where high-risk technical systems are prevalent has elucidated
organizational characteristics that have contributed to nuclear meltdowns, oil spills, and
aircraft accidents (Perrow, 1999; Qureshi, 2007; Sagan, 1993; Smith-Crowe, Burke, &
Landis, 2003). Risk and crisis management researchers have defined certain HRO
characteristics that have allowed organizations operating in environments laden with
disastrous systemic threats to achieve consistent and reliable execution of their
interdependent systems and processes to run effectively, efficiently, and safely (Flin,
Mearns, O’Connor, & Bryden, 2000; Klein, Bigley, & Roberts, 1995; Rijpma, 1997; K.
H. Roberts, 1990; Weick, 1987; Weick et al., 2008). Researchers of seminal accident
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mitigation have addressed the human factor as applied to human-made physical, tactical,
and technical failures related to the design characteristics of integrated systems (LaPorte
& Consolini, 1991; Perrow, 1999; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997). The risk and crisis
management literature has defined organizational characteristics such as structure,
decision making, management, communication, and culture as contributors to effective
HROs (Flin et al., 2000; Klein et al., 1995; K. H. Roberts, 1990; Weick et al., 2008). In a
meta-analysis of HRO research, Lekka (2011) summarized six overarching human factor
characteristics that influence effective HRO operations: containment of unexpected
events, problem anticipation, learning orientation, just culture, and mindful leadership.
Although the aforementioned high-reliability tenets were founded in studies of
traditional HROs from high-risk industries, such unexpected event management
knowledge is valuable and should be transferred to other non-HROs to cope with current
volatile business conditions (Waller & Roberts, 2003). The characteristics of reliable
system performance described in studies of high-risk industries generated other studies
applying HRO characteristics to risk mitigation in a broader set of organizations
operating under prosaic conditions (Ramanujam & Goodman, 2003; Vogus &
Welbourne, 2003). The health care literature has included several studies applying HRO
prevention tenets to risk mitigation in patient care (Bagnara, Parlangeli, & Tartaglia,
2010; Baker, Day, & Salas, 2006; Pronovost et al., 2006).
There also has been research to improve education and increase teaching
outcomes through HRO concepts (Bellamy, Crawford, Marshall, & Coulter, 2005;
Stringfield, Reynolds, & Schaffer, 2008). In addition, researchers have considered HRO
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features to mitigate pecuniary risk resulting from economic, market, and financial
uncertainties (Lo, 2009; K. H. Roberts & Libuser, 1993). Regarding the last listed HRO
application, Perrow (1999) noted increased of global commerce, market sophistication,
and rapid trading have led to greater complexity of interactions and increased dependent
tightened coupling in financial systems, making them vulnerable to interruptions and
imminent catastrophes.
COSO (2004) engaged PriceWaterhouse Coopers (PwC) to study the causal
factors leading to fraudulent financial reporting, which led to the production of the ERM
integrated framework. ERM is a comprehensive approach to managing risk in
organizations by aligning risk appetite and strategy; enhancing risk response decisions;
and reducing operational surprises and losses while integrating communication,
teamwork, and leadership (COSO, 2004; Gifun & Karydas, 2010). Beasley, Clune, and
Hermanson (2005) investigated the reasons only some organizations adopt ERM, which
provided a foundation for further ERM use research. Gifun and Karydas (2010), in their
study of integrating ERM with other organizational models, created a variation on HROs
called the high-reliability resilient organization, which provided a model for integrating
ERM as an attribute of high reliability in complex systems. The ERM framework affects
every aspect of a business and requires the full participation and engagement of every
person in the organization to ensure successful and effective implementation (COSO,
2004).
As discussed previously, HRO theory outlines various constructs that contribute
to reliable and safe operations, such as collective mindfulness, reluctance to simplify,
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culture, sensitivity to operations, and resilience (Lekka, 2011). Despite empirical
evidence showing that all employees must own responsibility for some aspect of ERM to
mitigate accidents (Arena, Arnaboldi, & Azzone, 2011; COSO, 2004), there has been a
gap in the organizational literature addressing the psychological constructs required to
mitigate financial disasters proactively that can cause significant harm to stakeholders
resulting from disruptions in highly integrated financial management and reporting
systems.
The literature has contained studies addressing the psychological factors of extant
financial crises and disasters but has not offered psychological concepts for mitigating
future financial crises and disasters resulting from unreliable financial reporting. For
example, Power (2009), in studying the financial crises of 2006 to 2008, addressed the
intellectual failure of control-based ERM systems to manage the entrepreneurial and risktaking characteristics of individuals. Lo (2009) addressed the inattention to the effect of
“hardwired” specific neurocognitive human behaviors as a contributing factor to
economic failure. Power and Lo offer different lenses regarding the influence of human
factors in financial crises, but neither of them offered evidence on ways to integrate
human factors with successful ERM in financial reporting systems effectively.
Furthermore, Argote and Miron-Spektor (2011) discussed the importance of
learning from rare events, including those that result in financial disasters, but they did
not specifically address how said learning could influence financial systems. In her call
for practical business communication research to better prepare students for ethical
business decision making, Jameson (2009) credited a series of communication failures as
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contributing to the financial disasters and the resulting negative global effects of the 2008
era, but she also did not offer a specific human-oriented solution. Ostas (2007) posited
that motivation and moral saliency are factors of executive fraud involving
embezzlement, financial reporting, insider trading, and larceny, and charged
“gatekeepers” (p. 597) for failing to protect investors from negative factors. Although
Ostas tied incentive motivation and rewards to the promulgation of financial fraud, he did
not offer a methodology for correction.
Current HRO theory literature contains research regarding HRO characteristics
such as learning, decision making, communication, and reward incentives, all of which
are integral to preventing accidents in nonfinancial, technologically complex, and highly
integrated systems (Lekka, 2011; Rijpma, 1997; K. H. Roberts, 1990; Schulman, 1993;
Weick et al., 2008). Gifun and Karydas (2010) provided research supporting the
integration of ERM in HROs, and the risk management literature has outlined the need
for comprehensive human resource engagement to implement the ERM framework
successfully (COSO, 2004; Lo, 2009; Power, 2009). More research is necessary to
investigate the psychological factors of ERM in HROs to address the failures in financial
reporting and management systems so that innocent third-party stakeholders are less
likely to suffer from fiscal risk-harm (Finkelstein, 2003).
Problem Statement
Fraudulent financial reporting and fiscal management practices caused risk-harm
to thousands of stakeholders and innocent third parties when Enron could not continue its
masquerade as a stock market leader (McLean & Elkind, 2004). Thousands of employees
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who invested their retirement savings wisely in the future of their company were
deceived by the fraudulent reporting of the company’s financial state of affairs, resulting
in thousands of employees losing their life savings. This case offered compelling
evidence that regulatory statutory constraints (i.e. auditing standards, security exchange
regulations, internal control mandates) alone failed to mitigate financial disaster. HROs
operate reliably and safely, despite the high propensity of accident risk harm (Lekka,
2011; Perrow, 1999; Rijpma, 1997; K. H. Roberts, 1990; Sagan, 1993; Schulman, 1993;
Weick et al., 2008), and human resources are integral factors in managing risk exposure
(Arena et al., 2011; Christian, Bradley, Wallace, & Burke, 2009; COSO, 2004).
Waller and Roberts (2003) pointed out that despite the specific contexts of their
operational environments, “HROs possess valuable transferable knowledge for non-HRO
organizations to minimize unexpected events” (p. 814). Although attempts are being
made to apply HRO constructs to other prosaic organizations, research is needed
regarding the applicability of HRO constructs in other organizations with profit motives;
market constraints; and volatile, or “messy,” environments (Lekka, 2011). Therefore, it
was reasonable to address the gap in the literature by defining the psychological factors
contributing to organizational ERM effectiveness in HROs as they apply to
organizational financial responsibility in an attempt to reduce negative financial
outcomes resulting from damaging disruptions in financial reporting and fiscal
management systems (Martinez-Moyano, McCaffrey, & Oliva, 2013).
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Purpose of the Study
Some industries not traditionally defined as HROs have found it useful to apply
high-reliability tenets to enhance the effectiveness of their operations (Bagnara et al.,
2010; Baker et al., 2006; Bellamy et al., 2005; Pronovost et al., 2006; Ramanujam &
Goodman, 2003; Stringfield et al., 2008; Vogus & Welbourne, 2003); however, to date,
researchers of organizational psychology have paid little attention to learning about the
ways in which the HRO constructs of ERM can promote organizational financial
responsibility (Libuser, 1994; Müssig, 2009; K. H. Roberts & Libuser, 1993). The
purpose of this qualitative, grounded theory study was to use HRO constructs as a frame
to identify and define the psychological factors of ERM effectiveness in organizational
financial reporting responsibility. The intention of this study was to establish a
foundation that could provide the leadership of organizations not traditionally defined as
HROs with the information necessary to promote effective financial risk-harm
management through ERM.
Research Questions
Three research questions (RQs) were designed to address the gap in the literature:
1. What HRO constructs applied in ERM are present in reliable financial
reporting?
2. How can HRO constructs applied in ERM minimize organizational
stakeholder financial risk-harm?
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3. How can HRO constructs applied in ERM inform other organizations to
motivate leadership and employees to promote fiscal fiduciary responsibility
while maximizing profitability?
Theoretical Framework
Studies of financial crises have used variants of NAT, HRO, MMDs, and
enterprise management theoretical constructs to frame the research (Calandro, 2012; J.
Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, & Wright, 2017; Jameson, 2009; Lo, 2009; Martinez-Moyano et
al., 2013; Müssig, 2009; Perrow, 2010; Power, 2005, 2009; Webel, 2010); therefore, it
was appropriate to ground a study defining the psychological constructs of organizational
financial responsibility with the same theories. As stated previously, an accident, as
defined by NAT, is a failure in one component of the system that causes disruption in the
interaction with another component, resulting in a disruption, or discontinuation, of
organizational output (Perrow, 1999).
Perrow (1999) discussed the inevitability of normal or systematic accidents in
organizations whose systems are interactively complex and tightly coupled. The
interaction can be linear (expected or planned) or complex (unexpected or unplanned),
the nature of which dictates the remedy and reaction to a disruption in order to avert a
catastrophic accident. Whereas other safety literature has been notably concerned with
the safety of first- or second-party victims such as operators and other personnel subject
to the system, NAT is primarily concerned with the safety of third- and fourth-party
victims such as innocent bystanders and future generations (Perrow, 1999). NAT
approaches ERM from an almost pessimistic perspective that accidents in high-risk,
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complexly interactive, and tightly coupled organizations are inevitable (Perrow, 1999).
With no slack for trial and error, these types of organizations implement ERM by
understanding the factors that influence their systemic interactions and anticipate, plan,
and account for any disruptions as a coping mechanism to reduce accidents (K. H.
Roberts, 1990; Weick, 1987).
HRO theory (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991) outlines the characteristics for coping
with the NAT factors inherent in complex organizations to promote reliability in effective
system interaction. HROs possess the potential for hazard, risk, or error that could affect
others egregiously, yet they implement and operate within an HRO theory framework of
nearly no failure (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991; Rijpma, 1997; K. H. Roberts, 1990).
Because HROs operate within a normal accident nontolerant environment, a robust ERM
framework is required to minimize risk, error, and hazard (K. H. Roberts, 1990). Whereas
NAT focuses on the inevitability of accident occurrence due to system operationalization
(Perrow, 1999), HRO theory focuses on the system operationalization of HROs to
promote ERM (Lekka, 2011).
Some characteristics of HROs are redundancy, operational procedure and policy
adherence, safety protocol culture, and unique hierarchal decision-making strategies (K.
H. Roberts, 1990). HROs often implement a comprehensive approach to manage risk
such as ERM in an effort to optimize system operation while promoting reliability
(Beasley et al., 2005; COSO, 2004). Literature on risk and crisis management has
identified the leading indicators of reliability as culture, communication, leadership, and
processes and activities that are integral in managing accidents (Flin et al., 2000).
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Although ERM is integral in promoting reliability, a robust risk management system, if
not monitored and adjusted regularly, can contribute to a culture of complacency by
personnel believing that the rules, processes, and compliance measures in place will
anticipate and manage every contingency (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991). HRO theory and
ERM as related to normal accidents align with the concept of defining the organizational
psychology factors of HRO effectiveness to minimize financial risk-harm to others while
maximizing organizational effectiveness and consequential success.
Nature of the Study
The aim of this grounded theory, qualitative study was to identify and define the
psychological factors of ERM effectiveness in organizational financial reporting
responsibility, using HRO and NAT factors as a frame. Because the study wanted to
generate or expand rather than simply test extant theory, a grounded theory methodology
was deemed appropriate for this study (Patton, 2002). Data were collected by
interviewing participants identified using a maximum variation purposeful sampling
strategy (Patton, 2002). This sampling strategy was appropriate to understand a
phenomenon within a certain type of job responsibility (homogeneity) in organizations
with different business purposes (heterogeneity). The sample stratified individuals
involved in the financial environment and the ERM framework of organizations from
different business sectors.
A semistructured interviewing method of inquiry was used to gather information
from the participants, transcribe the interviews, and perform the iterative process of
validating the transcriptions by using member checking and text modifications based on
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participant feedback. To triangulate the data from a deviant case perspective, data were
reviewed and analyzed from the Enron (McLean & Elkind, 2004) financial disaster case
reports to explore possible HRO psychology factors found in the reputable company
cases of this study yet missing in the fiscal systemic interruptions of this failed
organization. Using different strategies of inquiry facilitated triangulation of the data,
which lent support to the emergent themes and phenomenon (Trochim, 2006a). After
completing the transcription process, MS Excel and CAQAS such as NVivo v.11 were
used to elucidate and triangulate the emergent data through coding. Open coding was
used to expose commonalities in the data, axial coding to assemble the commonalities
into categories or groupings as they related to each other, and selective coding to tell the
story of the data and how the data contributed to or expanded extant theory (Creswell,
2013).
Definitions of Terms
The following terms and associated operational definitions were used in this
study:
Enterprise risk management (ERM): A comprehensive framework involving
organization-wide strategic, compliance, reporting, and operational components to
minimize risk while maximizing the opportunity to achieve an entity’s objectives (COSO,
2004).
High-reliability organizations (HROs): Enterprises that continuously and
effectively manage unpredictable factors in risk-laden environments defined by the
integrated technical nature of their operations (K. H. Roberts, 1990; Weick et al., 2008).
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Man-made disasters (MMDs): The prohibition of disaster foresight and an
increase in vulnerability that occur when there is a discordant existence between
espoused organizational safety measures and the reality of precautionary norms,
assumptions, beliefs, and values of the organizational actors (Pidgeon, 1997; Pidgeon &
O’Leary, 2000; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997).
Normal accident theory (NAT): The belief that organizations defined by highly
integrated and deeply interdependent systems are vulnerable to disasters caused by active
system failures exacerbated by discreet social organizational interactions (Perrow, 1999).
Perrow (1999) further defined the following ordinary terms in the context of
organizational accidents:
Accident: Involves a reasonably substantial and serious failure of a subsystem that
damages more than one unit and, in doing so, disrupts the ongoing or future
output of an entire defined system.
Catastrophe: Large-scale systemic accident that can cause extensive damage to
unwitting bystanders not involved in the system.
Coupling: The connective reaction of what happens in one organizational system
affects what happens in another.
Disruption: An occasion that causes the output in a subsystem or system to cease,
causing a correction or repair to the system.
Incident: Involves a failure of a subsystem or system that causes limited damage
to related parts or a unit, but does not damage the entire system.
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Interaction: The relationship of interdependent systems in relationship to linear or
complex functionality.
Subsystem: Integration of the various units of organizations that create the third
level of a system.
System: Interactive functioning of subsystems to produce the desired output.
Unit: The functional compilation of parts of the second level of a system.
Organizational culture: The learned norms, values, assumptions, and beliefs of
organizational actors that shape the paradigm in which organizations operate (Schein,
1984).
Risk appetite: The assessed risk allowed to be taken by an organization within the
purview of specific reporting and compliance measurements to promote its strategic and
operation position (COSO, 2004).
Risk harm: The notion in contrast to risk appetite that exposure to risk can cause a
setback to an individual’s welfare, thus causing them harm (Finkelstein, 2003).
Assumptions
The ontological assumption of this study was that HRO psychological constructs
exist and are identifiable and definable. I assumed that I could locate and secure an
adequate sample of qualified participants to interview and that they would be
forthcoming, truthful, and honest about their observations, experiences, and activities. I
also assumed that the participants chosen via purposeful sampling of the homogeneous
population of organizations that were fiscally responsible and sustainable actually sought
and promoted reliability. Considering the epistemological concerns with generalizing
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qualitative findings (Patton, 2002), the overarching assumption was that HRO
psychological constructs were transferrable to financial reporting risk management
systems.
Scope and Delimitations
Researchers have used the efficient, safe, and dependable operations exhibited by
HROs as a foundation to investigate the applicability of HRO factors to other reliabilityseeking organizations (K. H. Roberts, 1990; Sammarco, 2005; Vogus & Welbourne,
2003). The scope of this study was to use NAT factors and HRO constructs in an ERM
framework to understand organizational financial responsibility and reporting. A
delimiting factor was the choice of participants.
Grounded theorists seek a homogeneous sample (Creswell, 2013) because the
credibility of qualitative inquiry relies upon data elucidated from information-rich cases
(Patton, 2002). Yet, Patton (2002) asserted that the lack of heterogeneity also might limit
the transferability of the findings across groups. To address this concern, the target
population included individuals involved in the financial and fiscal risk management
systems in organizations with varied business purposes.
Limitations
The key instrument for capturing the data in qualitative inquiry is the researcher;
therefore, the credibility of qualitative findings can be negated if the researcher’s biases
and variety of reactivity and reflexivity are not effectively managed (Creswell, 2013;
Patton, 2002; Trochim, 2006a, 2006b). My experience as a Maryland certified public
accountant (CPA) lent credibility to my ability to mine and analyze the data from a
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financial perspective. However, this professional status also might have created
limitations such as the presumption that the individuals involved in financial reporting are
subject to and abide by the overarching professional standards. This presumption might
not have allowed me to be open to emerging trends and themes involving HRO
psychological constructs in actors responsible for the overall financial health of their
respective organizations. Furthermore, any possible professional association or
relationship that I might have had with any of the participants could have led to the halo
effect (Patton, 2002), meaning that the participants might not have provided truthful
information in order to present them and their organizations in a more positive light.
Outside of the halo effect, some participants simply might not have been
forthcoming by nature and that despite the assurances of confidentiality and participant
protection, they might not have been willing to disclose actions performed that were in
conflict with responsible financial reporting. A limitation also existed because of the
possible inability to obtain sample organizations within the industry specifications
outlined in the sampling strategy. I tried to stratify the sample within the organizations by
obtaining employees from various levels of the corporate hierarchy (i.e. a member of the
C-suite, manager, and staff), so the data came from various perspectives. Limitations are
discussed in more depth in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5.
Significance of the Study
Reducing the disruptive financial occurrences decreases negative environmental
and situational impacts on human beings and on the future profits of local and global
organizations. To achieve this goal, not all businesses warrant the robust ERM
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requirements evident in traditionally defined HROs, such as redundancy, safety
protocols, and hierarchal decision-making structures (K. H. Roberts, 1990) because they
have different purposes, processes, and operations. However, all businesses require
employee commitment to operationalize reliable systems and processes. Employee
engagement embodies the involvement, commitment, and passion by which employees
work (Macey & Schneider, 2008) and is meaningful to system outcomes (Harter,
Schmidt, & Hayes, 2002), regardless of the organizational purpose. Classifying,
categorizing, and defining HRO psychological factors with respect to reducing return on
investment losses as applied to financial reporting and fiscal responsibility will contribute
to the global good by providing a framework that organizations can use to optimize
human capital investment and organizational effectiveness while minimizing risk harm to
stakeholders’ physical, financial, and emotional security, and to the larger social
economy.
Summary and Transition
When a system disruption or failure occurs in the integrated and synchronized
system of an organization, disaster can happen, and stakeholders and innocent third
parties can suffer. The level of negative effect is dependent upon the degree of integrated
system interaction and coupling; human interaction with the systems; existence and
implementation of an effective ERM framework; and ability to operate at a high level of
reliability, despite the chance of normal accidents occurring from disruptions in their
technically integrated systems (COSO, 2004; Perrow, 1999; K. H. Roberts, 1990; Sagan,
1993; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997). The quest for high reliability as a contributor to positive
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outcomes with minimal risk harm has been the basis for application of HRO
characteristics in other less technical, nonnormal accident, prosaic business settings
(Bagnara et al., 2010; Baker et al., 2006; Bellamy et al., 2005; Pronovost et al., 2006;
Stringfield et al., 2008).
Scientific literature has been thin regarding the application of HRO constructs to
define the psychological factors of reliable financial reporting and fiscal management. I
conducted this qualitative, grounded theory study using NAT factors and HRO constructs
to identify and define the psychological factors of ERM effectiveness in responsible
organizational financial reporting. The results of the study will assist organizations and
their leaders to operationalize the human psychological factors that encourage and
promote financial reporting reliability to minimize stakeholder financial risk harm while
maximizing the triple bottom line (Aguinis & Glavas, 2012) of organizational
performance.
Chapter 2 provides an overview of integrated financial reporting and management
systems. It then provides an in-depth literature review focused on disaster factors, risk
management, and HRO research related to the applicable psychological factors of
responsible financial reporting. NAT and supporting socio-organizational tenets
regarding how disruption in one component of highly integrated financial accounting and
management subsystems can affect other systems, resulting in catastrophic financial
outcomes. The ERM concept is then presented and tied into managing the financial risk
harm of unsuspecting third parties. Then HRO theory and supporting tenets are explained
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in relation to their use as a frame to define the psychological factors applicable to
effective ERM in promoting reliable financial reporting.
Chapter 3 presents the research methodology. Outlined are the research design
and rationale, my role as the researcher, instrumentation, data collection, and qualitative
analyses. Also discussed are participant matters such as selection, recruitment, and ethical
treatment. Chapter 3 also includes a discussion of the importance of trustworthiness and
the protection of human research subjects.
Chapter 4 provides a summary of the data gathered from the participants in
reputable responsible financial reporting systems. The influencing human factors of
responsible financial reporting systems are revealed by showing how the data were
organized and analyzed from the initial core category to subcategories, and how the data
within the subcategories were applied to the RQs. I present the data in tables, figures, and
narratives using quotations from the participants and juxtaposed examples from the
discrepant Enron (McLean & Elkind, 2004) case to support the thematic trends.
In Chapter 5, I explain how the data relate to HRO and ERM theory, and I provide
a human-related theoretical model for organizations to promote the accurate and reliable
reporting of entity financial activity in ways that mitigate risk-harm to third-party
stakeholders. Chapter 5 also contains information about the delimitations, limitations,
opportunities for further research, and the social implications of the findings.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
Professional accounting regulatory standards and statutes exist to protect the
individuals who rely on organizational financial statements (American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants [AICPA], 2013), yet the occurrence of large-scale financial
fraud cases (Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, & Neal, 2010) has indicated that rules and
regulations alone are not sufficient to mitigate fraudulent financial reporting and
irresponsible fiscal management (Ball, 2009). The literature on risk and crisis
management has defined certain characteristics of operations, leadership, risk
management, and culture as contributors to effective HROs (Flin et al., 2000; Klein et al.,
1995; K. H. Roberts, 1990; Weick et al., 2008). Other ordinary industries outside the
purview of large physical disasters have applied HRO tenets to promote reliable
operations (Bagnara et al., 2010; Baker et al., 2006; Bellamy et al., 2005; Pronovost et
al., 2006; Ramanujam & Goodman, 2003; Stringfield et al., 2008; Vogus & Welbourne,
2003), yet to date, literature on organizational psychology pertaining to the HRO
constructs of ERM in organizational financial responsibility has been minimal (Libuser,
1994; Müssig, 2009; K. H. Roberts & Libuser, 1993). The purpose of this grounded
theory study was to use NAT factors and HRO constructs as a frame to identify the
psychological factors of ERM in responsible organizational financial reporting.
This chapter first provides an overview of financial system integration and then
continues with a synthesis of relevant accident, risk, and HRO literature pertaining to
disaster factors of financial catastrophes, management of risk to mitigate stakeholder risk-
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harm, and HRO constructs to frame this study of psychological factors in responsible
financial reporting. Perrow’s NAT (1999), the focus for discussing disaster factors, was
supported by related discussions in human and latent errors, MMDs, near misses, and
production pressures. The literature on ERM (COSO, 2004) has supported the theoretical
basis for financial risk-harm mitigation, and the literature on HRO (Rijpma, 1997) has
provided the theoretical support for the study’s inductive inquiry into the psychological
factors of responsible organizational financial reporting.
Literature Search Strategy
I located peer-reviewed journal articles using Google Scholar and expanded my
resources by contemporaneously searching Walden University’s research database
subscription via the library link in Google Scholar. I also used the private source
databases with free access available through Google Scholar and professional websites.
The literature came from databases such as EBSCOhost, ERIC, ProQuest,
PsycARTICLES, PsycBOOKS, PsycINFO, SAGEjournals, ScienceDirect, AMLStores,
CRPIT, and InformsPubsOnLine. Bibliographies of particularly informative articles or
meta-analyses provided further reference sources. In addition, clicking the “Related
articles” link in Google Scholar located the title of salient theoretical articles that
provided an alternative stream of literature.
I used combinations and derivations of the following search terms: high
reliability, high-reliability organization, HRO, financial, finance, fiscal, accounting,
systems, normal accident, risk, risk management, enterprise risk management,
catastrophe, debacle, and disaster. Initially, to ensure the capture of seminal research on
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the topic of this study, I did not use date limiters. However, to locate current literature, I
used the “Since 2011” time parameter located in Google Scholar.
The search strategy returned substantive literature on HRO theory and
organizations, NAT, and ERM. The largest return came from the term high reliability,
with 3,240,000 results. The search for normal accident resulted in 2,100,000 hits. There
was an overlap in the literature on HROs and NAT because of the relative nature of the
constructs (Klein et al., 1995; Lekka, 2011; Leveson et al., 2009; K. H. Roberts, 1990; K.
H. Roberts & Bea, 2001; Vogus & Welbourne, 2003; Weick, 2004). A search using
enterprise risk management as the search term produced 1,810,000 results. I used
quotation marks as Boolean phrase search limiters, “enterprise risk management,” which
narrowed the results to 21,600. Because ERM has many industry applications, I used the
Boolean nesting search parameters (high reliability), and (WebFinance) to narrow the
results to fit the scope of this study. The search produced a substantial amount of
scholarly information to ground this study in theory.
Financial Systems Overview
The theoretical framework grounding this study centered on error-free-related
system integration and effective risk management to produce reliable and sustained
organizational operations. Because the study was an attempt to define these theoretical
constructs as they applied to organizational financial responsibility, following is a
rudimentary overview of the systemic nature of financial reporting and fiscal
management.
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Accounting System
An accounting system is predicated on the need to identify, record, and culminate
the transactions of businesses and communicate their effects to organizational
stakeholders (Wild, 2013). Bookkeepers in the transaction processing system document
the minutiae of the transactions of businesses in monetary units using a double-entry
method of accounting (Nobles et al., 2014; Wild, 2013). Every transaction is balanced
between at least two accounts by debiting one account and crediting another. The choice
of accounts and the decision to debit or credit is determined by the nature of the
transaction and the natural balance of the account according to its position in the financial
statements (Nobles et al., 2014). The listing of the accounts available for use is referred to
as the chart of accounts. When operationalized with entries specific to a unit of business,
the list of accounts becomes the general ledger (GL), which is an organization’s main
transactional recording system. Generally, small business owners or their accountants
post company transactions directly to the GL. However, because this study was
concerned with mitigating failures in a financial reporting and management system, this
discussion includes a simplified explanation of how large public organizations
matriculate transactions to the GL using a more complex subsidiary ledger system.
Subsidiary Account System
Organizations with voluminous, complex, or multistep transactions use subsidiary
reporting systems called subledgers to record voluminous amounts of related
transactions. Examples of common subledgers are cash, accounts receivable (AR),
accounts payable (AP), inventory, job costs, and payroll ledgers. Examples of subledgers
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containing fewer day-to-day operational items are those that record capital expenditures
for property, plant, and equipment (fixed assets), or financing transactions such as funds
borrowed and loaned. The depth and structural sophistication of the subsidiary system
depends on the volume and type or nature of the transactions.
For this overview, the following is a simplistic example of how subsidiary ledger
systems integrate with the overarching GL reporting system. Transactions in the AR
subsidiary ledger of a large retailer with stores all over the United States might include
the combined results of several regional AR subledgers. The regional AR ledgers reflect
the AR activity of the various stores located in the region. The individual stores in the
region populate their AR ledgers with the subsidiary ledger data from the various
departmental AR systems. Each department’s subsidiary ledger reflects the minutiae of
customer transaction data relating to sales, order fulfillment, payments, returns, credits,
and write-offs (Nobles et al., 2014). The transactional entries in each subsystem are
periodically reconciled and summarized, and the results are posted to the preceding
organizational level’s subsidiary. The culmination of the subledger entries is posted to the
GL control account with the same name (i.e. AR, AP, Fixed Assets, etc.).
Offering a comprehensive education regarding the effects of the detailed
interactions among the separate subledgers on the various GL accounts was beyond the
scope of this overview. The previous example was used only to demonstrate the
interaction and coupling (Perrow, 1999) nature of financial reporting systems. Accurate
management and recordation of voluminous segmented transactional minutiae within
each subsidiary affects the interactive integrity of subsidiary ledger systems, which has a
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direct effect on the integrity of the GL and the validity of the compiled financial
information. A failure in one component of the financial reporting system can affect the
entire system.
Financial Reporting System
The accountants prepare a periodic comprehensive report called a trial balance,
which lists the initial ending balances of all the GL accounts. This report is the first pass
at making certain that the books balance, that is, the aggregate debit entries equal the
aggregate credit entries. The accountants analyze the accounts and, if necessary, make
appropriate adjustments, such as accruals. When the accountants are satisfied with the
account balances, they compile the data into informational reports called financial
statements (Wild, 2013).
The financial statements, which generally include a balance sheet, income
statement, statement of cash flows, and statement of owner’s equity, are used to inform
internal users such as management and leadership, and external users such as banks and
investors about the economic viability of the company (Nobles et al., 2014; Wild, 2013).
Management reviews the statements and determines whether the information accurately
represents the financial condition of the company. If deemed necessary, further
adjustments to the journal entries are made, and the books are closed. When the books are
closed, no changes can be made without approval. Management disseminates the
financial statements to interested stakeholders as required by loan covenants, reporting
standards, or investor relation needs. The financial reporting system provides a means of
communicating information regarding the financial condition of the company to internal
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and external users. The accuracy of these statements is imperative because ratios such as
debt equity, earnings per share, and net leverage are used to make integral business
decisions.
Quality and Risk Control Systems
Users depend upon the integrity of an organization’s financial reporting system to
portray the financial condition of the business accurately. An organization’s financial
quality and risk control systems contain internal and external control mechanisms
designed to protect users from risk-harm resulting from misrepresentation of an
organization’s financial position (Nobles et al., 2014). Individuals and processes within
the organization execute internal control systems. COSO (2013) developed the internal
control-integrated framework to assist organizations in developing applicable internal
control principles to ensure stakeholder confidence in the entity’s ability to achieve
operational, reporting, and compliance goals within the business’s economic and
operating environment. Internal control principles provide a guideline by which
organizations “establish responsibilities, maintain accurate records, insure assets and
bond key employees, separate record keeping responsibilities from asset custody, divide
responsibility and related transactions, apply technological controls, and perform regular
and independent reviews” (Wild, 2013, p. 259).
Individuals outside of the organization perform the functions and processes of an
external control system. External control systems were designed to protect users of the
organization’s financial information by engaging qualified auditors who are independent
from the company to evaluate and opine on the company’s internal controls, reporting
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processes, and financial condition. If the auditors conclude that there are breaches in the
internal controls or that the financial statements do not fairly represent the financial
condition of the company, professional ethical and regulatory standards require them to
disclose this opinion to the public in an auditor’s report (AICPA, 2014). When the
internal and external control systems are compromised, the risk of financial disaster
increases.
Failures in the internal and external control systems in the Enron (McLean &
Elkind, 2004), and other renowned financial reporting scandals of the time, prodded the
U.S. Congress to enact the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX; Civic Impulse, 2015),
which established statutes holding the management of publicly traded companies
responsible for maintaining, documenting, and certifying a robust system of internal
controls (Nobles et al., 2014; Wild, 2013). SOX addressed external control breaches
stemming from the lack of independence by restricting the types of consulting services
that an audit firm can provide to a company while performing its independent audit and
by limiting the number of years that an accountant can lead an audit to no more than 7
years without a 2-year break (Wild, 2013). Furthermore, SOX provisions outlined harsh
penalties on individuals and committees responsible for audit and financial reporting
activities for not adhering to strict independence, disclosure, governance, and
transparency requirements (Ernst & Young LLP, 2012). Congress also established the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (2015) to oversee the work of independent
auditors (Cullinan, 2004; Nobles et al., 2014; Wild, 2013).
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Summary
The reliable interaction of an organization’s accounting, financial reporting, and
control systems is key to generating accurate and dependable information regarding the
financial condition of a company. Just as disruptions in complex, integrated, tangible
systems create the potential for physical catastrophes (Perrow, 1999), interruptions in
complex organizational financial systems can result in a distorted view of the company’s
economic outlook, which provides a platform for fiscal disaster (Calandro, 2012).
Internal and external control systems use risk management processes and procedures to
expose, correct, and mitigate financial systemic disruptions to protect stakeholders, the
public, and the larger economy from the effects of catastrophic financial meltdowns. Just
as habitual disregard for harm avoidance measures can incubate and precipitate physical
disasters (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997), financial control system failures permit erroneous,
negligent, and fraudulent acts to evolve into egregious financial disasters (Calandro,
2012; Perrow, 2010).
Disaster Factors, Management of Risk, and High-Reliability Organizations
The theoretical tenets of this study were distinctly independent yet interrelated.
Perrow (1999) stated that although seemingly contradictory, HRO theory and NAT
inform one another. Sagan (1993) used both theories to analyze risk management in the
context of near misses in the U.S. nuclear weaponry sector. In the analysis of MMDs,
Turner and Pidgeon (1997) listed NAT and HRO theory as complementary theoretical
frameworks. Finally, because risk is an integral factor in understanding and preventing
disasters, the literature on NAT, HRO theory, and MMDs has addressed ERM in some
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manner. This theoretical tapestry, coupled with underlying constructs, made organizing
and arranging the unique constructs logical and methodical (C. M. Roberts, 2010).
Therefore, the theories were addressed as they related to disaster factors, management of
risk, and promotion of reliability.
Disaster Factors
Normal accident theory. Perrow (2004, 2010) widened the scope of high-risk
technical disaster research from a single-component failure approach and examined
discreet failures in social organizational system interactions as the cause of accidents.
Perrow (1999) maintained that the nature of the interactions among interdependent
organizational systems dictates the propensity for accidents and the inevitability of
disasters, which is the premise of NAT. In a normal accident environment, organizational
system interactions can range from complex, where heterogeneous, independent systems
integrate in no predetermined sequential time or relationship to produce a desired
organizational outcome, to linear, sequentially arranged systemic integration, where the
outcome of one system is time dependent upon and directly related to the outcome of
another (Perrow, 1999). The degree of integration or dependency, whether complex or
linear, is coupling (Perrow, 1999). K. H. Roberts (1990) pointed out that coupling is not
an indication of the number of interactions, but the brittleness and reactivity of the
systemic connection.
A loosely coupled organization has equifinality, which is the idea that integrated
systems can possess their own logical functions and interests yet integrate with other
systems to achieve the desired collective outcome (Von Bertalanffy, 1972). Room for
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trial and error, or slack as Perrow (1999) referred to it, cushions the effect of disruptions
in these independent systems, limiting intense negative reverberations throughout the
organization. A tightly coupled organization is one in which the systems are so intricately
integrated that there is little or no time to react to a system disruption or failure. In the
absence of immediate and effective remedial actions, reactions to unanticipated failures
in a tightly coupled system can emerge as the source of a critical accident (Perrow, 2010).
Perrow (1999) developed the 2 X 2 interaction coupling chart, shown previously in
Chapter 1, to classify organizations according to the blend of linear-complex interaction
and tight-loose coupling.
Accident investigations tend to begin with operator error as the cause of
catastrophic accidents in error-inducing systems (Reason, 1997), but NAT provides a
platform for looking beyond the operator to the organizational characteristics that
contribute to faulty systemic interactions for the cause (Perrow, 2010; Sagan, 1993).
Reason (1997) observed that on-the-job investigative approaches and accident research
findings have an inverse relationship. Investigators first look to the person or team
members who performed the unsafe act, then to the local workplace setting, and then to
the organizational factors to determine accident causes. Conversely, the literature on
accident research has shown that organizational factors influence local workplace
performance, which allows unsafe acts to occur. Although researchers have found NAT’s
subjectively plotted interaction/coupling categorization inadequate for detailed accident
cause analysis (Leveson et al., 2009; Sagan, 1993; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997), assigning an
accident like the Columbia shuttle explosion to a cell in the 2 X 2 interactive coupling
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framework initiates a systemic dissection of the accident from a socio-organizational lens
rather than from a purely component or active failure perspective (Weick, 2004). Lo
(2009) maintained that the intricate credit, legal, accounting, regulatory, and liquidity
relationships in financial systems fit the complexity and coupling criterion that defines
financial crises as normal accidents. Research has indicated that HRO characteristics such
as redundancies and organizational learning (Lekka, 2011; K. H. Roberts & Bea, 2001;
Weick et al., 2008) can increase interaction complexity and tighten coupling, both of
which are factors of NAT (Perrow, 1999; Sagan, 1993).
Human error. Human beings are integral to successful system integration, so it is
only reasonable that individual human error can be blamed as the initial cause of
organizational disasters (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997). Perhaps a reason for “blaming
individuals is [that] it is emotionally more satisfying than targeting institutions” (Reason,
2000, p. 768). However, Reason (2000) suggested that there are two worldviews of
human error, namely, the person approach and the system approach, to address accident
prevention. The person approach is a traditional view that accidents are caused by unsafe
acts of individuals such as forgetfulness, inattention, poor motivation, carelessness,
negligence, and recklessness. The system approach assumes that because human beings
make mistakes, organizations account for this assumption during system development
and evaluation to ameliorate the effects of human mistakes (Reason, 2000).
Perrow (1999, 2010) addressed the individual effect by cautioning that the agentic
factor not be overlooked when individual decisions influence system failure in financial
crises. Rochlin (1999) supported the importance of agent actions and judgments at every
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level of the safety process in securing a safe climate. In his effort to design control and
safety systems for hazardous industrial process plants, Rasmussen (1997) found that an
initial investigation of human-machine interaction led to a comprehensive top-down
systemic analysis, which included contemplation of decision-making mechanics, the
reporting culture, regulation, legislation, and the adaptation of humans to dynamic
changes in the sociotechnical system. The computerized stock-trading system debacle of
1987 was an example of how society’s attempt to control human task error and
promulgate safe operations by rules and regulations worked in a stable environment, but
when dynamic changes in technology increased integration and coupling, social and
behavioral factors became critical in maintaining a safe environment (Rasmussen, 1997).
Individual errors often are recurrent and allowed to perpetuate because of system
weaknesses; therefore, documenting and analyzing accidents from a personal task
analysis perspective is key to locating certain systemic dysfunctions; however, securing
total safe and reliable operations exceeds the simple decomposition of individual task
performance and mandated rules and regulations (Rasmussen, 1997; Reason, 2000). This
tenet was evident in the “tsunami of accounting scandals” (Ball, 2009, p. 277) from the
turn of the millennium, with Enron being one of the more notorious cases.
Accounting and governmental sectors responded to the financial crises of the time
with further regulation in the form of SOX in 2002 (COSO, 2004). The subsequent
Lehman Brothers banking scandal (Valukas, 2010) prompted Congress to enact the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Webel, 2010), and the
Madoff Ponzi scheme (Markopolos, 2010) spurred the Securities and Exchange
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Commission (SEC, 2012) to take “decisive and comprehensive steps to reduce the
chances that such frauds would occur undetected in the future” (p. 1). Cullinan (2004)
maintained that although some SOX provisions might have mitigated risk-harm to third
parties, the act “does not contain provisions designed to enhance intellectual ability and
diligence of auditors to recognize problems” and prevent future fraud (p. 862). Cullinan
posited that the focused reaction of Congress to the symptoms of Enron’s audit process
failure limited the act’s provisions from “engaging in a more serious effort to identify and
treat the underlying disease of a lack of a sense of public duty, and inadequate emphasis
on audit competence in the audit profession’s culture” (p. 862). Even with stricter
standards, mandates, and other regulatory intercessions in place, human acts of financial
fraud still occur (Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2014).
Latent errors. Latent errors are uncorrected organizational deviations. On their
own, they might not result in an accident, but they can develop into or combine with
other latent errors to create system weaknesses (Ramanujam & Goodman, 2003; Reason,
1997). Ramanujam and Goodman (2003 conducted a content analysis of internal audit
reports to investigate the construct validity, antecedents, and adverse consequences of
latent errors in the Barings Bank collapse. They identified the distribution of work,
interdependence upon work activities, and stability of the organizational culture affect the
linkage between latent errors and adverse consequences. When controls such as internal
audits fail to detect latent errors, or when cultural constraints negate appropriate actions,
an external event, even one as unlikely as an earthquake in Japan (Ramanujam &
Goodman, 2003) can trigger an adverse financial consequence.
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Reason (1997) proposed a schema commonly known as the Swiss cheese model
to communicate how active failures and latent risk conditions can result in disasters (see
Figure 2). Simply summarized, the model illustrates that active failures and latent
conditions create holes in otherwise solid planes, or slices, of organizational systemic
defenses. Poor design, gaps in supervision, and weak processes and procedures allow an
accident causal trajectory to pass through a hole in a control layer, and in most cases, a
defensive subsequent solid layer will stop the trajectory, alleviating the chance of disaster
(Reason, 1997). The holes open and close as the organization learns from the failures and
makes corrections. When soft (i.e., training, regulations, learning, etc.) and hard (i.e.,
safety features, alarms, working equipment, etc.) defensive measures are in place and
operational, the adverse effect of a single unsafe act on the system is minimal if existent.
However, in reality, culturally shaped active failures, and latent errors created by poor
executive, regulative, and managerial decision making create various random holes in the
defensive planes. When a failure or a latent error is not recognized or corrected, the hole
does not close, and the chance that subsequent weaknesses will align increases. The
aligned holes eliminate defensive layers, which creates an unobstructed accident
trajectory for an unchecked hazardous event to gain momentum through the organization,
giving way to a catastrophic accident (Reason, 1997).
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Figure 2. Reason’s Swiss cheese model of risk. Reprinted from Managing the Risks of
Organizational Accidents (p. 12), by J. Reason, 1997, Burlington, VT: Ashgate,
Copyright 1997. Reprinted with permission.
The notion of latent conditions and the breakdown of defenses was important to
this study because although purported dubious technical accounting, reporting, and
disclosure measures were seen as the root cause of financial disasters such as Enron
(Jickling, 2002; SEC, 2009), latent conditions such as leadership centered on pecuniary
self-interest and fraudulent decision making cultivated these financial ignominies (Ball,
2009).
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Man-made disasters. Turner (1976) performed a detailed qualitative, grounded
theory analysis of 84 official accident reports logged with the British Government during
1965 through 1975 and developed the MMD model to explain catastrophic events from
the discordant perspective of espoused organizational values and beliefs (i.e., what is
intended) and organizational realties (i.e., what is actual). Most case reports
acknowledged the existence of psychological factors of proximal actors and conditions in
the preaccident phase (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997). However, Turner and Pidgeon (1997)
further found that overarching shared intentions, assumptions, and actions of safety
culture actors embodied an environment prohibiting disaster foresight and increasing
vulnerability.
According to the MMD model, the initial culturally accepted beliefs and
associated precautionary norms as set forth in laws, codes of practice, mores and
folkways provide the platform for Stage I of the sequential events predicating disasters
(Turner, 1976; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997). Stage II, the disaster incubation period (Turner
& Pidgeon, 1997), is the passage of time when discrepant, unnoticed interactions between
culturally accepted beliefs and actions and the potential for real hazard accumulate.
During this stage, intentional or unintentional disregard for information and its
processing, bounded rationale, power-influenced hierarchal decision making,
organizational learning ability, and misdirected assumptions during “business as usual”
allow energies, resources, and manpower to stealthily fester into a culminating negative
event, or as Turner labeled, Stage III of MMDs.
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In Stage IV, organizations absorb the consequences of the incubating chains of
discrepant events, which inform organizations of the inaccuracies of their cultural
assumptions and beliefs. The organizations interpret these data to reform the
organizational norms (Scheytt et al., 2006). The resulting rescue and salvage efforts of
Stage V make ready the way for learning from the events. Operationalizing the newfound
knowledge gained in Stage IV and Stage V by reshaping the organizational cultural to
prevent future disasters occurs in Stage VI (Turner, 1976). The difficulty with
effectuating learning in Stage VI is that the same breadth and depth of cultural
assumptions and norms that allowed the disaster to occur in the first place might skew
inquiry, which could inhibit or prohibit substantive corrective adjustments (Turner &
Pidgeon, 1997). The MMD theory informed this study from the perspective that financial
disasters are not acute, sudden, and unexpected events; rather, they are the resulting
culmination of intentional or unintentional fiscal systemic latent errors.
Near misses. Sagan (1993) grounded his analysis of the U.S. nuclear weapons
industry in NAT and HRO theory. He found that apparent accident-free operations were
not necessarily the result of systems designed to promote reliability, but were fortuitous
actions not credited to a specific preventative protocol. Political in-fighting and deflection
of blame can cause a serious near miss to be overlooked as a sign of an emergent
incubating disaster, meaning that if the near miss is ignored, it might go away (Pidgeon &
O’Leary, 2000; Sagan, 1993). Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) provided an example of such
ignorance when patients expressing concerns were not recognized as opportunities for
learning but were dismissed by staff as “complaints.”
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Sagan (1993) asserted that organizational culture grounded in politics and selfinterest stifled learning from previous near misses. The point of Sagan’s research was that
apparent safe and reliable operations do not dismiss the need for disaster awareness in
highly complex, tightly coupled organizations. The value of individual alertness and
readiness to respond to anomalies and irregularities is critical to averting catastrophes
more than creating additional systems to increase reliability. Sagan’s near-miss research
was used in this study to point out that what might appear to be proper organizational
reporting might not be representative of reality and the underlying developing financial
disasters.
Production pressures. Perrow (1999) argued that the call for efficiencies in
tangible systems to get there faster and do things quicker, better, and cheaper puts undue
pressures on systems and their members to perform in ways that outweigh their social and
moderated capacity for safety. Decisions to improve the cost effectiveness of an
operation increase the chances of causal accident factors to align and result in a tragic
event (Rasmussen, 1997). Organizational “elites” are at fault for putting profits ahead of
safety because they feel insulated from risk. Private gain, power, and self-interests direct
the pressure to perform and are difficult to adjust in the interest of risk management
(Christian et al., 2009; Perrow, 1999; Vaughan, 1990; Weick, 2004).
Production pressures not only impair physical systems but also push financial
systems to produce beyond their intended capacity (Müssig, 2009). The drive for
financial institutions such as banks, brokerage houses, and insurance companies to gain
competitive advantage for finite consumer financial resources promulgated the
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development of innovative investment instruments fraught with financial risk and
potential collapse (Lo, 2009). Financial performance pressures often resolve in the abuse
of earnings management tactics (Lou & Wang, 2011). Earnings management, when used
in a reasonable manner that does not violate federal antifraud statutes (Beasley et al.,
2010) or generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP; Nobles et al., 2014), is a legal
but often questionably ethical, financial reporting tool used to smooth volatile financial
activity via reasonable adjustments to the books (Ball, 2009; Rosenfield, 2000).
However, when used to support share price artificially and as a basis for
executive/managerial remuneration plans, earnings management becomes a manipulation
tool for fraudulent reporting (Ball, 2009; Beasley et al., 2010; Lou & Wang, 2011;
O’Connell, 2004).
When pressures to perform financially outweigh the moral saliency of proper
reporting, executives breach their fiduciary responsibility and commit financial reporting
fraud (Lou & Wang, 2011). Ostas (2007) investigated the determinants of executive fraud
decisions and reported that because fiduciary fiscal infractions were not associated with
physical human harm, executives perceived financial reporting fraud as less immoral than
breaking workplace safety regulations. The need to maintain earnings levels for Wall
Street and executives’ immoral and unethical decision making were at the heart of
Enron’s catastrophic financial system failure (Arnold & De Lange, 2004). Ostas used
Enron to demonstrate how financial systems, including controls, fail when a corporate
culture tolerates executives’ decisions to breach their fiduciary duty to pursue pecuniary
gain rather than exercise moral self-restraint.
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In their discussion of the keys to enhancing reliability in complex organizations,
K. H. Roberts and Bea (2001) iterated the need for aggressive error seeking and
containment mindfulness, and integrated communication outlined by other HRO
theorists, and they added a cost-benefit analysis perspective by pointing out that HROs
address the tension between rewarding efficiency and rewarding reliability. This notion is
important when discussing the reliability of financial reporting because the expense of
accident-avoiding strategies can appear to erode profitability if management’s focus is on
short-term monetary gain. When an organization’s focus is on profit or benefit
sustainability through reliable operations, the apparent erosion of short-term gain from
increased training, maintenance, testing, and other redundant HRO strategies is accepted,
measured, incentivized, and rewarded (K. H. Roberts & Bea, 2001).
Workers often are conflicted by leadership rhetoric regarding organizational goals
for safe and reliable operations while basing rewarding and incentivizing programs on
fiscal performance only. The pressure to produce earnings often outweighs espoused
goals for reliable operations, making K. H. Roberts and Bea’s (2001) point particularly
salient in promoting reliable financial reporting. HROs appreciate and manage the
delicate balance between fiscal and reliable performance by quantifying the cost of
accidents as well as the value of mitigating these costs, continually evaluating reward and
incentive plans, and assessing the alignment of espoused goals with real goals (K. H.
Roberts & Bea, 2001). Vaughan (2009) observed that historic political budgetary
decisions created a collusion of bureaucratic, technical, and cost/schedule/efficiency
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mandates in NASA’s desirable safe culture, transforming it to an environment ripe for
cultivating disaster.
Learning failure. On January 28, 1986, the space shuttle Challenger exploded
only 72 seconds after liftoff (Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger
Accident, 1986). A technical O-ring failure was the component failure of the Challenger
accident, but deep-seated organizational factors such as decision making, organizational
learning, culture, and hierarchal structure caused the accident (Vaughan, 1990, 2003,
2009). In 2003, 17 years after the Challenger disaster, the space shuttle Columbia
exploded upon reentry into the Earth’s atmosphere (Columbia Accident Investigation
Board, 2003). Again, although the physical cause of the accident was a technical breach
in the thermal protection system caused by a piece of insulating foam, investigative
reports indicated that dysfunctional organizational factors such as communication,
information processing, decision making, learning, and culture factors were at fault
(Deal, 2004; Pidgeon & O’Leary, 2000; Vaughan, 1990, 2009).
Experiences of failed task performance can transfer into knowledge to be shared
with other organizational members. However, the successful transfer of this knowledge
into learning is contingent upon the latent context of the organization (Argote & MironSpektor, 2011). Failure to respond in accordance to generally accepted advice can cause
harm to victims (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997), yet Vaughan (2009) pointed out that even
when generally accepted advice dictates needed change, negative patterns embedded in
the organizational culture can continue because of external, political, and other
unpredictable control agents.
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Carmeli and Gittell (2009) found that the probability of losing a lot by admitting a
mistake often prohibits learning. When this happens, the depth of learning is limited to
detecting and correcting superficial errors rather than investigating and challenging the
deep organizational causes. Superficial single-loop learning leads to band-aid fixes rather
than adjustments to the underlying culture. A culture of trust, psychological safety, and
high-quality interpersonal relationships are variables that correlate to successful learning
from experience, or deep-seated double-loop learning that challenges the underlying
beliefs and assumptions of the organization (Argote & Miron-Spektor, 2011; Carmeli &
Gittell, 2009).
Schein (1993) posited that psychological safety is a variable in group change
because it promotes learning through substantive communication or dialogue between
and among hierarchal corporate levels. However, Schein also pointed out that latent
hierarchy-based subcultures hinder learning, organizational integration, and coordination
because organizational learning cannot occur until the learning first takes place in the
executive subculture, which is doubtful when executives resist self-analysis. Effecting
cultural change by learning from mistakes is difficult for an organization because of the
underlying culture.
Management of Risk
Risk management. Risk management research has been a prevalent and relevant
paradigm worthy of investigation and implementation, as indicated by the increase in the
number of articles referencing ERM and risk management officers (Liebenberg & Hoyt,
2003). Because the current study was concerned with providing empirical evidence to
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assist in managing integrated financial systems risk to ameliorate financial disaster, the
predominant source of risk management literature for the study has centered on the risk
factors of catastrophes caused by failures in complex technical systems. Managing
catastrophic risk is essential because even though space shuttle explosions (Vaughan,
2003); oil spills (Gill et al., 2011; Graham et al., 2011; Harrald et al., 1990); nuclear
power plant meltdowns (Perrow, 1999); nuclear weapons near misses (Sagan, 1993);
chemical plant leaks and explosions; and mass transit accidents are rare, the damage is
generally devastating, tangible, and easily observed. However, the risk management
literature also has included research in less formidable yet vital technical systems as
information technology (Sammarco, 2005) and health care services (Bagnara et al., 2010;
Pronovost et al., 2006). Institutions manage market risk by using mathematical equations
to quantitatively analyze the effects of business practices or specific transactions used to
protect assets, realize returns on investments, or mitigate losses associated with capital
market activity uncertainties (Ernst & Young, 2013; Lo, 2009; Power, 2005).
Furthermore, often overlooked in the discussion of risk management has been the
strategic risk in protecting an organization’s most valuable intangible asset, namely, its
reputation (O’Rourke, 2004) or headline news exposure (Levine, 2004; Valukas, 2010).
In their discussion of reputation risk management, Bebbington, Larrinaga, and
Moneva (2008) stated that reputation is a valuable intangible asset that “produces
tangible benefits such as charging premium prices in exchange for quality, lower resource
costs, customer and employee loyalty, and cushion when a crisis occurs” (p. 339).
Valukas’s (2010) report on the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy included comments from
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the then-global financial controller regarding concerns about the reputational and
headline risk inherent in certain transactions used to reduce the balance sheet and impact
the publicly reported net leverage ratio. Irresponsible financial reporting agents
manipulated fiscal data and breached their fiduciary duty to achieve pecuniary gain,
disregarding the long-term effect of their decisions on the organization or other
stakeholders (Valukas, 2010).
Executive disregard for policies and perpetual warnings from internal and external
sources, a nontransparent reporting culture, and negligent external control on the part of
independent auditors Ernst & Young allowed Lehman’s questionable accounting
practices to incubate into a financial disaster adversely affecting the organization and
related stakeholders, including the U.S. economy (Valukas, 2010). Reputational capital
can be managed through strategic operational compliance and financial (reporting)
interactions with stakeholders (Bebbington et al., 2008).
Enterprise risk management. COSO (2004) designed the ERM framework to
provide a common language and guide to operationalize stakeholder organizational value
by maximizing opportunity while minimizing risk to achieve the organization’s strategic,
operational, reporting, and compliance goal objectives.
COSO (2004) defined ERM as
A process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, management and other
personnel, applied in a strategy setting and across the enterprise, designed to
identify potential events that may affect the entity, and manage risk to be within
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its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of
entity objectives. (p. 2)
The ERM framework also expanded the previously established internal control
framework of operational, reporting, and compliance goal achievement to anticipate,
assess, and embrace uncertainties from a strategic goal achievement perspective (COSO,
2004). Furthermore, where the internal control framework included risk assessment as a
forensic component of quality internal control, the ERM model expanded the risk
assessment component into three segments that when coupled with components from the
internal control framework make up the total risk management components in COSO’s
ERM framework (DeLoach & Thomson, 2014).
Eight ERM components integrate with the management process of an
organization. The checkpoints ensure that the tenor of the organization is centered on risk
appetite values and ideals (internal environment), then it ensures that objectives are set
(objective setting) so that internal and external threats or opportunities can be identified
(event identification), assessed (risk assessment), and actions developed to respond to the
events (risk response). Procedures and processes (control activities) operationalize
effective risk response actions. Capturing, analyzing, and effectively disseminating
relevant information (i.e., communication) to all members of the organization is integral
to the fluid, iterative, and interactive nature of ERM. As organizations change, so may the
requirements of ERM. Therefore, regularly evaluating (i.e., monitoring) the ERM process
ensures that the framework is modified and adjusted accordingly to accomplish its goal
(COSO, 2004). A comprehensive and fluid integrated ERM system facilitates insight into
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all aspects of business planning because it approaches risk management from various
organizational perspectives and provides a standard for implementation and monitoring.
Some organizations have adopted ERM’s holistic risk management system to
increase stakeholder value, but others have not (Beasley et al., 2005). Determinants of
ERM system adoption include dictates from boards of directors or other senior
leadership, external regulatory standards, and the presence of risk managers or other such
designated executives whose duty it is to focus on risk matters (Kleffner, Lee, &
McGannon, 2003; Liebenberg & Hoyt, 2003). Other organizational factors that influence
ERM adoption are organization size, auditor type, industry categorization, and statute
requirements (Beasley et al., 2005). ERM does not look the same in every organization.
However, Peter Frank, PwC partner, stated that successful ERM programs have one thing
in common, a robust risk process culture (as cited in Essaides, 2013).
J. Cohen et al. (2017) used the ERM framework outlined by COSO (2004) to
examine the linkage between ERM and the quality of financial reporting by performing a
qualitative analysis of 11 organizations’ governance triad that they defined as chief
financial officers (CFOs), audit committee members, and external audit partners. They
found that ERM influenced the quality of financial reporting and internal controls but had
less impact on the quality of external audits. J. Cohen et al. attributed this lowered impact
to the propensity for auditors to focus on audit compliance standards and lack of ERM
knowledge or value. Although the ERM framework was intended to provide an objective
structure to implement a comprehensive risk management platform, Power (2009)
purported that without more emphasis on governance quality rather than regulatory
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compliance, ERM might be reduced to a “corporate policy document only to provide
symbolic security” (p. 851). Clarke (1999) referred to plans that try to control dangers as
fantasy documents “set in rhetoric of technical competence, and often in one of national
interest, providing a context that helps persuade audiences (internal and external) of their
legitimacy” (p. 16). The frequency with which external auditors have played a role in
financial disasters (e.g., Enron, Madoff, Lehman Brothers, and others) raises the question
whether financial audit documents are simply fantasy documents designed to assert
tenuous confidence in the financial condition of a company.
Although the ERM framework was intended to assure stakeholders that inclusive
goal achievement would be at minimal risk, it has limitations. ERM is a system
addressed, developed, and implemented by individuals, and the human resource system
drives its success (COSO, 2004). It is reasonable that similar factors causing technical
system failures, such as misguided cultural assumptions and values, fiscal pressures,
errors, injudicious agentic decisions, and control failure, can cause an ERM system to fail
(DeLoach & Thomson, 2014).
Power (2009) expounded on the systemic risk of ERM by outlining the conflicts
of a holistic risk appetite concept built on compliance-driven notions. Power maintained
that harnessing an organization’s entire risk scenario under one premise is nearly
impossible because of the behavioral subjective biases and predispositions of the
individuals involved. The critical imagination necessary to excavate unknown future
events requires an arena of discomfort and ambiguity, yet this appears to be in conflict
with an ERM designed as an auditable tool of due process (Power, 2009). A compliance-
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driven risk management approach prohibits the intricate view of interconnectivity that
organizations have with their environment, which in itself limits the scope of risk
assessment. Scheytt et al. (2006) maintained that regulatory process side effects can be
counterproductive to risk management in that they create their own subset of procedural,
reputational, and legal risks. A comprehensive, firm-wide ERM framework provides
value to organizations and their stakeholders. However, excessive emphasis on
compliance and regulation limits ERM effectiveness by placing a wedge between
managing uncertainties and the overarching purpose of supporting goal objective
achievement.
High-Reliability Organizations
Certain technical high-risk operations cannot implement trial-and-error risk
management methods because the cost of a system failure to a population or an
environment outweighs the benefit of learning from an error (LaPorte & Consolini,
1991), which precipitates the need to operate at a high rate of reliability from the start.
Groups of researchers investigated the unique characteristics of these high-risk technical
organizations operating with unusually high rates of reliability and developed the HRO
theory and the concept of HROs (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991; Orlitzky et al., 2003; K. H.
Roberts, 1990; Schulman, 1993). HRO theory defines the deliberate systemic
organizational paradigm, meaning that despite the normal accident tendency, some
organizations are able to manage risk where they operate nearly failure free (Lekka,
2011; Perrow, 1999; Rijpma, 1997; K. H. Roberts, 1990; Sagan, 1993; Schulman, 1993;
Weick et al., 2008).
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HRO theory parallels NAT’s premise, wherein deeper organizational
characteristics and system interaction failures often are the antecedents to accidents in
high-risk technical industries, even when it appears initially to be operator error (LaPorte
& Consolini, 1991; Perrow, 1999). Furthermore, like the MMD model, HRO theory
acknowledges that certain organizational factors allow active and latent failures to
compile and incubate to a point where the rules and regulations in place to mitigate
accidents lose their defensibility (Pidgeon, 1997; Reason, 1997; Sagan, 1993; Turner &
Pidgeon, 1997).
HROs reduce the risks associated with human-technical system interaction by
designing initial systems to address the organizational factors outlined in NAT’s complex
and highly coupled inevitable accident model (Perrow, 1999) and the MMD model of
accumulated latent and active errors (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997), which increases an
organization’s vulnerability paradigm (Sagan, 1993). The accident-causing literature
regarding risk factors in high-risk industries has contained theories developed from a
posteriori analyses of accident case reports, but the HRO literature has contained research
about the antecedents and determinants of reliability from a concurrent ethnographic
approach to identify the factors that contribute to nearly accident-free operations in highrisk organizations (Bourrier, 2011).
Leveson et al. (2009) outlined the fallibility of high reliability as the prominent
construct in safe operations from a systems theory engineering perspective, in that
dysfunctional yet reliable systemic interaction can lead to accidents. When production
pressures or migration in processes influence safety constraints and processes negatively,
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system interactions become dysfunctional, creating an accident-prone environment
(Leveson et al., 2009). From this idea, Leveson et al. developed a fluid, enterprise-wide
systems/control safety risk model that includes mathematical risk analysis processes to
combat system degradation resulting from active pressures or constraints on the system.
Control and communication between and among levels maintain the hierarchical system
control process in the desired model. Leveson et al.’s application of an active and
iterative enterprise systems/control risk model to promote reliable and safe operations in
high-risk organizations supports the application of a fluid ERM model to control system
degradation for managing risk in less highly technical operations not subject to
immediate safety breaches.
HROs are not error free. They are organizations recognized by their lack of
catastrophic events, despite advanced technological capabilities and complex
interdependent systems (K. H. Roberts, 1990). Seminal HRO theorists recognized this
characteristic and conducted studies to investigate performance reliability traits of the
U.S. Federal Aviation Administration air traffic control system; the Pacific Gas and
Electric Company’s electric power system, which includes the Diablo Canyon nuclear
power plant; and the flight operations of U.S. aircraft carriers and other similar
organizations (Bourrier, 2011; Sagan, 1993; Schulman, 1993). The literature generated by
these and other studies outlined specific thematic characteristics germane to HROs, with
the overarching characteristic being the continued mind set to actively and aggressively
seek, gather, analyze, and synthesize data regarding the current operating environment to
diligently and vigilantly search out system failures or errors that would lead to disastrous
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outcomes if not addressed (Lekka, 2011; K. H. Roberts & Bea, 2001; Weick & Sutcliffe,
2007; Weick et al., 2008). However, error awareness without actions to mitigate danger
are useless and allow errors to accrue into disastrous events (Weick et al., 2008).
Collective mindfulness. HROs anticipate, contain, respond to, and rebound from
errors through collective and mindful attention to errors operationalized by a
preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify interpretations, sensitivity to
operations, commitment to resilience, and deference to expertise (Weick & Sutcliffe,
2007; Weick et al., 2008). Collective mindfulness was significant to the theoretical basis
of the current study as an antithetic construct to the unreliable irresponsible financial
reporting that led to the Enron case (McLean & Elkind, 2004). Financial reporting agents
in this case observed and understood some of the latent errors and active failures in the
reporting system, yet they either chose not to, or were unable to, act to correct them
(McLean & Elkind, 2004), which engendered unreliable reporting and potential financial
debacle.
Preoccupation with failure. HROs exist in a constant state of failure
anticipation, that is, they expect the unexpected (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). As stated
earlier, failure is a precursor to learning how to avert disaster. However, if HROs rarely
experience failure, the opportunity to learn is not apparent. Therefore, how can
preoccupation with failure be a factor of successful ERM in an organization with limited
failure? Weick et al. (2008) surmised that any lapse in system or component operation is
reason for investigation and that one deviation, no matter how small, if left unaddressed
could breed disaster. Examples include “recent changes in supervision, issues delegated
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without follow-up, lack of a questioning attitude, missed steps in a procedure, people not
on the same page, and staff spread thin, distraction from schedule pressures” (Weick &
Sutcliffe, 2007, pp. 47-48). Broadening the definition of error from only egregious and
interrupting to include commonplace changes makes seemingly mundane maintenance
activities high order for locating small incidents or weaknesses for accident prevention
learning (LaPorte, 1996; K. H. Roberts & Bea, 2001; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007; Weick et
al., 2008). Taking from Sagan’s (1993) near-miss discussion, even those actions used to
avert accidents are opportunities to learn.
Consistent success promulgates complacency and self-reliance, both of which can
increase the tendency for human error (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991). Lo (2009) suggested
that long periods of economic growth and prosperity lead to investor complacency, which
reduces the diligent seeking of latent errors and failures that could lead to financial crises.
Even during periods of continued operational success, HROs diligently combat failure
potentials that emerge from diminished vigilance, discontinued adjustments, and the
failure to strive in a complacent environment (Weick et al., 2008). An organization
preoccupied with failure assumes that something is wrong, even when it appears not to
be.
Reluctance to simplify interpretations. Non-HROs strive to simplify or
streamline processes and procedures in the interests of efficiency, productivity, and
profitability by arriving at consensus about which data to ignore and which to act upon
(Shawn Burke, Wilson, & Salas, 2005). Simplification in HROs is slower and evolves
differently, and the need for simplification diminishes with each analytical challenge
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(Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). Reluctance to simplify interpretations means continuously
dissecting and analyzing organized processes and procedures from divergent perspectives
to combat risk inertia created by complacency (Weick et al., 2008). HROs seek and
embrace reasons to challenge the system status because they are never satisfied with the
accident-prevention status quo.
Heterogeneous inquiry instigated by team members diverse in experience,
training, and organizational status can generate redundant system analysis through
skepticism and disagreement (Shawn Burke et al., 2005). Vogus and Welbourne (2003)
suggested that organizations use skilled temporary employees to provide fresh insight to
mindless routines. Resulting consensus from challenged perspectives can generate
additional skepticism from other members, which generates yet more probing and
analysis of processes and procedures (Weick et al., 2008). Managing the various
perspectives of individual challenge and debate for the good of operations requires a
culture of interpersonal excellence, such as active communication, employee
engagement, trust, and mutual respect, to mitigate potential issues resulting from hubris,
bullying, and self-importance (Vogus & Welbourne, 2003; Weick et al., 2008). The HRO
concept of reluctance to simplify interpretations was relevant to this study as a construct
to combat the simplification of auditing and reporting techniques, processes, and
procedures simplified in the interest of profitability.
Redundancy. NAT theorists have argued that redundant measures create an
atmosphere of complacency (Rijpma, 1997). HROs value the redundancy of
informational technology components, parts, and personnel duties because it ameliorates
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the brittleness of tight coupling, so they use methods to actively address complacency
from reliance on duplicity (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991; Lekka, 2011; Rijpma, 2003; K.
H. Roberts, 1990; Weick et al., 2008). Extra efforts to implement redundant technologies,
components, and extensive cross training come at a cost. Therefore, the decision to invest
in high-reliability measures depends upon the weight of avoiding hazardous accidents
versus the cost of hazardous disasters (K. H. Roberts, 1990).
Sensitivity to operations. The notion of sensitivity to operations questions
whether the reality of the work is being performed as prescribed by the analyses, plans,
and designs developed to address the complexity of the operations (Weick & Sutcliffe,
2007). Sensitivity to operations means taking a step away from the objective, measured,
and quantified operational constraints to view operations from an experiential and
comprehensive perspective for thematic anomalies, or other evidence of changes in
operational condition that can pose safety threats. Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) provided an
example of sensitivity to operations when a high level of needle stick injuries was
occurring among medical cleaning personnel. By analyzing the process, management
realized that the injuries were not the result of careless individual error; instead, they
occurred because trash receptacles resided under old needle dispensers. The trash
receptacles were moved, and the injuries stopped. Reacting insightfully to an existing
error to correct it is one indication of sensitivity to operations. However, an HRO that
successfully operationalizes sensitivity to operations will look at a near miss as an active
failure or an error worthy of investigation and learning, not as evidence of its satisfactory
safety and reliability processes (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007).
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Saturated awareness and alertness to every situational aspect of the current
operating environment requires effective communication, valid interpretation, and higher
level cognitive interaction between team members and the social construct of the system.
Weick and Roberts (1993) surmised that collective, heedful actions of system actors
creates a platform upon which sense making can occur to validate and confirm that
operations are going as planned. When the collective group’s “knowledge of failure,
details, potential for recovery, and relevant experience” indicate that operations do not
make sense within the confines of the system, the same collective effort is used to
reconstruct the system to make sense (Weick et al., 2008, p. 45). When the social
construct of the human resource system promotes heedless actions dissociated from the
system, errors accumulate, and accidents occur (Weick & Roberts, 1993).
Commitment to resilience. The ability to reconstruct a system
contemporaneously or asynchronously to make sense of adverse conditions and to
contain and bounce back from disruptions (Weick et al., 2008) distinguishes HROs from
other organizations. Resilient organizations learn from adversity caused by internal (i.e.
production pressures) and external (i.e. investor and market) influences, with the result
being reliable operations. Resilient commitment assumes that current knowledge is not
adequate to manage what is unexpected, so HROs continue to press and challenge the
system’s perceived accurate interactions, even when the system appears to be stronger
after having addressed a particular error (Vogus & Welbourne, 2003; Weick et al., 2008).
The medical maintenance team whose members suffered from accidental needle pricks
responded to the repetitive and unsafe occurrences in a manner that made their operations
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stronger and posed less threat to employees and possible greater societal danger, had
disease been spread by unintended needle pricks. However, the team’s knowledge of and
effective response to the needle prick threat unwittingly stifled anticipation of a similar
yet unrelated error because the actors might simply have applied the successful removal
strategy of the trash receptacles as a fix rather than investigate other failure outcroppings.
Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) defined resilience in the form of control as
A system able to minimize or eliminate unwanted variability, either in its own
performance, in the environment, or in both…The fundamental characteristic of a
resilient organization is that it does not lose control of what it does but is able to
continue and rebound. (p. 70)
Taking control can refer to the ad hoc convergence of informed and
knowledgeable individuals to contain an emerging crisis stemming from an adverse
system disruption, to fighting ambivalence occurring from the orderliness of successful
past performance (Weick et al., 2008). The reflexivity of response and reaction to a
situation depends upon the accessibility of information needed at the time, regardless of
decision-making authority.
Structure and deference to expertise. As a participant observer in an in-depth
case study aboard two nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, K. H. Roberts (1990) recognized
that structured hierarchical differentiation facilitated routine operations through a rigid
chain of responsibility and extensive communication methods facilitated access to
expertise in critical situations. However, in a moment of crisis, personnel of hierarchical
rank could invoke their specific expertise to make emergent decisions in the name of
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safety (Bigley & Roberts, 2001; LaPorte & Consolini, 1991; Vogus & Welbourne, 2003;
Weick et al., 2008). Members of the team closest to frontline operations often are the
most proximal to error events and are, therefore, the best people to make quick decisions
to prevent conversions of system disruptions to serious accidents (Weick & Sutcliffe,
2007). The apparent decentralization of the hierarchical decision-making dimension of
HROs seems paradoxical, but Leveson et al. (2009) pointed out that the immediate
limited decision-making nature of lower ranking individuals, such as the authority of
aircraft carriers’ seamen to abort landings, mitigates disaster, but does not change policy
or process unless leadership addresses the effect of the decisions on the system.
When the hierarchical structure is impenetrable, lower ranking corporate members
often are reluctant to speak up, challenge authority, and push the matter of correcting
discovered latent failures (Weick et al., 2008). Furthermore, higher power-ranked
members generally operate in a bounded and rational decision-making zone (Turner &
Pidgeon, 1997) because they do not have the hands-on work experience knowledge to
value the information offered. In some cases, underling concerns are ignored so as not to
interrupt a seemingly profitable status quo. When a lower level error combines with a
higher order error such as bounded and rational decision making, unethical leadership, or
poor communication, the resulting effect can be complex and difficult to reconcile
(Weick et al., 2008).
When higher ranked corporate members who possess the hierarchical power to
make permanent change do not address errors declared by lower ranked members,
normalization of acceptable deviance develops (Vaughan, 2003). Ordered reliability in a

61
culture of normalized deviance is dangerous because it allows risk inertia to multiply
exponentially as the hazard slips through the holes in the organization’s defenses that
leadership refuses to plug (K. H. Roberts & Bea, 2001; Weick et al., 2008). Turner and
Pidgeon (1997) referred to the structured nature of unintended consequences as antitasks.
If the purpose of hierarchically structured systems is to accomplish the organization’s
tasks, then the unintended consequences that arise from these negentropic, order-seeking
systems are considered antitasks rather than completely random errors. Antitasks of a
hierarchical structure can amplify a failed system component in such an orderly fashion
that problem acceptance integrates into the organization’s culture and that even when
higher ranked members finally acknowledge and deem the deviance formidable, the
inertia cannot be stopped, and disaster occurs (Vaughan, 2009).
This notion is particularly salient to irresponsible financial reporting. McLean and
Elkind (2004) provided various examples of lower ranked stakeholders questioning the
financial reporting practices of Enron, with no heedful reactions from the executives for
various self-centered reasons. Enron’s aggressive, individual success-seeking,
competitive, unethical, and rule-stretching culture allowed the orderly, negentropic nature
of financial reporting systems to promulgate its financial accounting system failures in an
orderly fashion all the way to Wall Street’s unsupported earnings reports (Sims &
Brinkmann, 2003). Sims and Brinkman (2003) posited that Enron’s culminated financial
collapse was the direct result of decisions and actions permitted by Enron’s culture.
Organizational culture. A culture embodies the embedded shared assumptions,
values, and beliefs developed to make sense of organizational problems and solutions
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(Schein, 1983). Leaders establish and drive organizational culture, and culture shapes the
paradigm in which organizations operate (Schein, 1983, 1984). Weick and Sutcliffe
(2007) used O’Reilly’s (1989) model of corporate culture conditions to corroborate their
notion of reporting, justice, flexibility, and learning in HRO culture (see Figure 3).

Figure 3. Managing culture. Reprinted from “Corporations, Culture, and Commitment:
Motivation and Social Control in Organizations,” by C. O’Reilly in California
Management Review, 32(4), p. 23. Copyright 1989 by the Regents of the University of
California. Reprinted with permission.
Organizational culture eventually resolves in financial outcomes, often referred to
as the “bottom line” of a business (Denison, 1984; Glaser, 2014). Negative cultural
influences can soften the boundaries of control systems, thus allowing latent risk
conditions to normalize into business as usual, which sets the stage for a socioorganizationally caused technical disaster (Martinez-Moyano et al., 2013; Rasmussen,
1997; Vaughan, 2009).
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Sims and Brinkman (2003) used Schein’s (1984) five primary cultural influencing
leadership mechanisms (i.e., attention, reaction to crisis, role modeling, allocation of
rewards, and criteria for selection and dismissal) to analyze the effect of leadership on
Enron’s demise. The analysis detailed various examples of negative leadership influences
responsible for generating a culture of antitask development. To protect stakeholders
from the harmful effects of negative influences, authorities designed and implemented
regulatory, legislative, and industry controls. However, if the organizational culture does
not embrace and promote the control system, stakeholders can experience risk-harm.
In the wake of Enron, O’Connell (2004) analyzed accounting practices, corporate
governance, and regulations, positing that “fundamental failure of contemporary
regulatory and corporate governance systems means that ongoing abuses and costly
failures will continue to plague our capitalist system” (p. 737). Calandro (2012) used
NAT to define and assess methodologies for analyzing global systemic financial risk, and
argued that although quantitative and regulatory measures can moderate risk and decrease
the probability of financial crises, financial risk management methodologies must
acknowledge and account for qualitative social and behavioral factors to be truly
effective. HROs operate in a rules-and-regulation schema, but they also engender and
nurture a culture that addresses the human social factors to operationalize the regulations
and controls designed for risk management effectively (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991).
Informed culture. An organizational culture develops from the stories, artifacts,
and common language of the members (Schein, 1983). Storytelling is a natural
mechanism used to transfer knowledge between and among organizational constituents.
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Initial reactions to what organizational members learn upon assimilation are integral in
determining their reactions to pressure-driven factors during performance (Weick, 1987).
By telling stories of previous incidents, problematic situations, and subsequent
resolutions or difficulties, HROs send the message that it is safe to report to others
information about potential errors and possible solutions (K. H. Roberts & Bea, 2001;
Weick, 1987).
Just culture. To foster open communication, there must exist a trusting
atmosphere where members report errors, both theirs and the errors of others, without
fear of retribution. Reason (2000) conveyed that a reporting culture requires the key
element of trust and that even though trust exists in a just culture where the boundary
between blameless and blameworthy actions is blurred, accountability remains for those
who intentionally engage in unacceptable and unsafe behavior. K. H. Roberts and Bea
(2001) indicated that systems of reward and incentive must encourage open
communication of all organizational information, including safety issues, to embellish a
culture of trust in the interest of safety. Rewards skewed toward financial performance
will extinguish espoused values of failure avoidance and affect reliable operations
negatively.
Diverse culture. As a culture develops, team members assimilate to the culture
and share like-minded thinking. A diverse culture creates the requisite variety of
individual characteristics to address potential errors and accident mitigation in HROs
(Weick, 1987). This thought contradicts the homogeneous nature of redundant safeguards
and further supports the need for a just culture whose members are less likely to trust
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individuals who are different from them (Weick, 1987). Gifun and Karydas (2010)
promoted the value of diverse perspectives in the analytic-deliberative decision making
process of the highly reliable resilient organization model.
The various functions of financial reporting systems create an integrated web of
operations manifested under one set of overarching general accounting, auditing, and
reporting rules and regulations. Organizational complexity increases when processes and
procedures require participatory and coordinated integration across departmental lines
(Schulman, 1993). At Enron, internal competing constraints such as compensation
structures linked to profit and revenue production, and external performance pressures to
produce earnings, generate and maintain viable market presence, and meet financing
covenants fostered a culture of fiefdoms operating out of self-interest (Arnold & De
Lange, 2004; McLean & Elkind, 2004). Lekka’s (2011) review of HRO literature
emphasized the importance of organizational culture factors to ensure consistent and
reliable operations in organizations subject to catastrophic events.
Summary and Transition
The purpose of this qualitative, grounded theory study was to use HRO constructs
as a frame to identify and define the psychological factors of ERM effectiveness in
organizational financial reporting responsibility. Chapter 2 provided an overview of
financial reporting and management systems, along with a review of relevant literature, to
showcase the theoretical basis for the study as it pertained to mitigating disaster factors,
managing risk, and organizing for high reliability. The NAT and error literature have
explained possible socio-organizational factors of financial system collapse and resulting
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disaster (Perrow, 1999; Pidgeon & O’Leary, 2000; Reason, 2000; Sagan, 1993; Turner &
Pidgeon, 1997). The ERM literature was presented as an established framework for
operationalizing the human factor in risk management (Beasley et al., 2005; COSO,
2004; Power, 2009; Rasmussen, 1997; Reason, 1997). The HRO literature served as an
applicable guidance to frame this investigative study to define the psychological factors
integral in reliable and responsible financial reporting systems (K. H. Roberts, 1990;
Schulman, 1993; Vogus & Welbourne, 2003; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007; Weick et al.,
2008).
The interaction of an organization’s accounting, financial reporting, and control
subsystems is key to generating accurate and dependable information about the financial
condition of a company. Interruptions in complex organizational financial systems can
result in distorted views of the economic outlooks of companies that can become a
platform for fiscal disaster (Calandro, 2012). Perrow (1999) developed NAT to explain
how disruptions in complex, integrated, and tangible systems create the potential for
physical catastrophes. Regulations, statutes, and professional standards provide internal
and external control risk management processes and procedures to protect stakeholders,
the public, and the larger economy from the effects of catastrophic financial meltdowns.
Just as habitual disregard for harm avoidance measures can incubate and precipitate
physical disasters, as outlined in the MMD model (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997), financial
control system failures permit erroneous, negligent, and fraudulent acts to evolve into
egregious financial disasters (Calandro, 2012; Perrow, 2010).
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Also bound by regulations, rules, and standards to protect third parties, highly
technical and complexly integrated organizations such as petrochemical and nuclear
power plants use HRO constructs to conduct operations in nearly accident-free
environments. HROs address potential risk-harm to third parties by developing and
nurturing organizational cultures that promote collective and mindful ERM through
learning, preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify, redundant training and safety
measures, sensitivity to operations, and fluid structural decision making with deference to
expertise. Although the literature on financial risk and crises management has addressed
the human factor in minimizing financial disasters, the ERM factors outlined in these
sources primarily have addressed quantitative measures balancing risk-taking
transactional activities with reward and minimal negative impact on organizational
stakeholders, a tenet known as risk appetite (Arena et al., 2011; Beasley et al., 2005).
There has been a gap in the literature regarding the psychological constructs of successful
human interaction with organizational factors to mitigate the risk of financial reporting
system disaster (Calandro, 2012; Müssig, 2009; Power, 2009).
Chapter 3 outlines the rationale for choosing a grounded theory research design,
my influence as the data collection instrument in the study, the recruitment and selection
of the participants, and the criteria for saturation and sample size. In addition, information
regarding data collection, analysis, and coding is included in Chapter 3, along with
assurances regarding the consideration of trustworthiness and the ethical treatment of the
participants.
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Chapter 4 presents the data revealed from interviewing 13 participants engaged in
reputable responsible financial reporting systems. The influencing human factors of
responsible financial reporting systems data are organized and analyzed from a core
category to subcategories, and applied to the RQs based on the subcategorical groupings.
Tables, figures, and narratives using quotations from the participants and juxtaposed
examples from the discrepant Enron (McLean & Elkind, 2004) case to support the
thematic trends used to present the data. Chapter 5 summarizes the data related to HRO
and ERM theory, and provides theoretical modeling to address the human factors that
support the accurate and reliable reporting of entity financial activity in a manner to
mitigate risk-harm to third-party stakeholders. Chapter 5 also presents information about
the delimitations and limitations of the study, opportunities for further research, and the
social implications of the findings.
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Chapter 3: Research Methods
Introduction
Despite preventive regulatory constraints and best practice policies and
procedures, financial disasters resulting from irresponsible fiscal management and
reporting occur, causing risk-harm to unsuspecting stakeholders, innocent other thirdparties, and the greater economic environment. HROs are subject to regulatory
constraints and best practice policies and procedures, but they also possess organizational
characteristics that promote reliable operations, despite the tendency for accidents to
happen (LaPorte, 1996; K. H. Roberts, 1990; K. H. Roberts & Bea, 2001). Understanding
the psychological factors of HROs as they apply to responsible fiscal management would
assist in promoting reliability in the less tangible yet highly integrated systems of
financial management. The organizational psychology literature discussing such an
application has been sparse and disconnected; therefore, the purpose of this study was to
use NAT factors and HRO constructs as a frame to identify characteristics of ERM
effectiveness in organizational financial reporting responsibility.
This chapter includes an explanation of the research design as well as the
rationale for the choice of design, including participant selection logic, sampling strategy,
instrumentation, and data analysis methodology. Because researchers are the instrument
in qualitative studies (Creswell, 2013; Patton, 2002), the chapter also includes a detailed
discussion about my role as the researcher. Matters of trustworthiness and the ethical
procedures used to protect the participants also are presented in this chapter.
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Research Design and Rationale
Grounded theory inquiry uses objective induction to elucidate empirical
knowledge from a target population involved in a common practice or process that will
generate or expand, rather than simply test, theory (Patton, 2002). The rigors of grounded
theory inquiry provide organizing and coding tools useful for the in-depth analysis of
potentially large amounts of data by subjective and penetrative exploration through
interviews while applying extant theory to maintain objectivity during inquiry (Patton,
2002). This method of inquiry was appropriate to explicate the unique dimensions of
HRO psychological constructs germane to effective ERM in fiscal management and
financial reporting.
The following RQs were designed to generate relative interpretable data:
1. What HRO constructs applied in ERM are present in reliable financial
reporting?
2. How can HRO constructs applied in ERM minimize organizational
stakeholder financial risk-harm?
3. How can HRO constructs applied in ERM inform other organizations to
motivate leadership and employees to promote fiscal fiduciary responsibility
while maximizing profitability?
Role of the Researcher
The measurement instrument in qualitative research is the researcher (Creswell,
2013; Patton, 2002). As an observer participant, my experience, knowledge, feelings,
beliefs, and values affected the variety of reactivity in the study (Patton, 2002). A
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philosophical assumption in qualitative inquiry is that by acknowledging personal factors
or biases that might affect data analysis and interpretation, researchers engage in epoche,
or the setting aside of their experiences, as much as possible to facilitate discovery of an
original perspective of the phenomenon being studied (Creswell, 2013). Because biases
can affect data coding, analysis, and interpretation, all of which can reduce the credibility
or validity of the findings (Creswell, 2013; Patton, 2002; Trochim, 2006a, 2006b), I
managed my personal influencing factors by understanding my predispositions,
contemplating how they could have affected the study, and reserving them until the study
was complete. Furthermore, I used an initial coding scheme (see Appendix A) to remain
objective and focused on the thematic concepts relevant to this study (Corbin & Strauss,
2008). This coding scheme allowed me to remain open to all possible data defining HRO
psychology constructs as they might have applied to organizational financial risk-harm
management without straying into unrelated areas.
I am a CPA licensed in the state of Maryland. In line with the AICPA’s (2014)
Code of Professional Conduct, CPAs are qualified professionals whose overarching
ethical responsibility is to serve the public interest with integrity and due care by
providing objective and independent third-party assurance regarding the validity and
accuracy of the financial activities reported by the management of organizations. CPAs
perform attest, tax, managerial, and other derivations of related professional services,
depending on the needs of the user. Assurance services such as audit and review
engagements are designed to inform third-party users of the integrity of the information
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presented by management in the statements of financial position (AICPA, 2013). The
precept of third-party reliance upon financial reporting was central to this study.
My credentialing lent credibility to my ability to mine and analyze the data from a
financial perspective. A possible bias arising from my credentialing was the presumption
that all individuals involved in accounting inherently abide by the specific regulatory,
ethical, and reporting standards set forth by the governing agencies guiding assurance
servicers. This presupposition might have restricted my openness to emerging trends and
themes of HRO constructs apparent in responsible financial reporting and management.
However, although I have some experience with assurance services, the preponderance of
my public accounting experience has been with tax compliance and managerial
consulting, which might have ameliorated the constricting effects of the presumption
allowing me to be open to apparent HRO constructs of responsible financial reporting.
Furthermore, I reviewed cases of fraudulent financial reporting evidencing that not all
individuals subject to the AICPA assurance standards have exercised their professional
responsibility to third-party users with objectivity and integrity (Calandro, 2012; Ernst &
Young, 2013; Markopolos, 2010; McLean & Elkind, 2004).
As the measurement tool in this study, I was aware that any professional
association or relationship with any of the participants, coupled with the sensitive and
revealing nature of financial reporting and fiscal performance, could have resulted in the
halo effect (Patton, 2002). I had to be cognizant of the possibility of participants
providing false information to portray themselves and their organizations positively
rather than realistically. To mitigate the variety of reactivity of this effect, I asserted my
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position as a researcher, not as a CPA, a colleague, or a professional network contact. I
provided assurance that the identities of the participants and their organizations would be
protected, as outlined in the informed consent. To mitigate a halo effect further, I used
my accounting knowledge to mine truthful and honest information from the participants
by analyzing publicly published or requested financial statements and reports. This
procedure facilitated triangulation of the data provided by the participants (see Appendix
B). I also was cognizant of the fact that some participants simply were not forthcoming
and truthful about their actions if they were contrary to responsible reporting, regardless
of my association with them.
Gender could have been a factor in my role in this study in that I am a female
CPA. According to the Current Population Survey (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,
2014), women represent more than 60% of the accountant and auditor population.
However, according to the same survey results, women represent less than 30% of chief
organizational officers, which could include CFOs. Because I sought participants who
were predominantly responsible for promoting accurate and responsible financial
reporting and mitigating financial risk-harm, some participants were CFOs and were
male. Men and women have different financial risk tolerance (Francis, Hasan, Park, &
Wu, 2014), a factor that could have had a bearing on my interpretation of the data. I was
cognizant of this factor when analyzing the data.
In some qualitative settings, the role of the researcher as observer participant
affects the variety of reactivity simply by being present (Patton, 2002). This situation was
not a concern in this study because my short-term presence as an interviewer did not
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affect the characteristically longitudinal outcome of the embedded financial reporting and
management practices of the organization with which I was associated at the time of the
study.
Target Population
The target population comprised individuals responsible for or involved in
organizational fiscal risk management and financial reporting. I anticipated that CFOs,
CROs, controllers, auditors (external or internal), and accounting staff of organizations
possessing sound financial management would fit this inclusion criterion. The SEC cited
the need to meet internal or external earnings expectations as the most common
motivations for fraud (as cited in Beasley et al., 2010). I sought participants who were
members of fiscally solvent, publicly traded companies who used certain procedures to
reveal indicators of sound financial position (AICPA, 2015). Because meeting earnings
expectations is limited not only to Wall Street expectations but also is used in securing
debt financing and as the basis for compensation structures, securing participants from
smaller private organizations was appropriate and helped me to triangulate the data,
adding trustworthiness to the findings (Patton, 2002).
In the COSO-sponsored study authored by Beasley et al. (2010), the most
frequent industries cited as engaging in fraudulent reporting were computer hardware and
software, other manufacturing, health care/health products, retailers/wholesalers,
telecommunications, and other service providers. These conclusions were consistent with
COSO’s (1999) study (as cited in Beasley et al., 2010). Therefore, to qualify the target
population further, I chose organizations whose primary business purpose was similar to
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those listed for a more comparable yet still heterogeneous sample frame. The participants
chosen to be in the study shouldered the burden of the research, but they also became the
beneficiaries of the research in that they might be able to use the psychological factors
defined by this research to further their mission of promoting responsible financial
reporting and management while maximizing organizational goals.
Participants were selected using a maximum variation purposeful sampling
strategy (Patton, 2002), an approach that supported the credibility and transferability of
the results (Creswell, 2013; Patton, 2002). Participants were screened to ascertain their
knowledge of financial reporting, as dictated by the rules, regulations, and standards of
the accounting profession, so that I could consider the level of knowledge during data
analysis. The deep inquiry of the critical homogeneous sample frame of actors
responsible for fiscal risk management and financial reporting revealed the rich and thick
data required to define HRO psychological constructs in organizational financial
responsibility, and the heterogeneity of organizations across business purposes provided a
breadth of understanding and support for theoretical application across groups (Patton,
2002).
Data richness was further enhanced by exploring the phenomenon under study
from different perspectives (Creswell, 2013); therefore, the sample frame also stratified
employees, leadership, and external accountants related to the financial environment and
the ERM framework of organizations. The goal was to obtain participants from different
levels of power in organizational reporting systems. Doing so provided information from
different work experiences, system involvement, and output angles, thus improving the
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likelihood of retrieving valid data. To approach the data from yet another perspective, I
used the Enron (McLean & Elkind, 2004) financial disaster as a deviant case to contrast
and compare the emergent HRO psychological constructs with the deleterious factors of
irresponsible financial management that contributed to fiscal systemic interruptions and
ultimate third-party risk-harm in these cases.
Theoretical sample size is determined by the research purpose, the data
elucidated, and phenomenological emergence (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Patton, 2002). At
a certain point in inductive inquiry, gathering a larger quantity of information does not
contribute to the phenomenological model. When this happens, the data are considered
saturated (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Creswell, 2013; Patton, 2002). Theoretical
development research is an iterative process with no definitive precepts other than to do
the necessary work to extract the relative theoretical data (Corbin & Strauss, 2008;
Creswell, 2013; Patton, 2002). Based on this notion, I determined that the direction of the
research and the availability of the organizational constituents dictated a sample size of
eight to 10 participants. I was satisfied with the final sample of 13 participants.
Participant Recruitment
After receiving approval from Walden University’s Institutional Review Board
(IRB approval #08-10-16-0331125), I recruited the qualified participants via nondirect
and direct personal invitation. Nondirect invitations were made by posting an invitation
to join the study on the professional social media site LinkedIn, the Maryland Association
of Certified Public Accounts’ (MACPA) volunteer opportunity webpage and through its
listserv, and Walden University’s Participant Pool. Although the LinkedIn call for
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participants received 41 views, no participants were generated from that venue or the
indirect invitations posted on the Walden University Participant Pool or the MACPA
volunteer page or listserv. However, association with MACPA proved fruitful because it
solidified the credibility of the study in the local professional community and generated
an opportunity for a direct invitation to one participant who subsequently agreed to join
the study.
Personalized e-mail has positive effects on response rates (Heerwegh, 2005). Any
confidentiality and privacy concerns regarding the use of e-mail are addressed in the
Human Research Protection section of this chapter. I sent direct e-mail invitations to
individuals of organizations that were financially sound, as indicated from public
knowledge, such as in Forbes Magazine’s list of America’s 100 most trustworthy
companies that was generated by GMI Ratings, a provider of governance research and
ratings, and public financial data found in the annual Form 10-K, which is the public
financial disclosure of publicly traded organizations. No responses were generated from
these direct e-mail invitations; however, direct invitations sent to individuals responsible
for the sound, ethical, and responsible financial reporting of reputable companies known
professionally by me and referred to me by others generated the remaining participants.
After a recruited individual agreed to participate, I generated an e-mail from
SurveyMonkey’s Email Survey Collector, which provided more information and a link to
the informed consent and the demographics survey. In an effort to secure further
participants, the invitation also contained the following information:
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NOTE: If you have personal contacts outside of your place of employment, whom
you believe may meet the requirements to participate in this study, please forward
this invitation to participate to them so they can contact me and I can send them
their personal SurveyMonkey link. A forwarded link will not work.
Because participation in the study was voluntary, no questions, with the exception
of Question 1, which consented to participating in the study, required an answer before
moving on. If this question was not answered, the participant received the following
message: “You must consent to participate to continue; otherwise, you can exit the survey
and not participate, or, if you need more information before agreeing, please contact the
researcher.”
I used the self-reported information in the demographics survey (see Appendix C)
to determine the eligibility of the participants to be in the study. For example, if the
company was privately held and did not issue reviewed or audited financial statements
for third-party reliance, the individual was not qualified to participate. Had any
disqualifying events occurred, the individuals would have been sent private e-mails
thanking them for their time and advising them they did not meet the participation
criteria. I did not need to send any disqualification e-mail notices because there were no
contraindications in the survey responses indicating that any participants were not
qualified to be in the study.
Instrumentation
I used a demographics questionnaire to collect specific information about the
eligibility of the participants, and I collected inductive data using a standardized, open-
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ended interview approach (Patton, 2002). Using a rigid questionnaire would have
inhibited the natural phenomenological discovery and data elucidation germane to
qualitative inquiry (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Creswell, 2013; Patton, 2002). However,
conducting the interviews without using a guideline in this grounded theory study might
not have mined the consistent thematic data required to develop or advance extant theory
(Patton, 2002). A semistructured interview protocol acted as the framework to gather
related emergent qualitative data (Patton, 2002) and as an agenda for collecting and
analyzing voluminous narrative data that assured interested third parties such as IRBs or
subsequent researchers of the dependability and confirmability of the results (Corbin &
Strauss, 2008).
To address the RQs, I developed the interview protocol from an NAT, HRO, and
ERM lens using analysis of the deviant Enron case and my professional knowledge of
financial reporting and management. Analyzing historical financial disaster information
from the Enron scandal (McLean & Elkind, 2004) facilitated the data triangulation
regarding responsible financial reporting and fiscal management. I formatted the openended interview questions (IQs) to seek data about promoting as well as prohibiting
responsible financial management to add descriptive richness by triangulating the data
from negative and positive perspectives (Patton, 2002). Ethical standards and
professional principles in accounting are operationalized through rules and regulations
guided by GAAP (Nobles et al., 2014). They promote integrity, objectivity, uniformity,
and comparability of financial reports to protect users relying on the financial information
contained in the reports from risk-harm (AICPA, 2014).
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To ensure credibility, I sought peer-debriefing (Chenail, 2011) or peer-auditing
(Seale, 1999) feedback from professional colleagues regarding the ability of the IQs to
elucidate rich and valuable data pertinent to the RQs. Most valuable was the feedback
from forensic accounting colleagues. These peers did not qualify as participants in the
study because of our employment relationship or contractual professional association.
Data Collection
After the qualified participants consented to join the study voluntarily, I contacted
them to schedule private interviews at times and locations convenient to them, suggesting
quiet locations with limited distractions (Creswell, 2013). If time or distance did not
allow any participants to meet with me in person, I offered to conduct the interviews via
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP)/video calls such as Skype and record the calls, or via
non-video-recorded calls. Of the 13 interviews, eight were face-to-face meetings in the
participants’ office settings. One interview took place in my office, another in a
conference room at the educational institution where the participant taught, one in the
participant’s home, and one in a local coffee shop. Initially, I was concerned about the
audibility of the recorded interview in the coffee shop, but we were able to sit in a private
area of the shop. I also tested the recording device before we started. I had no trouble
hearing the recording while transcribing the participants’ responses. Only one interview
was conducted via recorded telephone call because the participant’s schedule was such
that an arranged location could not be set. At the onset of the interview, I informed this
particular participant that the call was being recorded. Consent to record the call was
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obtained and recorded before the interview began. No other interview methods were used
to collect the data.
No personal or organizational conditions negatively influenced the respondents’
participation. However, one organization was in a period of reorganization with regard to
structure and strategy, a situation that provided a unique perspective of the ERM of
responsible financial reporting and management. Also worthy of noting is the fact that
although financial reporting deadlines loom throughout the year, the interview period
occurred during the fall and winter holidays, which provided a more relaxed platform that
encouraged fluid and easy conversation. This time-induced setting was not anticipated
when outlining the interview process, but it did give me more time to extract substantial
data from the respondents than might have been possible under more stressful
circumstances and tighter time constraints.
At the scheduled times of the face-to-face interviews, I arrived early enough to set
up and test the Olympus WS-853 digital voice recorder that I used to record the
interviews before the participants arrived. I tested the digital recorder before the
respondents arrived and again after their arrival by introducing myself and then asking
the participants to state their first names and the date. At that point, I stopped the
recording so that each participant and I could listen to it to ensure that we had quality
audio for the interview. We then proceeded with the actual interview. Testing the
equipment before recording ensured quality audio reception and negated the need to
repeat the initial interview (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Creswell, 2013; Patton, 2002).
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I noticed that when the face-to-face interviews commenced, the participants
fixated on the audio recorder that I had placed on the table or desk, which made the start
to each interview slightly stilted. Because building trust and rapport between researcher
and participant elucidates richer data (Patton, 2002), I was concerned that the focus on
the equipment would prohibit rich data mining. However, additional questions in the
interview protocol regarding job duties, involvement with rules and regulations, and
expertise took the focus from the equipment and placed it on the participants, which
provided a platform for me to build rapport with them and for the participants to relax
and speak freely and often passionately about the topic thereafter.
I followed the same protocol for each interview, modifying it as the interviews
progressed for redundancy, clarity, and to fit each participant’s situation and
circumstances. The open-ended IQs were successful in focusing the dialogue on the
purpose of the study while also encouraging the participants to share their unique
experiences in responsible financial reporting. At times, the participants became so
passionate and informative that I had to redirect some participants back to the essence of
the IQs.
If I believed that I could excavate more data from any of the interviews, or if any
participants offered data that deserved to be pursued, I obtained their permission to
follow up with them for clarification or verification (Creswell, 2013). All but three cases
went no longer than the 1 hour promised. I advised the participants in the three extended
interviews that my allotted time had expired and that unless they wished to continue, I
would thank them for their time and conclude the interviews. The participants
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appreciated my respect for their time but wished to continue because they felt that they
had more information to provide. One participant was contacted via e-mail after the
interview for additional information. I downloaded the audio files to my laptop
immediately after the interviews for redundant storage in the event that the data on the
recorder were accidentally erased or corrupted.
In all data collection scenarios, there were no debriefing procedures. I thanked the
participants for their time and reminded them that as a part of member checking, I would
send them copies of their individual transcribed responses to review and summaries of
the preliminary interpretation of the data derived from the interviews to provide feedback
concerning accuracy. I also advised the participants that they would receive an executive
summary of the study upon completion.
Data Reduction
I designed the IQs to elucidate data connected to each RQ. The IQs relevant to
RQ1 were intended to investigate the presence of HRO constructs that promote reliability
in organizational financial reporting. The IQs pertaining to RQ2 addressed adherence to
the rules, regulations, standards, and statutes intended to mitigate financial risk-harm.
Some peers have argued that “doing the right thing” and maximizing
organizational net income rarely coexist in successful organizational reality. They have
not been alone in this thought: Many researchers have addressed variations of
dichotomous relationships between corporate social responsibility, that is, doing the right
thing, and financial organizational success (Aguinis & Glavas, 2012; Frooman, 1997;
Orlitzky et al., 2003; Peloza, 2009). The IQs relevant to RQ3 were intended to address
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how leadership and employees in currently financially sound organizations value,
operationalize, and promote this seemingly paradoxical relationship in practice and how
this knowledge can be transferred to other organizations. Defining the motivational
psychological constructs of leaders who promote fiscal fiduciary responsibility within
their organizations’ ERM while achieving sustained financial success in practice will
provide evidence to other leaders that there are contributing psychological factors to
acknowledge when promoting fiscal responsibility without harming the sought-after
profitability of the organizations. The data extracted using these IQs supported RQ3 in
providing tools for leadership to select and motivate employees to achieve organizational
goals by performing their duties and tasks in the realm of responsible financial reporting
and management.
I looked to embodied transcription (ET; Brooks, 2010) and Matheson’s (2007)
detailed and iterative transcribing methodologies as the first step in reducing and coding
the data. Transcribing is the first step in qualitative data analysis (Bailey, 2008), yet
descriptions of the transcription stage in qualitative literature often have been limited to
brief mention that the data were transcribed, with little attention to the interpretive
process occurring during this step (Brooks, 2010; Lapadat & Lindsay, 1999; Matheson,
2007). The iterative process of listening and speaking the words of the interviewees
repeatedly immerses researchers in the information provided by the interviewees,
allowing for better detection of converging data, thematic commonalities, and emerging
theory (Brooks, 2010). Brooks (2010) defined the iterative three-cycle process of
transcribing, that is, (a) revisit and repeat, (b) revision, and (c) refinement and reflection,
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as ET. I used and adapted to my purpose the descriptive methods of ET provided by
Brooks and the detailed methodology outlined by Matheson (2007).
The iterative ET process in this study went as follows:
1. I listened to the interview responses with earphones while speaking what I
heard so that the voice recognition software, Dragon NaturallySpeaking v.13
(DNS) could transcribe my spoken words. This process included rewinding
and repeatedly listening to various phrases to ensure that I heard the words
correctly and understood their meaning.
2. I listened to the interview responses with earphones again while following the
original rough transcriptions to correct misinterpretations by DNS of
substantive content and correct typographical errors. This step also included
various instances of rewinding and repetitive listening.
3. I then read the transcriptions for sensibility and corrected nonsubstantive
content, such as they’re/there, and/in, and we’re/were.
4. Although the conversational nature of each interview resulted in
grammatically imperfect transcriptions, I used Microsoft Word’s spell and
grammar check capabilities to correct items that would not affect content but
would make the transcriptions easier to read and interpret. These checks
included items such as mistyped words, capitalizations, and punctuation not
caught during previous content reviews.
5. I then sought credibility of the data by giving the participants the opportunity
to review their individual transcriptions for errors, a validation method called
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member checking (Creswell, 2013). This process occurred as soon after the
interviews as possible to take advantage of personal recollections of the
responses.
During the interviews, I took brief field notes of body language such as smirks or
shrugs that were impossible to capture in the recordings. Doing so proved useful in
interpreting the participants’ spoken words. I incorporated these notes in the memos
documenting my interpretive thoughts (Creswell, 2013). Field notes and memos
contributed to the credibility of the data analysis by providing a framework to
conceptualize the thematic trends, patterns, and models (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Patton,
2002). Memoing while transcribing the interview responses helped me to recognize when
the data collection efforts reached data saturation (Patton, 2002) and acted as a precursor
to open coding (Lapadat & Lindsay, 1999), the first step in the data analysis process.
Experiencing the transcription process segued naturally into the open, axial, and selective
coding required in grounded theory (Creswell, 2013). After transcribing the interview
responses and receiving no changes from the participants during member checking, I
imported the raw transcriptions into NVivo v.11 and used the documents to create initial
case nodes.
I used NVivo v.11, Microsoft Excel, and Microsoft Word to elucidate and
triangulate the emergent data. I used open coding to manipulate and assemble the data to
capture commonalities in the data and axial coding to assemble these commonalities into
categories or groupings as they related to each other. To explain further any relationship
between the categories and the central phenomenon, I used selective coding by RQ to
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show how the data contributed to the emergent theory (Creswell, 2013). However, the
raw data contained in the participants’ experiences and captured in their transcriptions
were complex and multifarious, requiring intricate analysis to elucidate theoretical
meaning. This process began by organizing the data.
Data Analysis
The analytic process in qualitative research is not static; rather, it continuously
evolves, possibly requiring several iterations and methodical attempts to reveal linkages
and relationships within the data, thus exposing the developing theory (Patton, 2002).
Analyzing the data in this case proved no different. I scrutinized and manipulated the data
from various perspectives as needed to complete the coding process.
Open Coding
During the interviews, some participants answered the IQs in an orderly way that
allowed the data to fall naturally into various categories established by the IQs as they
related to the RQs. However, other participants responded to one IQ and continued to
share information that answered or provided data for various other IQs without
prompting. Because the initial coding schema and interview protocol aligned with the
RQs, I attempted to organize the initial transcribed responses by copying and pasting
them into a Microsoft Word document formatted with headings by IQ to import and auto
code in NVivo v.11. To ensure that I had captured all of the raw data in the transcriptions,
I highlighted the responses in the raw transcriptions in yellow to indicate that I had
reviewed and addressed them. Organizing the data gives qualitative researchers a preview
of the analytic process (Saldana, 2013).
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The IQs generated integrated and related data, which signaled possible
overlapping discussions in the constructs of reliable procedural adherence in the ERM of
responsible financial reporting. Participants often responded as if I had already asked
them the IQ previously by using words like, “As stated previously” or “Like I said
before.” In situations where the answers fit more than one IQ, I copied the responses to
both questions in the formatted Word document.
After organizing the responses per IQ, I further exposed the data by importing the
formatted documents into NVivo v.11 for auto coding, creating parent nodes from the
RQs and child nodes for the IQs as they related to the RQs. I then read the interview
responses again and created categorical nodes within the IQ nodes to code relevant data.
Because the amount of data generated was overwhelming and unruly, I attempted to
cultivate the data by coding via a priori coding schema initially developed from the HRO
and NAT theoretical frameworks. Glimpses of concepts and themes emerged, but the data
still seemed to be static rather than forthcoming in a manner conducive to theoretical
construction. Therefore, I approached the coding from yet another perspective by creating
an outline of the RQs and the supporting interview prompts in Excel, coding the
applicable phrases with the questions, and labeling the answers with the applicable ERM
component and HRO construct. Although frustrating, this iterative process is typical of
qualitative analysis and facilitates reduction and analysis from various perspectives in
order to arrive at the thematic story and developing theory (Corbin & Strauss, 2008).
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Axial Coding
Raw coded data alone do not determine the substantive significance of the
information provided by study participants (Patton, 2002). Per Corbin and Strauss (2008),
grounded theory researchers benefit by using the “flip-flop” technique of turning a
concept “inside out” and “upside down” to microanalyze the data through a combination
of open and axial coding to expose categorical relationships. I compared, manipulated,
and analyzed the data to group themes logically from a holistic perspective to construct a
platform for theme emergence and ultimate theory production. Reducing the data by
revisiting the processes and information was a challenging and time-consuming yet
enlightening process because it converged the essence of inductive, open-minded analysis
through an interpretive lens of relational data interaction to produce cogent theoretical
direction.
Discrepant Cases
The only discrepant case in this study was the Enron case, which was used for
deviant case comparative research analysis to support the data from a juxtaposed
perspective by illustrating factors related to fraudulent or irresponsible reporting that
were missing or converse to the factors identified in this study. To analyze the data from
this case, I read The Smartest Guys in the Room: The Rise and Fall of Enron (McLean &
Elkind, 2004); marked pages; highlighted text; and made notations in the margins. I also
obtained trial proceedings and antidotal and empirical literature regarding the Enron case.
I used NVivo v.11 to assist in the analysis of the data gleaned from the 13 interviews.
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After completing the coding, I analyzed the path of emergence and created a
narrative to support the findings by outlining the propositions and schemas for a new
theory (Patton, 2002). I then developed a model to illustrate my findings when such a
process was deemed appropriate. I anticipated that the emergent theory would define
HRO psychological constructs applicable to the ERM of responsible financial
management.
Trustworthiness
Because qualitative research does not derive empirical knowledge based upon
quantitative numerical methods, matters of trustworthiness are different from those
relevant to validity, reliability, generalizability, and objectivity seen in quantitative
research (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Creswell, 2013; Patton, 2002; Trochim, 2006a,
2006b). Although various criteria exist to measure a qualitative study’s counterpart to
quantitative validity and reliability (Creswell, 2013), in this qualitative study, I addressed
matters of trustworthiness using Lincoln and Guba’s postpositivism evaluative criteria of
credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability (as cited in Creswell, 2013).
Throughout the study, I accounted for credibility through such processes as
triangulation, member checking, data saturation, reflexivity, and peer debriefing (Patton,
2002). I addressed transferability by seeking a homogeneous sample from heterogenetic
industries to generate detailed descriptions to support the findings (Creswell, 2013). Field
notes, memoing, and peer review supported dependability (Creswell, 2013); I addressed
confirmability by outlining the research procedures and methods in detail and reflexivity
by discussing my role as the researcher.
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Human Research Protection
Participant risk analysis performed using Walden University’s IRB application
revealed no participant risk-harm in regard to psychological stress, jeopardy of personal
information irrelevant to the study, or physical harm. However, there was the potential
for minimal beneficence, justice, and respect (American Psychological Association,
2002) risk-harm in regard to confidentiality, unsolicited interruption to the participants’
work routines and workplace environments, impact on social or economic standing, and
coercion to participate because of any possible professional relationship with me.
To address confidentiality risks, participants were assured upon initial verbal or email contact that all information provided by them and reported in the study would not be
specifically linked to any personally identifiable information (PII). Participants provided
their preferred e-mail addresses to link to the informed consent and demographics survey.
Unless the participants chose to change them, those e-mail addresses were used
throughout the study. I used alphanumeric nonspecific identifiers consisting of letters to
identify the source (i.e. EXT for external accountant, IPR for private company, and IPU
for public company) and numbers to identify the participants within the source (i.e.
EXT01, IPR02, IPU03). All data were stored on my personal, password-protected
computer. A backup of the data was made and stored on a separate removable hard drive
and locked in my personal office desk. No PII or interview recordings were uploaded to
any virtual online storage platform.
To limit the negative impact on the participants’ work routines and the work
routines of their colleagues, I clarified when, where, and how it was appropriate for me to
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contact them. I respected their privacy and professional duties by not interrupting them
needlessly and at inopportune times. The participants’ positions or statuses in the
organizations were not negatively impacted by their involvement in the study. No
specific financial information about any of the organizations was revealed by any
participants.
My credentials as a CPA further bound my ethical treatment of any revealed
financial data. To mitigate any coercion factor brought on by any professional
relationships with any of the participants, I reiterated that during the study, I was acting
as a researcher, not a professional colleague. The informed consent form read and agreed
to by the participants before the interviews educated them about the study, including the
fact that their participation was voluntary and that they could withdraw from the study or
stop the interviews at any time, including not agreeing to any follow-up interview
requests. Participants agreed to participate only if they were compelled to contribute to
scientific knowledge; they were not coerced into participating.
Summary and Transition
This chapter presented information about the rationale for using grounded theory
inquiry to define the HRO constructs as they applied to responsible financial reporting.
Also included was information about the research methods, including the overarching
influence of my role as the data collection instrument and my control of bias in
reflexivity. The participant selection criteria and recruitment procedures, including the
relationship between data saturation and sample size specific to this study, were
explained. Information about collecting the data using a semistructured interview
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protocol and analyzing the data was included. The chapter concluded by addressing
matters of trustworthiness and the ethical treatment and protection of the participants.
Chapter 4 outlines the data elucidated from reputable, responsible financial
reporting systems. The influencing human factors of responsible financial reporting
systems are revealed by showing how the data were organized and analyzed and how the
data within the subcategories were applied to the RQs. The data are presented in tables,
figures, and narratives using quotations from the participants and juxtaposed examples
from the discrepant Enron (McLean & Elkind, 2004) case to support the thematic trends.
Chapter 5 discusses the results, provides a conclusive theoretical summary, and offers
recommendations for future research.
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Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
Rules, regulations, standards, and statutes guide actors in the financial reporting
arena to protect those who depend on financial statements as a reflection of an
organization’s fiscal health (Wild, 2013). Although most organizations employ some
variation of ERM in their financial reporting systems to achieve organizational goals and
mitigate risk, there are still accounts of fiscal misappropriation, unethical behavior, and
misguided actions by financial reporting actors that result in third-party harm. Examples
include Enron (McClean & Elkind, 2004); the Madoff Ponzi scheme (Markopolos, 2010);
and Lehman Brothers (Valukas, 2010). There has been relevant research regarding
human factors of financial crises, monetary debacles, and unethical fiscal behavior (Lo,
2009; Ostas 2007; Power, 2009), yet antipodal research has been limited when
investigating the beneficial behavior and psychological factors that contribute to
responsible reporting in organizations that sustain positive operational goals while
mitigating third-party risk harm (Finkelstein, 2003; Jameson, 2009). Guided by NAT and
HRO research, I investigated the presence of human-related constructs in the effective
and reliable ERM of highly integrated yet less tangible responsible financial reporting
systems.
Three RQs guided the study:
1. What HRO constructs applied in ERM are present in reliable financial
reporting?
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2. How can HRO constructs applied in ERM minimize organizational
stakeholder financial risk-harm?
3. How can HRO constructs applied in ERM inform other organizations to
motivate leadership and employees to promote fiscal fiduciary responsibility
while maximizing profitability?
This chapter includes a discussion of the personal and organizational conditions
that influenced the interpretation of the study results, participant demographics, and
characteristics relevant to the results, as well as pertinent details about the data collection,
reduction, and analysis processes. To address trustworthiness, the chapter also includes a
discussion of matters relevant to credibility, transferability, dependability, and
confirmability.
Participant Demographics
The 13 participants in the study came from three groups of accounting
professionals. Four individuals were external accountants (EXT) with experience in
auditing and consulting; five members represented private companies from industry (IPR
) that issue financial statements reviewed or audited by external accountants; and four
participants represented publicly traded companies (IPU), whose financial statements are
readily available via their investor relations or investor services site on the Internet. The
industries represented were public accounting firms (31%), financial services (15%),
health care/health products (8%), manufacturing (8%), telecommunications/technology
(23%), mass communications (8%), and distribution/logistics (8%). This representation
of industries was consistent with the target population outlined in Chapter 3. The gross
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revenue of the represented companies averaged from under $10 million (8%) to over
$100 million (39%), with the majority in the $10 million to $100 million range (54%).
The companies’ average number of years in existence was 48.85 (SD = 38.07; see Table
1).
Table 1
Participant Industry, Reporting Status, and Average Gross Revenue
Classification
Industry
External accounting
Financial services
Health care/Health products
Manufacturing
Other services provider
Telecommunications/Technology
Reporting status
Privately held public accounting firms
Privately held with issued statements
Publicly traded
Average gross revenue rank
> $100 million
$10 million-$100 million
< $10 Million
Note. N = 13

n

%

4
2
1
1
2
3

31%
15%
8%
8%
15%
23%

4
5
4

31%
38%
31%

5
7
1

38%
54%
8%

Personnel positions stratified three external accounting managers and one external
accounting partner, five industry members from the C-suite, two internal accounting
managers, and two internal staff accountants. Participant gender was distributed as evenly
as possible with an odd number of participants (women at 54%; men at 46%). Ten
participants were CPAs, with two CPAs also achieving a master’s of business
administration (MBA) degree, and one of them further certified as a charted global
management accountant (CGMA) and certified merger & acquisition advisor®
(CM&AA). One participant, an IPU CFO, achieved the MBA degree, and two
participants held undergraduate accounting degrees. The average participant age was
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49.00 (SD = 11.56), with average experience in financial reporting and management
being 23.85 (SD = 10.11) years (see Table 2). Six participants reported years of
experience in enterprise risk management (M = 14.17, SD = 11.48).
Table 2
Participant Organizational Position, Gender, and Credentials
Classification
Position
External: Manager
External: Partner
Internal: C-Suite
Internal: Management
Internal: Staff
Gender
Female
Male
Credentials
Accounting degree
CPA
CPA, CGMA, MBA, CM&AA
CPA, MBA
MBA
Note. N = 13

n

%

3
1
5
2
2

23%
8%
39%
15%
15%

7
6

54%
46%

2
7
1
2
1

15%
54%
8%
15%
8%

Data Saturation
Repetitive thematic indicators began to emerge about the sixth interview, but
because I was aware of the tendency for new grounded theory investigators to fall prey to
theoretical bits (Patton, 2002), I continued to conduct the interviews, using the previous
transcribed data as a comparative analytic tool for each subsequent interview. Although
the same thematic sampling seemed to be present in the transcribed data, I was not
satisfied that the data had become saturated because I had not secured representation
from the IPU population. Because financial debacles that cause the greatest stakeholder
financial risk-harm seemingly occur in publicly held and traded companies, obtaining
participants from this area was critical to the credibility of this study. Therefore, I
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continued to recruit participants in this financial reporting arena until I secured and
interviewed three qualified IPU representatives. After hearing the same thematic trends
from these participants, I felt that gathering more data would not add to the theoretical
basis of this research, so I ceased recruitment efforts.
Core Category Identification and Characterization
According to Patton (2002), “Grounded theory produces a core category and
continually resolves a main concern, and through sorting the core category, organizes the
integration of theory” (p. 489). I performed a word frequency query in NVivo v.11 with
stemmed words and a minimum length of four letters to initialize data theming (Saldana,
2013). A word frequency query on the auto-coded data identified “people” as the
prominent theme. Initially, I discounted this result because (a) there were duplicate
bodies of text coded to different question nodes in the auto-coded data that might have
skewed the data, and (b) the result appeared to impair credibility because it simply
seemed too obvious. It made sense that “people” would be the most prominent theme, but
could this finding be relevant to the theoretical outcome of this study? To test this notion,
I first eliminated the possibility of excess frequencies from the duplicate references in the
NVivo v.11 auto-coded data by performing an additional word frequency query using the
same parameters on the raw interview transcriptions. Again, “people” was the prominent
theme. Figure 4 shows the similarities using word clouds.
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(data coded by RQ)

100

(raw interview data)
Figure 4. Word cloud comparison. Results of Nvivo v.11 word frequency queries for
coded data by RQ and raw interview data.
To seek further credence to the theoretical relevance that “people influence the
ERM in responsible financial reporting,” I performed a case-by-case comparative data
analysis using a word frequency query in each case. This analysis revealed that although
people was the most frequently used word in eight cases, the most frequently used words
in the other five cases were organization, look, different, accounts, and control.
Furthermore, in four of the five cases in which people was not the most frequently used

101
word, other words relating to individuals, such as managing, management, manager, and
staff appeared in the top five positions (see Table 3).
Table 3
Five Most Frequently Referenced Words in Interview Transcriptions
Participant identifier
1
2
EXT01
people
talking
EXT02
people
needs
EXT03
organization audit
EXT04
people
look
IPR01
people
department
IPR02
look
people
IPR03
people
managers
IPR04
people
needs
IPR05
different
accounts
IPU01
people
money
IPU02
accounts
function
IPU03
people
managers
IPU04
control
sure
Note. N = 13; “people” mentioned 11 times

3
client
look
people
managing
change
sure
business
talking
project
opportunities
audit
process
reporting

4
look
good
staff
audit
management
reports
report
billing
people
balance
control
reporting
audit

5
believe
help
firm
organization
good
managers
look
account
organization
good
manager
mistake
right

Table 4 shows the results of an analysis of the word frequencies greater than 100
for the aggregated interview cases, which revealed that although other relevant words
appeared with great frequency, the word people was mentioned 565 times, more than 300
times more often than the next frequent word, manage, which was mentioned 248 times.
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Table 4
Word Frequencies > 100 for Aggregated Interview Transcriptions
Root word

Similar words

People
Manage

No. of times
mentioned
565
248

Peoples
manage, manageable, managed, management, manager, managers, manages,
managing
Look
looked, looking, looks
227
Report
reporting, reported, reporter, reports
224
Talk
talked, talking, talks
188
Account
accountability, accountable, accountancy, accountant(s), accounted,
182
accounting
Organization organizations, organizations’, organize
170
Audit
audited, auditing, audits
169
Sure
make sure, making sure
156
Different
differently, difference
138
Control
controller, controllers, controls
123
Process
processes, processing
117
Right
right, “right”
109*
Culture
cultural, culturally, culture, cultures
104
Responsible
response, responses, responsibilities, responsibility, responsible,
102
responsibly
Note. *The word frequency for “right” was 343 times. The word “right” was used in conversation to
acknowledge statements and end phrases. The data were cleaned to eliminate conversational references and
retain 109 references in the context of “doing the right thing,” “hiring the right people,” “the right answer,”
and “making the right choice.”

Finally satisfied with the results of this analysis, I deduced that because not all the
participants used people the most frequently, other relevant themes could have emerged
as a core category to describe the factors of ERM in responsible financial reporting.
Therefore, the finding that people was the most prominent theme in this stage of analysis
was relevant and provided the basis for data reduction and analysis.
This induced interpretation provided a starting point for data reduction and theory
development, and it also gave credence to the value of investigating the psychological
constructs of human resources in reliable ERM in the reporting systems of fiscally
reputable organizations. Sole reliance on mandated control mechanisms, compliance
measures, and other authoritative dictates designed to mitigate third-party risk-harm are
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not in and of themselves sufficient for responsible financial reporting. If organizational
psychological human factors prohibit proper implementation and utilization of the
processes and procedures essential to the ERM framework of financial reporting systems,
responsible reporting is sabotaged, rendering any existing control and monitoring
mechanisms fantasy tools (Clarke, 1999) with no purpose than to feign responsible
reporting activities and protect third parties from risk-harm.
Subcategory Identification and Characterization
For further analysis, I reduced and assembled the data into subcategories of
relative analytical pieces to investigate the structural conditions of the people factor
integral to the reliable ERM of responsible financial reporting. To do this, I made the
following open-ended qualitative inquiries: (a) What do they do? (b) How do they do it?
(c) Why do they do it? (d) Who are they? and (e) Where are they? With the exception of
the Where data, which I organized and analyzed in table format, I used NVivo v.11 to
position these questions as child categories under the core category of People and coded
the frequently used words and themes according to these qualitative inquiries to
document the thematic data, as discussed next.
Under this scrutiny, the data revealed thematic commonalities of reliability in
responsible financial reporting. They are summarized as follows:


What do they do?: Internal and external reporting actors of reputable
organizations have ERM control and monitoring measures and tools in place
to promote responsible financial reporting. They use processes and procedures
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such as analytical reporting, metrics, and reconciliations to internally and
externally audit system controls (see Appendix D).


How do they do it?: Through effective communication and information,
individuals who promote responsible financial reporting take an active role in
operationalizing the ERM control measures and tools successfully. When
individuals seek, share, inquire about, and use information pertaining to
reporting compliance, they do the “right” thing and own the compliant
reporting process (see Appendix E).



Why do they do it?: Internal environment characteristics in the organization’s
culture and leadership seduce employee engagement, motivation,
accountability, and reputation sensitivity, all of which influence the
establishment and maintenance of positive reporting behaviors. Although
slightly adapted for the nontangible nature of financial reporting, reputable
organizations’ mind map of ERM of financial reporting appears to possess
HRO characteristics centered on the internal environment (see Appendix F).



Who are they?: The individuals operationalizing the ERM factors in
responsible financial reporting possess the “right” traits and skills to dictate or
encourage ethical actions in the context of strategic fiscal decisions.
Individuals different. They appear to be responsible, knowledgeable, virtuous,
and they care that they are doing the “right” thing (see Appendix G).



Where are they?: I analyzed the references made to organizational positions
and created a table to analyze these data, which are in Table 5 later in the
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study. It appeared that individuals occupying various positions inside and
outside the organization influenced the quality of the reporting system.
Leadership in the form of C-Suite and Board members was the primary
internal influencer of ethical behavior and accounting task performance. Yet
even more reference was made to the employees and managers as the actual
reporting actors. Surprisingly, although referenced often as a method of
accountability in monitoring controls, the policing force of the external
auditor appeared not to be the primary influencer of reliability.
Analyzing and grouping the data from a subcategory perspective allowed further
exploration of thematic connections as a progression to theoretical development (Corbin
& Straus, 2008; Patton, 2002). After exposing the data further, I noticed that some
subcategories shared conceptual properties and themes. When variations in similar data
fit into more than one category, I placed them in the most relevant subcategory.
Research Question Identification and Characterization
I grouped the subcategories as they best related to the RQs. I realized the
redundancy of RQ1 and RQ2 in that they were essentially making the same inquiry when
I felt it appropriate to place the same subcategories in each RQ. Because HROs are
concerned with mitigating third-party risk-harm, RQ1 was asking RQ2 in the context of
reliable financial reporting. Because RQ1 did not specifically deal with third-party riskharm, I grouped the subcategories outlining the explicit data relevant to tasks and
procedures with RQ1 and the more underlying human factors with RQ2.
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Research Question 1
RQ1: What HRO constructs applied in ERM are present in reliable financial
reporting?
What do they do? People in responsible reporting systems of reputable
organizations tend to the objective setting, event identification, risk response, risk
assessment, control activities, and monitoring components of COSO’s (2004) ERM
framework. From a financial reporting perspective, the overall ERM objective setting
component was focused on reputation management within the purview of overall
operating strategies and goals.
Interestingly, all participants provided data indicating that they were actively
integrating these various components of the ERM framework in their reporting activities,
yet only six participants indicated years of experience in risk management when
completing the demographics survey. The element that all participants did not state,
namely, that they had experience in ERM, could have indicated that they were unaware
that the activities that they performed were a part of COSO’s ERM framework.
Control activities. The most common ERM themes to mitigate reporting risk
while achieving the organization’s objective found in this study were (a) control
activities, and (b) monitoring tasks. The data revealed that all the participants in reputable
reporting systems felt that controls (mentioned 123 times) were integral to the activities
required to mitigate enterprise reporting risk. Participants spoke of internal and external
audits (169 times) to identify control needs, create the controls, and test controls.
Furthermore, procedures (75 times), and processes (117 times) were designed to make
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sure that all controls were in place to detect and report errors and mistakes when they
occurred. Participants used metrics and budgets as measurements to monitor control
effectiveness. In line with these methods were regular reconciling activities such as
checking (60 times), comparing (16 times), forecasting (16 times), balancing (27 times),
analysis (23 times) and reporting (81 times). Because words can have different meanings,
“reporting” under these subcategory analyses were modified to exclude references to
“financial reporting” as a noun because of the frequent use of the phrase in the interviews
as the topic of the study. Frequencies included the reporting activities only as a verb.
IPR03 described the company’s attention to dissecting and organizing processes:
I’ll say this, we analyze everything. If it flies in and around your head, I probably
have a chart on it. It’s really kind of exhausting but we continually look at
possibly the same thing many different ways. So we just keep coming back to
stuff and pounding it and maybe we’ll leave it alone for a while, then we come
back and say, how’s [that item] doing now, in a different view? And then it
usually discloses something you didn’t assess when you looked at it 3 years ago.
The data in my study revealed that the standard professional control procedures
and processes designed to protect the third-party stakeholders who relied on financial
statements produced by the organizations were respected and adhered to.
How do they do it? Information and communication (COSO, 2004) was a strong
ERM element that influenced the proper operationalization and performance of control
and monitoring activities in the reputable organizations of this study and was missing
from the discrepant Enron case.
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Inform and communicate. In this study, actions outside the bounds of the typical
compliance reporting that promoted effective enterprise reporting risk management
(ERRM) included effective communication (349 times). Communication references in
these cases included engaging in regular exchanges between leaders and employees,
asking or being asked questions, actively watching or looking for items or opportunities
then having conversations about the findings, making documentation for others to follow,
documenting deviations and errors, and encouraging individuals to raise concerns.
A sample of the integration of effective professional control and monitoring
measures and the information/communication connection is present in the quote from
IPU03:
A lot of it was communicated and a lot of it was process and policy and
documentation [italics added to emphasize applicability]. Everything there was
documented, everything was documented, everything. Every procedure, every
process, there was as little judgment involved as possible. And in accounting and
reporting there is a ton of judgment…but every process is documented, and all
work is documented, and signed off and reviewed…there were questions, if you
did these 12 steps … and you signed off on them when you did them, and then
you handed that to your supervisor and your supervisor verified them in some
way that you did what you said you did. And if there was ever a problem or
mistake identified it was absolutely clear that you better communicate that up. As
soon as or before you even know it’s an issue, you need to communicate that. And
we did that and as soon as you communicated that, the documentation process
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started as far as evaluating what actually happened, what’s supposed to happen,
why did this happened and all of that. The legal department was notified, the
upper management was notified… it was just unbelievable… There would be a
person designated as the person responsible for getting this issue documented and
communicated up.
As mentioned previously, an organization can have procedures, processes,
policies, and controls in place but if the human resources system does not operationalize
them through documentation and communication, they become nothing more than
fantasy documents intended to provide false comfort to unknowing reliant third parties.
Organizations with reliable financial reporting systems hire the right people and manage
them to operationalize control activities successfully. The reporting actors at Enron,
including external auditors and regulatory monitors, were subject to the same compliance
standards as the participants in the public organizations whom I interviewed, but the
deviant case organization appeared not to possess the critical human factors and
psychological constructs relating to communication and information to operationalize
reliable financial ERM successfully.
Although at one time Enron hired the right people to perform responsible
reporting, managing them to do what they believed they were hired to do was tainted by a
culture and a value system that rewarded revenue-generating reporting. Concerned
individuals in the Enron reporting system wrote memos and tried to bring up
irregularities, but their efforts fell on the deaf ears of leadership. Although a contributor
to some of Enron’s intricate dealings, corporate treasurer Jeff McMahon finally raised
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concerns about the noneconomic purpose of the self-dealings surrounding the special
purpose entities created by Enron to manipulate earnings. He was dismissed by a transfer
to a new start-up special purpose entity. When discussing the effective implementation
and use of control procedures and processes, the participants in this study emphasized the
importance of open access to financial, strategic, and operational organizational
information, and they espoused the benefits of regular and open communication between
staff and leadership so that all were engaged in promoting the ERRM of the organization.
Research Question 2
RQ2: How can HRO constructs applied in ERM minimize organizational
stakeholder financial risk-harm?
Why do they do it? The data describing what people do to contribute to the
responsible financial reporting system and how they do it emphasized the active oversight
components of COSO’s (2004) ERM framework; the “why” data revealed the less overt
or latent factors of the internal environment component of the ERM framework. These
factors aligned with HRO and NAT factors. Participants described the organizations as
different from other organizations for which they had worked in terms of their internal
environments and their influence on individual reporting behaviors and reporting
outcomes. Interestingly, the effect of an organization’s internal environment was not
mentioned by any governance triad in J. Cohen et al.’s (2017) study as being an ERM
factor. The researchers, who also were surprised at this omission, stated that it was
possibly due to the difficulty in measuring factors such as tone at the top and linking
them to ERM.
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Culture and leadership qualities. Although there were other noncontrol activityrelated factors of the internal environment in the data, organizational culture and
leadership attributes and actions were the primary factors referred to by the participants
as the greatest influencers of organizational success. Reference to the culture or the
corporate environment was made a collective 149 times, and reference to leadership,
which included managers and members of governance boards, was mentioned 479 times.
If culture influences responsible reporting, it would make sense that some form of
leadership would be a conjoined theme because leaders develop and reinforce an
organization’s culture (Schein, 1983, 1984),
Informed culture. Internal environment descriptions of the organizations in this
study indicated evidence of informed, just, and diverse cultures. The research outlined in
Chapter 2 showed that similar cultural factors existed in HROs (Weick & Sutcliffe,
2007). The previous outline of data indicated that the free flow of information and open
communication contributed to how the people in organizations with responsible reporting
systems accomplished their goals. This communicative atmosphere created an informed
culture. The organizations in this study fostered informed cultures through transparency
and disclosure. An informed culture supported by a transparent society encouraged
financial information sharing freely between various units of organizations so that the
other organizational actors could analyze and integrate the financial data with their
operational data to achieve organizational goals.
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When answering what factor most influences organizational success, IPR03
stated, “Communication is huge. Transparency, kind of goes along with that… we don’t
have anything to hide.”
IPR05 commented:
I think …we are pretty transparent, if that’s the right word. We kind of give the
organization…okay, from a financial reporting viewpoint, going back to my job
and financial reporting, on a weekly basis I put in front of them a report that tells
them what our current cash, accounts receivable, and accounts payable is. It gives
them what our labor is, our utilization is, our headcounts, our turnover is, our
billings month to date, year to date, what our forecasts are. I mean it’s a ton of
information at their fingertips. And this is filtered to the executive level; to the
partners and then it stops at the top layer of management, about 30 or 40 people,
and financial people are included there.
In addition to contributing to organizational success, transparency created
reporting accountability within the organizations. Non-financial-reporting actors fed the
reporting system information from their operating units, so skewed budget, forecast, or
result information would taint the outcome of the synthesized financial data, resulting in
inaccurate reporting.
The following comment from IPR03 was an example of how an organization used
metrics reporting to generate communication and foster an informed culture:
It’s kind of like what we are doing is we are really just saying to the individual,
really you think estimated costs, are going to be $25,000 to finish? That doesn’t
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feel right, because last time you told me it was going to take $12,000 and that was
only a week ago when we met. What’s changed this week? We are helping people
by reminding them and asking questions. You know we’re clearer in our
expectations.
EXT04 credited transparency and the resulting accountability as a factor for
adherence to policies and procedures in the statement, “The whole big brother concept.
Unfortunately, you know it is human behavior. And when you know someone is looking
over your shoulder, you’re gonna behave differently.”
These organizations were fastidious in disclosing to interested parties
nonfavorable organizational events that might negatively affect operations and
subsequently affect their financial well-being. Because the organizations in this study
were sensitive to their reputations as stable successful companies and not just short-term
financial results, they disclosed irregular items so that deviations could be addressed and
fixed to manage reputation risk. In some cases, high-level financial actors reported in
person periodically to their respective audit committees, and as part of the discussion,
they were expected to disclose concerns within their control environments that required
monitoring.
IPU04 described these meetings:
And they talk about the area that they are influencing. And about what areas in
their businesses that they have to pay attention to, I mean you have to pay
attention to everything for control purposes, but what are the areas they have to
[concentrate] on…. if there’s been an acquisition, how does integration affect the
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control environment for that acquisition. What you’re going to say is, here’s a key
area of my business that I’m concerned about, that I’m working on it and so
forth…and so you know, if I have a blowup, I’m going to have to tell the audit
committee. If I [hadn’t told] them or hadn’t highlighted some areas of significant
control that I have to pay attention to [during that conversation], and then I have a
blowup in that area, they are going to say to me, why wasn’t that on your radar
screen.
Conversely, Sharren Watkins, former vice president of Enron and former
reporting agent under CFO Andrew Fastow, recalled Skilling, then COO of Enron,
lamenting about having to report a more than $400 million portfolio loss to the audit
committee. McClean and Elkind (2004) quoted him as saying, “I don’t want to be the one
to go tell Enron’s board we’ve had a big loss when we’re supposed to be such great risk
managers” (p. 131).
Just culture. There was evidence in the data that indicated that open
communication and free-flowing information allowed the reporting actors, financial and
nonfinancial, to feel comfortable enough to voice their observations, concerns, and
opinions about specific items being reported; the existence of possible errors; and
impediments in the general flow of information without judgment or negative retribution.
Cox, Jones, and Collinson (2006) pointed out that open and honest communication
between and among members provides a sound basis for trust, an element of a safety
environment. The ability to report, share, and communicate in a safe atmosphere instills a
certain trust among agents and fosters a just culture (Reason, 2000).
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Human error can result in honest mistakes, but honest mistakes can incubate into
extraordinary events that cause unintended harm to third parties relying on the
organizations’ financial reporting (Reason, 2000). No fear of retribution to report a
mistake might mitigate a larger reporting mishap, thereby protecting unsuspecting thirdparty stakeholders. Lower ranked participants expressed little or no hesitation to
admitting a mistake or reporting a discovered error for fear of negative reprisal.
The following quote by high-ranking IPU01 triangulated the lower ranked
participants’ sentiments from a varied perspective:
I mean people make mistakes or just [do] sloppy work. And if you make a
mistake, we don’t crucify you over that. If you make a mistake every now and
then, we fix it, you know; it’s not the end of the world.
Conversely, there was evidence that there would be retribution if a mistake was
not reported:
When I probed to investigate any existing reflexive relationship between reporting
mistakes and punishment, IPU03 responded emphatically:
You would be fired if you didn’t [Italics added] communicate an issue. If you hid
anything, or if somebody found that you hid something, or if somebody found that
you checked the procedure and you really didn’t do it, you would be fired.
In most cases, if a teammate, a manager, or any other superior found a mistake
during the review process, the error was brought to the person’s attention, and the
individual was coached to correct the reporting actions.
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EXT04 credited transparency and sensitivity to the development of a trusting
environment that eased corrective conversations:
Well, in the being totally transparent [environment], he would bring it up to you
and your supervisor at the same time. So, it may not be comfortable to anyone,
but if there is any issue, then it’s confronted at the beginning. [Researcher:
Communication?] Absolutely.
In some cases in this study, said employees were sorted, or relocated, to different
areas of their respective organizations to perhaps find a better fit and remain employed, a
strategy described by almost half (46%) of the participants. However, if the individuals
did not improve and grow, but continued to make mistakes, or if behavioral issues were
the basis for continual errors that created a risk to the responsible reporting system, those
individuals were counseled out.
EXT04 explained it this way:
At some point, if you stop growing where you are, then it’s not beneficial to you
or the organization. You need to move on to a new place where you can continue
to grow… and make a more positive contribution to the organization. … they
refer to that as sorting. And so they basically evaluate skill sets continuously, and
they work at it. If there is a performance issue or borderline performance issue,
then [you ask] does that correlate with the skill set. You know, is there a
deficiency in the skill set for that particular position, and is that individual and
their skill set, is it valuable to the organization, and is there another better fit? Or
is it behavioral, and then you’re counseled out.
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To support the maintenance of a just culture, care was taken as to how the
discovery of a mistake, corrective coaching, and counseling out of an ineffective actor
was communicated so that trust among the remaining members was maintained.
EXT04 continued:
And that needs to be communicated in the right way not only to that individual
but to the entire organization, and do I think we’ve done it perfectly? Absolutely
not, but we certainly tried to do the best job of communicating that. These
decisions were very difficult to come to, they were difficult to handle, but they
were done from the right place. And that’s with the idea of having a better
organization for the future.
All participants agreed that intentional wrongdoers were terminated immediately,
and in some cases, the participants shared experiences where the offenders were
prosecuted. Although it appeared that a just culture contributed to reliable ERRM, there
was no tolerance for fraud or deception in these organizations. If an employee continued
to make the same mistake and was not held accountable, there also could be negative
reverberations in organizational moral and trust (Reason, 1997). The opposite was true at
Enron when it came to adhering to accounting standards and regulations. Enron rewarded
those who twisted, pulled, and broke the boundaries of reporting tolerance in the name of
pure revenue generation.
In her address to the Academy of Management address shortly after the demise of
Enron, Watkins (2003) discussed her position in the back office:
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That’s when I ran into what I thought was the worst accounting fraud I’d ever
seen. Enron had allowed Andy Fastow to enter into an unprecedented conflict of
interest: as chief financial officer of Enron, where his fiduciary duties meant
looking out for the best interests of Enron, while also becoming general partner of
an investment partnership, LJM, where Andy raised $600 million of limitedpartner monies and was charged with maximizing returns for limited
partners….Now, I hadn’t practiced accounting in over 10 years, but I knew
accounting had not gotten that creative; basically, Enron was hedging with itself.
(pp. 120-121)
Diverse culture. In addition, although most of the organizations appeared
hierarchical in structure, the cultures also reflected diversity in regard to experience and
expertise. In fact, two cases of fraud were detected, not by dictated audit procedures but
by a staff auditor’s awareness that various transactions did not appear proper.
EXT03 explained the discovery of fraud:
And the unique thing is that people would need to recognize is fraud is not
necessarily caught by doing an audit. This [fraud] was found by “whoopsie,” by
one of our staff who happened to be reviewing an invoice … And again it was just
happenstance... And then, this whole thing unraveled from there.
Although testing the discovered transaction was not in the scope of the audit plan,
the audit manager acknowledged the staff auditor’s concern at the presence of a possible
material deviation and acted by allowing further investigation and averted an accounting
catastrophe by tending to a near miss, a term coined by Sagan (1993). In the interest of
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time and money, the audit manager could have dismissed the staff auditor’s concern over
an invoice or chastised the individual for taking the time to dig into the details and
encourage the person to move forward, leaving the fraud undiscovered. However, the
manager deferred to the expertise of the auditor by respecting that the individual had the
knowledge to detect a deviation. Furthermore, the auditor displayed an active role in
being aware of possible deviations in the reporting system outside the scope of the audit,
which demonstrated a preoccupation with failure, which is an HRO construct.
The reporting actors at Enron also displayed active roles. However, their roles
were not concerned with seeking out financial reporting system deviations and control
weaknesses; instead, they were actively seeking the next best way to circumvent controls
and monitoring activities. The culture at Enron cultivated innovation at all costs and
rewarded unchecked ambition, encouraged fraudulent or deceptive practices to stretch the
rules to add value, and publicly punished poor revenue-generating performance.
Leadership at Enron only deferred to the expertise of those from lower ranks when they
could assist in furthering revenue generation, not in reporting risk management. Sims and
Brinkmann (2003) deliberated on the juxtaposed term Enron ethics as the contradictory
reality of words and deeds, that is, what values are espoused and what are actual core
values. At Enron, there was a definite disconnection between what was held out to the
public as the code of ethics and what was happening during regular operations. This
façade degraded, not generated, trust in an organization.
Allocation of rewards. In an integrated culture, the criteria for allocating rewards
and punishments determine individual behavior (Schein, 1983). As seen in Table 5, 54%
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(n = 7) of the participants reported compensation structures of salary with reward
incentive linked to organizational financial performance, 30% (n = 4) of the participants’
compensation was salary with other reward incentives, and 15% (n = 2) received salary
only.
Table 5
Participant Compensation Base
Classification
Compensation basis
Salary only
Salary with reward incentive linked to organizational financial performance
Salary with other reward incentive
Note. N = 13

n

%

2
7
4

15%
54%
31%

How rewards are allocated signals to the actors what an organization values and
its expectations (Schein, 1983). The organizations in this study used monetary rewards
such as incentivized compensation and bonuses based on financial performance. There
also were cases of nonmonetary rewards such as parties and career opportunities to
recognize and acknowledge a job well done. Ostas (2007) argued that rewards
promulgate financial fraud, and K. H. Roberts and Bae (2001) asserted that rewards and
incentives that encourage open communication of lasting safety issues promote trust.
However, when they are tied to a short-term focus on profits, the rewards and incentives
diminish the value of long-term failure and accident avoidance activities that should
ensure reliable operations. “Enron’s reward system rewarded individuals who embraced
Enron’s aggressive individualistic culture and were based on short-term profits and
financial measures” (Sims & Brinkman, 2003, p. 251). The data in this study indicated
that reward plans in the reputable organizations appeared not to contribute to unethical
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behavior. This finding provides support that incentivized reward structures are not
absolute antecedents to fraudulent behavior when implemented within an internal
environment conducive to ERRM.
Leadership qualities. The wording “tone at the top” was mentioned 24 times to
describe the driver of the success of the organizations in this study by seven of the 13
participants. Another four participants referred to the tenor, or attitude, from the “top”
being the driver of ethical behavior and responsible reporting. The participants described
leadership as being communicative, connected, informative, and transparent; possessing
integrity and honesty; and being referred to as “big brother.” There was evidence of highquality leader-member exchange (HQLMX; Gerstner & Day, 1997) in these
organizations. Cultural composition perceptions and leadership traits of the organizations
engaged individuals in their jobs toward adhering to reporting compliance tools by
providing moral expectations, accountability that encouraged ownership in reporting
outcomes, and motivation to perform properly.
Employees look to the behaviors exampled by the leadership as indicators of what
is valued in and by an organization (Sims & Brinkman, 2003). Former Enron VicePresident Watkins (2003) addressed leadership and the tie to ethics by stating, “All eyes
are on you, and the slightest erosion in values at the CEO level is magnified in the
trenches” (p. 123). Enron leadership espoused a code of ethics of commitments to
communication, respect, integrity, and excellence, but they modeled, condoned, and
rewarded actions that were in direct contrast with the code, which led to rapid
degradation in the ethical culture of the company. Furthermore, Watkins alluded to a
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divisive and elusive tone of leadership when she described how it was not until she took a
back office job that was less trying and protracted to spend more time with her child, did
she notice the irregularities, inconsistencies, and absolute fraud that was taking place. As
leadership, she had been caught up in the “heady” façade, as she described it, as the $1
billion portfolio manager jet-setting around the globe to find the next deal or to court
clients at ski weekends or the Master’s Golf Tournament. As a reporting agent, she saw
what was happening.
Collective mindfulness. Accountability based on transparency and disclosure
generated by open communication and the free flow of information of the informed, just,
and diverse cultures created a platform for mindful awareness and diligence in the search
for errors. As stated in Chapter 2, the HRO concept of collective mindfulness is a state
wherein the internal organizational environment engages actors to identify risk by being
preoccupied with failure, sensitivity to operations, reluctant to simplify interpretations,
committed to resilience, tolerant of redundancy, aware of the current situation, and open
to deference to expertise (Weick et al., 2008). Preoccupation with failure and sensitivity
to operations were the strong HRO themes that embodied collective mindfulness in
addressing RQ2.
Preoccupied with failure. Data in the preceding example provided evidence that
the staff auditor possessed situational awareness of an item that issued a weak signal of a
deficient control and was allowed to pursue it. In the case of periodic audit committee
reporting, the reporter was actively seeking points where the system could be weak to
report on the weakness so that it could be on the “radar” when developing the audit plan.
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Sensitivity to operations. In four cases, the participants specifically expressed
sensitivity to operations by actively searching for ways to simplify, improve, or
streamline processes to promote accuracy in reporting historical activity in order to
provide better analysis and foresight to achieve organizational outcomes.
IPR03 shared how the organization wrote a program to compile date from various
reporters in the organization in order to provide comprehensive data for analysis by
commenting, “Humans can’t remember a lot of [information] right? I mean, it’s a lot too.
So, in any event …all the activities and actions are now centralized in one application we
wrote.”
Simplifying complex reporting to produce accurate financials for analysis and
foresight facilitated organizational success while mitigating risk-harm.
IPU04 described the goals of the financial reporting system:
We are going to constantly try to simplify [reporting] processes to remove
complexity. We’re going to constantly try to provide better analysis and insight,
and we will do that because we always say if we strive to remove complexity and
due process, simplification creates more time for us to do analysis and insight as
opposed to reporting numbers. [As company accountants,] we don’t want to be
people who just report numbers, we want to be your business partner, and we say
we will do those things under the umbrella of an efficient and effective control
environment.
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EXT02, who triangulated the data regarding sensitivity to operations, explained:
I know we are talking about financial reporting, but part of that is forecasting;
where do you foresee a company, which is actually important…some people think
it’s just the actuals. Yes, it’s the actual, but sometimes, also it’s the actuals in
comparison to what they said it was going to be. One of the problems is [reporting
actors] spend so much time trying to figure out where their actuals are, that they
have very limited amount of time to even forecast. So the very first thing that we
do is try to limit the amount of time that you spend trying to compile the actual, to
shorten that window, so [that] now, you have more time to see how things are
trending over the year compared to what I thought it was going to be. And then I
can make better decisions so that hopefully my Quarter 4 forecast is going to be
pretty close to what it’s actually going to be. And of course, we can’t predict
everything.
Some HROs employ skilled temporary employees to bring fresh perspectives to
the organizations’ systemic routine to combat complacency (Vogus & Welbourne, 2003).
A participant in an organization with international operations and global reporting
requirements responded to my inquiry about training or other programs that contributed
to the ERM internal environment by asserting the use of a global service organization for
consistency. The organization’s reasoning behind this strategy was that using services
from this type of enterprise provided best practices to streamline the standard reporting
activities, such as accounts receivable and accounts payable, which provided assurance in
consistency and accuracy, thus supporting the control environment. Assuming vendor
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risk management had a place in the organization’s ERM plan deeming the third-party
vendor as ethical and reliable, this was an excellent best practice. However, from a
human factor HRO perspective, this approach flew in the face of reluctance to simplify
interpretations and complacency tenets (Coutou, 2003).
Research Question 3
RQ3: How can HRO constructs applied in ERM inform other organizations to
motivate leadership and employees to promote fiscal fiduciary responsibility while
maximizing profitability?
Where are they? Individuals who influence ERM in reliable and responsible
reporting hold various positions in organizations. Participants spoke of the employees,
staff, managers, management, and other reporting actors who performed midlevel, handson reporting duties 357 times in aggregate. Executives, owners, partners, and other
leadership references aggregated at 166. The board of directors and audit or other
governance and oversight committees were mentioned 81 times in aggregate (see Table
6). The frequent references to the midlevel performers might have led one to believe that
they, as a population, had the greatest influence on reliable and responsible reporting.
However, data from 12 of the 13 respondents (92%) included words like tone at the top
and leadership to describe the greatest influencing factor in the successful ERM of
financial reporting in conjunction with organizational success. Although one participant
representing the other 8% did not include those exact phrases in the interview responses,
there were ample references to upper level positional members as facilitators of reporting
risk management and error detection.
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IPR04 explained:
As management, as owners, as supervisors, you have to convey that culture [of
compliance] to the staff and make them aware of what you’re trying to
accomplish, how you are trying to accomplish it, and education is a huge part of
it.
Table 6
Where: Reporting Influence Position Frequencies
Position in the organization
Management
Managers
Leadership
Employees
Staff
Board of directors
Owners
Audit committee
Partners
Executives
Supervisors
Finance committee
Quality control committee
Management policy committee
Internal control committee
Investment committee

n
115
99
82
66
61
41
34
31
30
20
16
3
2
2
1
1

Based on the data, although the lower level reporting actors contributed to reliable
responsible reporting because they did much of the day-to-day reporting activities, those
in leadership positions influenced the reporting actors to adhere to the control and
monitoring policies and procedural tasks designed to produce the accurate information.
Who are they? I clustered the individuals from various positions into three
groups: externals, leadership, and employees. Auditors and consultants were grouped as
externals; members of governing boards or committees, the C-suite, and other individuals
who influenced the culture of the organization were grouped as leaders; and staff and

127
managers were grouped as employees.
Essence of “right” or “good.” Sixty-two percent of the participants described the
individuals who comprised the human resources responsible for proper and reliable
reporting and organizational success as the “right people” or “good people.” Following
are responses given by the participants when prompted to identify factors promoting
success in organizational reporting and goal achievement:
IPU01 said, “You surround yourself with good people…Making sure that you have
the talent that understands the complexity of all the accounting rules and how they need to be
handled.”

EXT04 stated, “Organizations that grow and continue to thrive and retain good
people do so because of the good people that they bring on board and treat fairly.”
EXT01 remarked, “I think it is really dependent upon the right people.”
EXT02 commented, “Making sure that I'm hiring the right people to take care of
implementing those policies, monitoring those policies.”
Attributes of right or good included knowledgeable, responsible, caring, different,
honest, possessing integrity, and having a core value to do the “right thing.” Each
attribute is described next.
Knowledgeable: IPU03 said, “In many respects, in my opinion they brought in
people from public accounting because that’s the only place that I know of that you learn
what’s required of the financial reporting process.”
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Responsible: IPU03 stated:
Yeah well, I guess the thing that just popped out was personal responsibility. That
everyone is willing to take personal responsibility for their own actions and what
happened. And that the culture in the organization and the tone at the top making
it clear that, you know, that they want to do not only what’s legally right but
what’s morally right.
Integrity: IPU01 remarked, “So, I just have a simple approach with the financial
folks and the culture of the financial reporting here is integrity is everything. And if you
are ever asked to compromise your integrity you should say no. It’s simple.”
Care: EXT02 noted:
Because I’ll be honest, I don’t care about [the market]. But you know who I do
care about? I care about these people, and I care about my clients and making sure
that I'm giving them the best possible service.
Different: EXT01 said:
I think that in our industry, we tend to want the cookie cutter accountant. We have
an idea of what qualities they should possess, and that’s like what we want. But
actually, I don’t agree with that. I think that we are better off with people who
have different ways of thinking about things because maybe they will actually
stumble upon something that we wouldn’t otherwise have caught.
Core value or values system: IPR stated, “So if you have solid value oriented
people at the top that are setting the culture of the organization.”
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EXT01 said:
I think that in the end it boils down to your personal value system. And you know
like work related, not work related. I would say that who you are is who you are,
…Okay so me as an example, I am a Christian, so I believe in the bible, I believe
in integrity, and I believe in honesty and just having an honest side. Therefore, it
would be contrary to my belief system to swindle a company out of whatever, not
to say that it can’t happen because I am not perfect, but overall, I hold strongly to
these things because I feel very…because I understand what I am representing
and what is important to me.
IPR02 commented:
Well you know, your interview is with someone who really was grilled from even
the early days, that integrity, is important ….say the right thing or do the right
thing, you know, don’t lie, all that good stuff. This is pretty important. The
foundational level of attributes of my upbringing and the combination of getting
that CPA really made me feel like, wow, I’ve got to keep this….I’ve got to do the
right thing all the time because too many people rely on me. If I don’t have that,
then basically the organization can’t grow, or move forward, or exist without this
position, specifically being high in integrity.
Many participants acknowledged that because the possibility of acting in a
deviant manner exists in human nature, monitoring for this risk is important. However,
most participants offered that their sense of responsibility was embedded through their
upbringing, faith-based beliefs, respect for the CPA designation and/or fear of losing it,
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karma, doing to others as you want them to do to you, or simply being afraid of getting
caught and damaging their own reputations or suffering embarrassment. These intangible
factors were more valuable to the individuals than the achievement of wealth through
deceptive measures.
The following quote from EXT03 reflected the sentiments of most participants
when asked about quality human characteristics and traits of actors in successful
responsible reporting: “So coupled with being somebody who is honest and has integrity
and wants to do the right thing, you also have to know and have knowledge that you are
doing the right thing or have people who do.”
Commitment to resiliency. The reporting systems in reputable organizations are
not subject to the quick thinking reinvention of information found in the error response of
traditional HROs. However, they are more like the previously mentioned needle-pricking
incident, wherein the analysis and reinvention of a way to combat and correct an adverse
event develops into a stronger system and more reputable organization worthy of
stakeholder trust. The data indicated that the reputable organizations represented in this
study were committed to reputation resiliency.
A definition of reputation offered by Google is “a widespread belief that someone
or something has a particular habit or characteristic.” The characteristics of the collective
individual and organizational value system influence the objective setting of the business,
which is a strategic component of the ERM framework (COSO, 2004). Although the
objective of most for-profit companies is to achieve and maintain profitability and
shareholder market, the organizations in this study also were vigilant in their objective of
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protecting their reputations via straightforward economic reflections of their actual
financial health to generate shareholder trust and long-term investment. They did not let
short-term market decoys distract them in their efforts.
Perrow (1999) discussed production pressures as a factor of accidents in NAT. A
factor in the reputation management strategies of the public companies studied was the
reluctance to concede to the pressures from stock market analysts to show short-term
revenue for the sole purpose of driving stock prices. The data indicated that these
reputable, publicly traded organizations held strongly to the long-term objective of
creating solid value and reputation management through accurate and reliable reporting,
despite the market effect. This is not to say that they were not concerned with market
volatility and analyst perception, but as Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) said of organizational
resiliency, these companies were committed to their objectives and rebound effectively.
Participants advised that possessing a virtuous character and doing the right thing
might have meant losing revenue by terminating or not beginning a client relationship
with a prospective high revenue-producing organization that would not comply with rules
and regulations to which the accountants attested. In the context of a private organization,
it might have meant losing high revenue-producing individuals because of questionable
ethics. In the case of publicly traded organizations, it might have meant losing stock
market points because of a drop in earnings per share. In all cases, it could have meant
paying higher provider costs because the organizations terminated vendor relationships
with organizations as measured vendor risk because of substandard quality, irresponsible
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ethical practices, or both. Organizations with reputable reporting practices hire the right
people, who will continue the practice of ethical reporting, no matter the cost.
Conversely, reputable vendors prospected by Enron refused to do business with
the company, no matter the cost of lost revenue. In one instance, an expert was recruited
by Enron to develop hedging techniques for locking in gains on private-equity
investments to disguise an impending catastrophic loss, but declined, stating that the deal
was impossible and that he would not be involved because “it’s called equity risk for a
reason” (as cited in McLean & Elkind, 2004, p. 131). The essence of right or good people
had a different meaning at Enron. Employees were hired for their competence and ability
to generate revenue, even to the extent that it involved creative accounting. Because
generating revenue was valued in the Enron culture and was the criterion for
advancement, individuals were encouraged to step on other employees in an effort to
make the company money and were punished for doing the moral or ethical thing.
Mclean and Elkind (2004) cited Amanda Martin:
If you made money at the expense of other business units, it was good. To put one
over on one of your own was a sign of creativity and greatness. After time, those
who valued teamwork and collaboration were weeded out, and those who
remained were ruthless in cutting deals and looking out for themselves. (p. 121)
Generating investor trust in accurate and reliable reporting by doing the right
thing proved fruitful. IPU01 talked about the pressures of meeting the stock market
demand using the following metaphor: “[It] would be the tail wagging the dog if [the
market] dictated your way of operating. So you can’t let that happen.”
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To demonstrate this observation further, IPU04 acknowledged the market value in
committing to and being resilient to long-term objectives:
I just heard two analysts speak in the last month or so about [the Company] and it
is that we “look at the long-term,” you know. It’s the … consistent performance
over the long term [that] drives the interest; it’s what drives the shareholder value.
It’s not any one blip. You can have a really good year, you can even have a really
bad year…, but it’s over the long haul, you’re consistent and stable and that’s
what makes the difference, not the “let’s just make this one quarter.” What we
don’t want is, “Oh, great news they made the year,” and then something come out
about how we made the year. We get a lot of credit in the analyst community and
I think this “do the right thing” keeps carrying forward to that high level because
of that.
Enron also was sensitive to its reputation, but only as it related to Wall Street’s
perception of its current earnings per share. A former aide of Skilling, one of Enron’s
leaders, stated, “The stock price was his report card” (as cited in McClean & Elkind,
2004, p. 125). Enron’s objective of short-term revenue generation resulted in the
production of questionable intricate business maneuvers and unreliable financial
statements (Arnold & de Lange, 2004). In contrast to reputation resiliency at Enron,
IPU03 responded that reputable organizations “don’t care if they miss earnings by 3 cents
or whatever…[because] a short-term view is just the biggest harm to most public
companies.”
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In one particular case of doing the right thing, the company came forward
unprompted and absorbed an exorbitant loss to make a sector of third-party stakeholders
whole after a near $200 million mistake. Although there could have been perceived
potential financial risk harm to the investing shareholders, the overarching desire to
maintain its stellar reputation of being shareholder friendly was an asset that the
organization was unwilling to forfeit for short-term fiscal gain. In another case, a mistake
resulted in the possibility of losing more than money for a large client and its reputation
for exemplary customer service.
When the mistake was disclosed, the group behind the problem was not
terminated immediately. Conversely, leadership and other employees of an organization
rallied, or “swarmed,” as the participant stated, to save the multimillion dollar job to
protect its client and reputation for outstanding customer service at a monetary cost to the
organization and personal sacrifice to some of the employees, who rectified the problem
by working “day and night, over a holiday weekend.” Regardless of the expense, the job
was saved, and the value of the monetary loss was capitalized into intangible customer
loyalty.
As discussed in learning failure from Chapter 2, being wholly in the experience of
correcting a mistake to prevent it from happening again is indicative of a learning
organization. The organization in this example experienced successful transfer
knowledge about the root of the mistake and subsequent correction to operationalize the
deep-seated double-loop learning, as discussed by Argote and Miron-Spektor (2011) and
Carmeli and Gittell (2009). It also indicated the existence of a psychological safety net,
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wherein learning by various levels of the organization was facilitated through robust and
effective communication (Schein, 1993).
When challenged further about the outcomes of this experience, IPR05 explained:
They learned from their mistakes….I think it gave them a respect and knowing
that not that you don’t want to be in that position again but knowing that you had
a place to turn you’re not just going to turn around and say okay they’re going to
fire me so I might as well keep screwing up.
IPR05 commented further about leadership that “I think it builds confidence … I
think it built a lot of confidence in the leadership.”
When asked what happened at an organizational level after the mistake was
corrected, IPR05 answered that “it prevented it from happening again. Learning from our
mistakes.”
The reporting agents from the reputable organizations who participated in this
study used the ERM framework components of objective setting, event identification,
risk response, and risk assessment as a basis for establishing control and monitoring
procedures and processes such as checking, comparing, forecasting, balancing, analysis,
and reporting required to generate accurate and reliable financial reports (i.e., What they
do). Effective information and communication, another component of ERM, between and
among the reporting mechanisms from financial, strategic, and operational areas fostered
engagement between leadership and employees to adhere to the procedures and processes
(i.e., How do they do it?). The internal environment of the organization, another
component of the ERM framework, embodied the human factors (i.e., Why do they do
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it?) relevant to adherence to the procedures and processes. Present were data evidencing
quality leadership driving an informed, just, and diverse culture, which facilitated
collective mindfulness, a state wherein the actors are preoccupied with failure, sensitive
to operations, reluctant to simplify interpretations, committed to resilience, tolerant of
redundancy, aware of the current situation, and deferent to those with the expertise
(Weick et al., 2008). Every individual in hierarchical positions in the organizations (i.e.,
Where are they?) played a part in the responsible execution of procedures and policies.
However, although the lower ranked actors executed the procedural tasks, the HQLMX
and the oversight of the governing boards encouraged adherence to the rules. The essence
of the right traits and characteristics of the individuals (i.e., Who are they?) comprised the
general underlying virtuous tenet of the individuals who worked in these reputable
organizations.
Evidence of Trustworthiness
I was able to ensure confidence in the credibility and transferability of the
findings by securing participants who possessed common reporting goals yet different
tasks and duties in various reporting system positions of heterogeneous organizations,
including external accounting firms, private organizations, and publicly traded
organizations. Having a diverse sample was essential because the participants provided
viewpoints from different perspectives to ensure data saturation and to triangulate the
data. I used member checking to confirm reliability by e-mailing the individual
transcriptions to the participants as soon as they were fully transcribed and by e-mailing
the preliminary data interpretation after data reduction and analysis. Although I had asked
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the participants to respond only if there was a misunderstanding or a misinterpretation of
the contents of the transcriptions, I received three positive responses confirming their
accuracy and four positive responses indicating that the interpretation appeared on track.
Furthermore, the participants who responded were eager to see the study when it was
finalized and approved. Although there have been scientific discussions regarding the
drawbacks and problems with member checking (Morrow, 2005), using this method to
assure validity and verification was appropriate for this study.
I used negative case analysis to ascertain dependability by performing
comparative analyses of the contraindications to the factors found in the data that
contributed to responsible financial reporting. I did not perform rigorous data analysis to
discover the factors of financial fraud because that research had been conducted
previously and was not the purpose of my study. Furthermore, as themes and trends
emerged, I discussed them with my professional peers as a method to obtain
dependability.
Although the researcher is the measurement in any qualitative study, by memoing
my individual perceptions, I was able to bracket my initial perceptions to limit reflexivity
and view the data through a more independent lens because I did not perform external
audits or was part of an internal auditing team at the time of the study. This position,
coupled with the detailed procedures, addressed confirmability. However, my
credentialing as a CPA provided the ability to build rapport with the clients, understand
terms of art, and place myself in a situation described by a participant that allowed me to

138
be open to possible dynamic influencing human factors not evident to a nonaccounting
professional researcher.
Summary and Transition
Findings indicate that reputable organizations have the right people (Who are
they) in place throughout the financial management system (Where are they) to identify
financial reporting risk events and create effective control and monitoring processes and
procedures to mitigate third-party risk-harm (What do they do). Members effectively
communicate pertinent information throughout the organizations to those responsible for
operationalizing the procedures and processes, engaging them to take an active role in
responsible reporting outcomes (How do they do it). The elements of what the people do
and how they do responsible reporting aligned with the objective setting; control
activities; information and communication; monitoring; and risk event, assessment, and
response components of COSO’s (2004) ERM framework. In most organizations,
governance boards, compliance officers, or their equivalents directly address the above
oversight elements (J. Cohen et al., 2017; S. Cohen & Falcone, 2016). Answering the
“Why do they do it?” question revealed integral human factors and organizational
psychological constructs such as culture and HQLMX that influenced financial reporting
actors to act ethically, operationalize the procedures, and own responsible reporting
outcomes.
Chapter 5 summarizes the study with a discussion of the ways in which the data
related to HRO and ERM theory, and it provides theoretical modeling as a basis for
organizations to address the human factors that support the accurate and reliable reporting
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of entity financial activity in a manner to mitigate risk-harm to third-party stakeholders.
Chapter 5 also presents information about the delimitations and limitations, opportunities
for further research, and the social implications of the findings.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusion, and Recommendations
Findings
HRO theory guided this grounded theory study to identify and define the
psychological factors of ERM effectiveness in organizational financial reporting
responsibility. The intention of this study was to establish a theoretical foundation to
assist the leadership of organizations desiring long-term organizational success through
reputation management and responsible reporting with the information necessary to
promote effective financial risk-harm management through ERM. The data showed that
HRO constructs existed in reputable companies that used ERM framework components
to manage financial reporting risk, which translated into reputation and third-party risk
management.
The interpretation of the findings includes a discussion of the integration of the
data with HRO literature and the ERM framework, the limitations of the study, and
recommendations for future research. The chapter concludes with an explanation of the
ways in which the findings can be used by other organizations to influence positive social
change.
Interpretation of the Findings
Results confirmed that HRO theoretical constructs existed to promote reporting
compliance via COSO’s (2004) ERM framework in the financial reporting and
management systems of reputable organizations, thus mitigating financial stakeholder
risk-harm. This finding aligned with the literature outlining the ways that other nonHROs have applied high reliability theory (HRT) to achieve organizational goals and
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limit third-party risk-harm (Bagnara et al., 2010; Baker et al., 2006; Bellamy et al., 2005;
Pronovost et al., 2006; Ramanujam & Goodman, 2003; Stringfield et al., 2008; Vogus &
Welbourne, 2003). To arrive at this finding, I analyzed the data via the RQs and then
applied them in context to reporting systems using the components of COSO’s ERM
framework.
Enterprise Risk Management Framework
Although only about half (46%) of the participants indicated that they had formal
experience in risk management, evidence existed that these reputable organizations
actively used various components of COSO’s (2004) ERM framework to promote
accurate and reliable reporting in their responsible fiscal management systems. In some
of the organizations, governance boards or other leadership dictated formal ERM
programs, but in others, risk-mitigating activities and other inherent organizational
factors required to achieve organizational goals framed informal ERM plans.
The observation that the participants might have been unaware of their
participation in an ERM framework was in line with J. Cohen et al.’s (2017) investigation
into the existence of formal ERM frameworks in financial reporting. In their study, some
participants from the organizational governance triad (i.e., the audit committee, the CFO,
and the external auditor) did not definitively declare that a complete ERM program
existed as formal oversight for financial reporting. These results were concurrent with the
data from my study suggesting that demonstrated themes of ERM components existed,
providing risk reduction, accuracy of the financial reporting outcomes, and the integrity
of the fiscal management of reputable organizations.

142
RQ1 inquired about the HRO constructs applied in the ERM of responsible
reliable financial reporting. The results indicated a linkage to HROs. The collective
efforts to mitigate risk, either as a formal ERM program or from an informal ERM
framework, indicated the existence of an underlying common reporting risk management
mind set, or collective mindfulness (Weick et al., 2008), among responsible financial
reporting agents to alleviate the effect of fiscal deviations and financial reporting errors.
A collectively mindful approach to risk management in these organizations resulted in
evidence of the HRO constructs found in high-reliability theory; preoccupation with
failure, reluctance to simplify interpretations, sensitivity to operations, and commitment
to resiliency. Furthermore, the data showed evidence of HRO culture and leadership as an
influencing factor in the ERM of responsible reporting. There also were some deviations
from HRO influences such as less redundancy and reward structures similar to those
found in fraud cases. These separations from theory could have been related to the
subsystem coupling or integration differences that reporting systems possess versus
traditional HROs.
Objective Setting
Because some organizations involve dangerous systemic integration to reach their
goals, any interruptions in their systems have tremendous potential to harm innocent
bystanders (Perrow, 1999). HROs expend resources and energy to achieve their
objectives of failure-free performance, and many succeed, despite their highly integrated
and tightly coupled systems (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991). The strategic objectives set by
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the organizations in this study were to achieve failure-free reporting in an effort to protect
the organizations’ reputations by managing stakeholders’ risk-harm.
When pursuing profit motives, these organizations considered how their efforts to
achieve profits affected investor trust and long-term market share. They were reluctant to
concede to market pressures for immediate earnings and were willing to sacrifice shortterm revenue streams for long-term investor interest. They also were committed to
reputation resiliency. Although not verbatim, reluctance to concede and reputation
resiliency were variations of the HRO constructs of reluctance to simplify interpretations
and commitment to resilience. The premise of HRO constructs is the achievement of
failure-free performance by actively seeking, learning from, and correcting possible
erroneous situations before they incubate into system interruptions that result in disasters.
HROs are not satisfied with the status quo.
Although the organizations with reputable reporting systems that were
represented in this study were concerned with earnings performance, they looked beyond
the obvious objective of short-term profits. In the case of the publicly traded companies,
they looked beyond market performance and valued the investment in resources required
to protect their reputations via ethical and reliable reporting that protected their
stakeholders’ interests and built investor trust and reliability.
Control Activities and Monitoring
Risk event identification, assessment, and response are the premises of the HRO
constructs used to search for risk points and then assess their effect on the organizations’
reporting goals and overall fiscal risk management. Responsible financial systems in
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reputable organizations do not overlook or dismiss seemingly unrelated changes,
deviations, or interruptions, such as staffing shifts or IT modifications; instead, they
actively investigate whether the change resulted in a negative effect on reporting
outcomes. Constant awareness, acknowledgment, and action to address possible financial
system interruptions indicate evidence of a preoccupation with failure in the financial
reporting system.
EXT03 gave an example of how the external audit firm was engaged to perform a
best-practices audit by the leadership of a well-known nonprofit, even though it was
exempt from preparing disclosure filings. There was dissention in the organization about
the need to expend the funds for such an engagement, but leadership claimed that it
wanted to combat arrogance-generated complacency and look actively for errors,
deviations, and interruptions via whistleblower opportunities, conflict-of-interest
disclosures, and transparency to protect the reputation of the organization.
IPU04 gave another example: The CFOs of various divisions of an international
publicly traded company were encouraged to find possible interruptions to report to the
audit committee for fear that a systemic collapse would occur and that governance had
not been informed previously. Being situationally aware of unsuspecting signals that
could have generated a negative change in the financial system protected the organization
by reporting the errors or deviations that could have incubated into financial disasters.
Addressing the event identification, risk assessment, and risk response components
precipitated the need for control activities and continuous monitoring. With risk points
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identified and assessed, the organization responded by creating internal and external
control and monitoring activities.
Ongoing analysis via reporting and comparing actual and forecasted results,
reconciling accounts, fully executing checklists, and supporting active initiatives to find
errors and deviations was evident in the reputable organizations of this study. The
research literature on Enron indicated that even though some employees dutifully
performed their compliance activities, the organization still suffered the outcomes of
fraudulent activities and caused fiscal harm to innocent third parties. In line with a
premise outlined by Bebbington et al. (2008), the reputable organizations in this study
used control and monitoring activities to manage and minimize stakeholder risk-harm,
which resulted in reputation risk management.
External auditors tested and evaluated the controls, opined as to the quality of the
internal monitoring system and accuracy of the figures reported, and provided feedback
on the effectiveness of eliminating or finding deviations and errors to mitigate third-party
risk-harm. Keeping control and monitoring activities relevant by objectively exposing
them to review, iteratively referring to them in the context of current situations, and
revising quality control standards as needed reflected sensitivity to operations and a
reluctance to simplify interpretations. For instance, according to EXT04, a change in a
leadership position was an event worthy of revisiting an audit plan. IPU03 asserted that a
missed check box was a reason to investigate and report up. Weick et al. (2008) posited
that situational readjustments occur during times of interruption and resolve in individual,
interactive, and cultural readjustments.
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When the reporting system members do not evaluate and challenge the status quo
of control activities and monitoring processes, deviant behavior normalizes, and financial
actors become complacent and approach audit procedures and processes by simply
“checking the box.” This thought was in line with MMD theory (Turner, 1978), which
posits that inattention to latent errors and collapse in organizational foresightedness
causes the reporting system to drift into failure (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997), allowing a
financial disaster to develop and cause financial harm to third-party stakeholders.
At Enron, leadership sent mixed signals of espoused ethics values. Although to
the public, Enron leaders held out to value outstanding ethics, what they truly valued was
the effect of reporting on Wall Street’s reaction to the stock in terms of short-term
earnings. Even if employees were originally hired as morally principled reporters, they
soon learned that ethical reporting was not the objective; instead, rewards were given to
individuals in the company who did whatever it took to show profits and earnings. This
decoy distracted the reporting actors from taking ethical actions to resolve the errors in
the reporting system, which then allowed the fraudulent acts to develop into an egregious
crash of intentionally ignored signs and subsequent financial reporting system disaster
that harmed thousands of stakeholders. Because the importance of adhering to control
and monitoring activities, as well as ethics, was not pushed down from the top, the
reporting control and monitoring procedures and policies at Enron morphed into fantasy
documents (Clarke, 1999).
Information regarding the effect of control and monitoring activities is not new or
theoretically groundbreaking to those individuals who produce reliable and accurate
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financial reports for reputable organizations. Expectations set forth by the accounting
profession’s standard-setting boards and mandated regulations (Nobles et al., 2014; Wild,
2013) are designed to protect users of the fiscal information contained in the financial
statements upon which they rely. However, this information is significant within the
context of HRO theory because it supports attention to the human resource and mindful
nature of effective ERM control activities and monitoring components, which supports
effective implementation of procedures, policies, and achievement of the organizational
goals.
Information and Communication
The data showed that the financial reporting systems used control activities and
monitoring to facilitate accurate and reliable statements. However, the efforts to seek,
gather, and share significant information and effectively communicate it to pertinent
individuals in the organizations via documentation, training, and continual learning
operationalized the control procedures and processes into high-reliability tools. Quality
communication and the sharing of information created a transparent society, which
deeply engaged the reporting actors to be involved in the processes and outcomes
generated by reporting system controls.
Effective and quality communication between and among units is a key HRO
element in determining a comprehensive plan for risk management in complex systems
(Shawn Burke et al., 2005). This observation was in contrast to Jameson’s (2009)
commentary on communication failures as contributors to financial disasters and the
resulting economic downturn around 2008. Dysfunctional communication and

148
information processing also were found to contribute to the Space Shuttle Columbia
explosion (Deal, 2004; Pidgeon & O’Leary, 2000; Vaughan, 1990, 2009).
IPU02 provided a comprehensive example of how control and monitoring
activities, or lack thereof, and the communication and the flow of information, starting at
the lowest level, affected the financial reporting in an organization that had little or no
formal control policies. The CFO then described the haphazard methodology of
reconciling the subsidiary systems that was not working to promote accurate and reliable
reporting, even though members seemed to be communicating. Having identified the risk,
the CFO went through a process of risk response by creating control and monitoring tools
and then putting them in place.
However, there were cases where the policies were not being adhered to, so yet
another policy was created as a response to nonadherence. Monitoring activities were
also put in place to follow up on the effectiveness of the control activities. According to
the data, the presence of control and monitoring activities, quality information, and
effective communication to operationalize the procedures and policies were essential to
promote responsible financial reporting and fiscal management. Furthermore, these
activities contained HRO constructs to further the initiative to achieve ERRM, with the
goal of protecting organizational reputations.
Internal Environment
Like Enron, organizations can have various controls, procedures, and policies in
place and they can communicate and share information all day long, but if the actors do
not perform the procedures as intended, or if the information generated is contrary to the
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purpose of the process, the tools become fantasy documents and become ineffective in
truly mitigating third-party risk-harm. RQ2 inquired about the HRO constructs in ERM
that would minimize organizational stakeholder financial risk-harm, and the evidence
pointing to the overarching themes or filters that motivated, involved, and further
engaged the participants to adhere to the rules and procedures of successful ERRM was
found in the internal environment.
Although individual core values, personal traits, and characteristics contributed to
ethical reporting, elements of culture and leadership in the internal environment strongly
influenced the reporting human resource to adhere to the control and monitoring activities
designed to minimize stakeholder risk-harm. Elements of the internal environment as
factors that influence reporting compliance have been a theme discussed in the
accounting literature, but they have not been easily measured or operationalized (J.
Cohen et al., 2017; S. Cohen & Falcione, 2016). The data showed that signs of HRO
culture and leadership were similar to those found in HROs, which could have provided a
basis for measuring and operationalizing the internal environment elements discussed in
the accounting literature as antecedents to compliant reporting.
Culture. The overarching HRO factor and antecedent to responsible financial
reporting was organizational culture. The availability of information and effective
communication were mechanistic factors in nature and were responsible in
operationalizing control activities and monitoring processes. The mechanism was
important because if data were unavailable, inaccurate, or unreliable, internal users could
make poor decisions that might result in poor outcomes for that division, the entire
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organization, and eventually innocent stakeholders. However, there was a deeper aspect
of information and communication embedded in the internal environment that
psychologically motivated the individual reporting actors to adhere vigorously to the
procedures and policies in a manner that actively investigated systemic variables to
manage risk effectively in the reporting environment.
Informed culture. The sequential effect of uninhibited communication indicated
the existence of an informed culture that fostered the transparency and accountability
themes found in HRO constructs. An informed culture in an HRO context contains
artifacts and stories that create a deep-seated message that it is acceptable to seek out
errors proactively, admit mistakes, and report deviations.
In some cases, the informed culture also influenced disclosing or remediating
possible harmful events to third parties. However, compliance with disclosure
requirements depended on whether management was aware of any required disclosures,
and would actually come forth and document the events. If they were not aware, were the
events discoverable by external auditors during audit activities? Furthermore, if the
external auditors discovered events, actual disclosure compliance was dependent upon
the auditors’ dedication to doing the “right thing” and not conceding to revenue
production pressures to not disclose required items for fear of losing large revenueproducing clients. An informed and transparent society encouraged proper disclosure
because engaged individuals saw the input and outcomes of their actions that reflected
their share of responsibility to promote ERRM to protect organizational reputations and
third-party stakeholders.
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Connecting the individuals involved in financial matters through sharing
operating and compliance information freely and effectively in an informed culture
fostered a sense of ownership by nonequity members, which resulted in policy and
procedural adherence and subsequent accurate and reliable financial reporting. This
observation was in line with K. H. Roberts and Bea’s (2001) discussion about the need
for integrated communication during mindful error-seeking containment to enhance
reliability. Shawn Burke et al. (2005) stated that organizational member involvement in
decision making is a factor for successful transformation to high reliability.
Just culture. Humans are fallible: They make mistakes and inadvertent errors.
However, if left unaddressed nominal errors and mistakes can infiltrate reporting
systems and culminate in material weakness in financial statements. Transparency of
information generated trust among members. Reporting actors could find and report
errors and deviations as a matter of regular control activities because the information
was available for all to see. Reporting actors had little or no fear of retribution to admit a
mistake or disclose an error because it was expected that the shared information was
intended to generate awareness of reporting systemic weaknesses that would affect the
business reputations. Rather than generating pride in admitting a mistake or finding an
error, the just culture provided a psychological safety to the reporting actors to expose
weaknesses. Once exposed and reported, it was up to leadership to acknowledge the
problems and initiate actions to correct the matters systemically. This phenomenon
created a circular reference back to effective communication and the sharing of valuable
information, both of which encouraged transparency and accountability, and so on.
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Diverse culture. These organizations possessed cultures diverse in experience and
expertise, embracing differences to generate information that provided rigor to
discovering errors, control weaknesses, or other deviations. A diverse culture is an HRO
construct evidenced by robust dialogue to expose and explore corrections and controls
from various viewpoints to arrive at the best decisions, not just an individual or a team
consensus (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). One organization represented in the study
exampled its sensitivity to operations through diversity by understanding that a voluntary
retirement initiative and reorganization in the finance area were opportunities to review,
revise, and create standard operating procedures (SOPs) to mitigate risk related to
transfers in duties.
Value of an informed culture was evidenced by the forethought that with
documented procedures to communicate objectives, required tasks, and duties of a
position, another individual could come in, sit down, and fulfill the job by reading the
SOPs. A respect for a diverse culture was evidenced by the value shown for all levels of
expertise in the organization. However, a hierarchical structure was present, as evidenced
by reporting up and by leadership being accountable by signing off on the SOP process
before individuals transitioned out of their positions and others took their place.
The finance department at this organization was not distracted by the upheaval of
a transition; rather, it used the transition as a learning opportunity to mitigate risk arising
from the changes in roles and responsibilities. The HRT literature referred to a culture
committed to learning from mistakes as having a commitment to resilience. The flexible
and open flow of information between and among levels of the organization found in an
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informed and diverse culture, coupled with reduced fear in reporting deviations evident in
just cultures and a commitment to learning from and making the appropriate changes to
address weaknesses, eventually resolves in the financial outcomes of the organization
(Denison, 1984).
The conversation on human resource redundancies was flat, meaning that there
was not much discussion about the benefits of redundancy or redundant measures to
cover duties in the case of absences or staffing issues. It could be that they were inherent
in control activities and monitoring measures, but redundancy did not seem to be
forefront in the minds of the reporting actors as an influencing factor. Had this been a
discussion on information technology in financial reporting, there might have been more
dialogue about redundancies.
Furthermore, in the private company cases, the number of staff members who
dealt with financial matters was relatively small in comparison to the transaction load; in
most cases, there was some form of cross training to cover positions when employees
were absent. In other cases, the reporting leaders would cover the duties of absent
employees until they could find proper replacements, and in cases such as reorganization,
the reporting actors took on additional duties and responsibilities permanently. This
strategy seemed to be in the face of the HRO construct of reluctance to simplify
interpretations because as duties are added to individuals’ responsibilities, more
opportunity happens for errors and mistakes to develop into systemic weaknesses in the
financial reporting system. Additional rigor would be needed to investigate possible
weaknesses under the possibility that a task the other person or leadership should be

154
doing was being left undone or if an internal control such as segregation of duties was
incubating an error for possible reporting system interruption.
When asked about redundancies, IPU04 identified the benefits of redundant
performance through the use of service organizations for ordinary transaction reporting to
promote consistency and reliability. However, HRO theorists have posited that
outsourcing can degrade a system’s integrity by limiting requisite variety and beneficial
mindfulness, meaning that the provider is saddled with detecting errors and the buying
organization is left at risk of complacency in that reporting system (Weick et al., 2008)
Leadership. The numerous references to “tone at the top” as the influential factor
of organizational success, defined as achieving profit-making objectives while protecting
reputations and stakeholders, evidenced that leadership had the most influence on ERRM.
This observation aligned with the HRO discussion of hierarchical structure. The
hierarchical arrangement of positions by responsibilities and duties with regard to
reporting processes and procedures facilitates a fluid flow of information and
communication (Roberts, 1990). However, when information does not flow because of
impermeable structures, the individuals performing the reporting tasks do not feel that
they can reveal mistakes, errors, or deviations upwards (Weick et al., 2008). Thus, a
normalization of deviance develops (Vaughan, 2003), as was evident in the Enron case.
The case evidence in this study that leadership can influence responsible reporting
indicated deference to expertise, in that the hierarchical structure was penetrable by rankand-file individuals performing the reporting tasks, allowing higher positioned
individuals to be informed of and able to address possible reporting risk events to
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mitigate third-party risk-harm.
S. Cohen and Falcione (2016), who conducted a study for PwC, concluded that
only 26% of senior executives spoke of compliance and ethics as part of everyday
business communications. S. Cohen and Falcione as well as J. Cohen et al. (2017)
discussed the need for a culture of compliance and a quality internal environment, but
they did not provide any indication of ways to generate either. In their study on providing
a climate of compliance, S. Cohen and Falcione addressed such business strategy
elements as tone at the top, culture, and communication, but they did not indicate the
psychological connection between leadership and reporting actors that might contribute
to a compliant environment.
Results of my data showed that leadership is a central HRO theme in financial
reporting systems. A discussion about culture must include leadership qualities because
leadership drives culture (Schein, 1983). If leadership is unable or refuses to address
system weaknesses, the control environment wanes, and the inertia from the effect of the
weaknesses multiplies can result in financial disaster (K. H. Roberts & Bea, 2001; Weick
et al., 2008). Seeger and Ulmer (2003) posited that the responsibilities of a leader in
championing an ethical financial reporting culture include “communicating appropriate
values to create a moral climate, maintaining adequate communication to be informed of
organizational operations, and maintaining openness to signs of problems” (p. 59).
Leadership in responsible financial reporting cultures expressed having a deepseated virtuous quality to do the right thing. Despite many participants being
compensated by some form of incentive for financial performance, the leaders were
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concerned about what was right for the stakeholders of the organizations and considered
them in the decisions that they make and the role that they modeled to protect them and
the reputations of their organizations. Qualities like honesty, trustworthiness, and
integrity were used to describe the leaders in this study’s reputable organizations. Similar
value-oriented elements are present in transformational leaders who motivate their
followers to look beyond their self-interests for the good of their respective organizations
(Bass, 1999). Leaders in this study were knowledgeable of compliance matters and took
responsibility for reporting functions and results, something that generated mutual respect
and trust among the reporting members. Bass (1990) described transactional leadership,
the antithesis of transformational leadership, as a “prescription for mediocrity” (p. 2)
because the leaders get involved only when procedures and standards are not being
adhered to. Enron’s leader-driven transactional culture of reward for performance and
punishment for nonperformance resulted in disastrous outcomes because of the lack of
moral standards generally used by transformational leaders in motivating their team
members.
Results also identified a sociorelational dynamic that fostered connectivity
between leaders and reporting actors in the reputable organizations that encouraged
communication and motivation. The elements of transformational leadership generated
HQLMX (Gerstner & Day, 1997), which seemed to foster better compliance and
operationalize ERRM components. According to LMX theory, the quality of LMX has
been correlated positively with follower satisfaction, organizational commitment, role
clarity, and role performance (Krishnan, 2005). Engaged employees who adhere to
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policies and procedures because of a high-quality connectivity between leader and
follower (Krishnan, 2005) and who have little to no fear of reporting errors and mistakes
might reduce system drift and the incubation of financial control failures (Turner &
Pidgeon, 1997) that might permit nominal deviations to evolve into egregious frauds.
Familial compliance environment. RQ3 addressed the ways that HRO
constructs in ERM can inform other organizations to motivate leadership and employees
to promote fiscal fiduciary responsibility while maximizing profit. The investigation into
HRO constructs as a tool to promote reliably accurate financial reporting is premature
and requires development before practitioners can apply it. However, at the risk of
drifting from scholarly writing but imagining how HRO constructs in ERRM might be
applied to practice, the following metaphorical model developed from the interpretation
of the findings that could be used to communicate to accountants information about the
human factors that contribute to a compliant internal environment for ERRM.
Weick et al. (2008) referred to open and frequent communication and effective
leadership as good “motherhood items” (p. 59) in their discussion of HRO foundational
tenets. They surmised that in an environment under change, “a good mother is hard to
find” (p. 59). “Big brother” accountability, or overarching sense of someone watching;
the reference to HRO motherhood tenets discovered in the data; and the presence of
transformation leadership and HQLMX simulated a familial-like internal environment
where responsible reporting systems excelled. Reporting teams were akin to siblings
looking out for each other by checking and advising each other of in-group mistakes or
deviations so that as a team, they would be reflected in good light to the management
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above them (control and monitoring activities). Then teams at that level would make
certain that they were disclosing events and items among their team (information and
communication), so that when they reported up, they also would be reflected in good
light. Because it was expected in this family (culture) that information would circulate
and reach leadership, with the goal of pleasing the respected “parent.” Leadership, being
of good integrity, trustworthy, virtuous, and respected, as a well-regarded parent might
be, would understand an honest mistake and provide a basis for learning from the
mistake, but would not tolerate intentional wrongdoing without consequences
(connectivity). As in Enron, if the parents are not emotionally present (too busy looking
after their own interests), the children will not receive the guidance necessary to develop
and act properly and will, instead, look to modeling the parents’ behavior as a guide.
Limitations of the Study
The study did have some limitations. Although stratification across industries was
sufficient, there were two cases of participants being stratified over positions within the
organizations. However, the positions that the participants held in the companies were
sufficiently heterogeneous to address the topic from various perspectives. The
representation of five women in leadership positions mediated the possible limitation of
my gender as a female and gender-related risk tolerance influences.
The derived model from these organizations presented the panacea for perfectly
responsible, accurate, and responsible financial reporting and management. However, the
findings that certain HRO constructs exist in the ERM components of responsible
financial reporting systems in the studied organizations might not be generalizable to all
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organizations. Because culture and leadership characteristics were instrumental in
providing a platform for HRO constructs in the internal environment, the findings of this
study could be generalizable only to organizations whose governance boards and
leadership desire ERRM and are committed to championing the initiative. This limitation
did not allow me to address the agentic leadership influencing factors of failed reporting
systems. Furthermore, because there is a cost associated with turning over every stone to
look for errors (K. H. Roberts & Bea, 2004), there could be cost-benefit decisions that
create unknown inherent systemic weaknesses in certain integrated systems in
organizations desiring a responsible and reliable system that could not be detected in this
study.
Recommendations
I conducted this study to define the HRO constructs present in the ERM of
responsible financial reporting and fiscal management and find evidence of the presence
of similar constructs. Because this evidence was suggestive in nature, it would be
beneficial to develop a measurement to assess the state of high reliability in fiscally
reputable organizations. Doing so might make the descriptive nature of this study
applicable not only to financial reporting and fiscal management leaders but also the
accounting profession as a whole to put into practice. Black and McBride (2013)
referenced previous studies conducted to measure HRO applicability in hospital and
software startup companies to support their study, whose purpose was to measure and
assess HRO characteristics on collective and individual scales for applying HRO
constructs in fighting wildfires. Therefore, this recommendation for further research in
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applying HRO concepts in accounting practice is reasonable within the scope of human
resource and organizational behavior to enhance reliable performance outside of the
scope of traditional HROs.
Furthermore, although I referred to the connected nature of leadership to
individuals performing the control and monitoring tasks, more research is needed to
define the essence of connectivity or the quality of the social exchange between the
leaders, who possess or emit transformational leadership characteristics, and the reporting
actors, who are motivated by the tone at the top. Mindful leadership is integral to the
composition of HRO cultures (Lekka, 2011), and LMX and transformational leadership
have been linked to occupational safety outcomes (Christian et al., 2009). Vogus et al.
(2014) linked prosocial motivation and emotional ambivalence to mindful organizing and
warned against routinization because it prohibits the requisite variety and tension to
trigger prosocial motivation and emotional ambivalence. This tenet against routinization
could be a problem in the accounting profession, where procedures, policies, and process
simplification are the norm in compliance. Perhaps measurement of the personal quality
described by the participants as right would be integral to explaining this assumed benefit
of HQLMX in a dynamic responsible reporting environment, thus furthering an ERRM
model by providing a framework or tool for organizations to hire and cultivate the virtues
in leadership required to champion a responsible financial reporting environment.
Overlooking this as a first step in managing risk successfully could create risk in
choosing the wrong leader and could lead to financial reporting leadership risk.
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Social Implications
The premise of this research was to investigate the influencing factors that
promoted procedure operationalization and rule adherence by the participants from the
studied organizations to promote responsible reporting and limit third-party risk-harm.
Because there is a fair amount of judgment in principles-based financial accounting, the
profession uses rules regulations; standards; and associated policies, procedures, and
processes to control deviations that incubate into material weaknesses. HROs are well
versed in controlling errors and system interruptions that might affect the reputations of
organizations and unwitting third parties if they are allowed to develop into disasters. By
defining the existence of the HRO psychological constructs that motivated the
participants, all of whom were in the financial reporting and fiscal management
environment, the results of this study will provide leaders and governing boards with a
framework that could influence the individual judgments inherent in principles-based
accounting.
Being aware of an HRO conceptual framework will help leadership to develop
internal policies and procedures that will operationalize the ethical fiscal management
and representation of their respective organizations’ financial resources to protect the
organizations’ reputations and third-party stakeholders. On a broader scale,
understanding the HRO factors of the ERM of responsible financial reporting could
require modifications to government and professional regulation to mitigate risk to the
global economy from the effect of undetected errors in the complex financial systems of
multi-national organizations. Beyond the scope of policy application, the findings of this
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research could lead to the integration of HRO construct knowledge in the financial
reporting curriculum to influence the education, training, and certification of accounting
professionals.
Conclusion
Finding the existence of ERM components in responsible fiscal management
systems was not a surprising outcome because financial reporting actors are required to
abide by the AICPA (2016), whose guidelines were designed to provide external and
internal control measures for mitigating the third-party risk-harm associated with errors
and fraud. However, the development alone of procedures, policies, and procedures will
not improve reporting compliance. ERRM in responsible financial reporting systems also
addresses the human factors required to encourage adherence to procedures and policies
designed to operationalize control and monitoring activities effectively. Results of the
study revealed the presence of HRO collective disaster foresightedness and mitigation
constructs in reputable organizations ethically achieving their organizational goals while
protecting third-party stakeholders from risk-harm and that regardless of individual
awareness of a formal program, a reduced yet concentrated version of the ERM
framework emerged that was tailored to ERRM.
ERRM assumes a profit-making motive, meaning that organizations have
assessed the risks and identified the events that could interrupt profitable operations, as
most organizational ERM initiatives do. However, what also seemed to be present in the
ERRM of these organizations was an overarching emphasis on reputation risk
management that was accomplished via inherent HRO constructs that contributed to the
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development of and adherence to adequate control activities and monitoring measures of
COSO’s (2004) ERM framework and regulations and standards of the accounting
profession. A better understanding of the effects of an HRO environment on financial
reporting outcomes to develop and implement HRO constructs in the intangible reporting
systems of organizations would benefit organizations by helping to protect their
reputations and, more importantly, the innocent third-party stakeholders who depend on
the integrity of the organizations’ reporting systems.
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Appendix A: Initial Coding Scheme
AWARE: Being aware that a deviation does or could exist, opening the door for fraud.
ACKNOWLEDGE: Speaking up, vocalizing, or stating in some way the presence of a
deviation to leadership, and leadership acknowledging and embracing the
problem, instead of down-playing or ignoring it completely.
ACTION: Containing and correcting the deviation so that it does not escalate into a
disaster.

AWARE

ACKNOWLEDGE

ACTION

As a guide for coding, I will listen for the following HRO and ERM constructs to emerge
from the data as they apply to the following overarching concepts in financial
responsibility:
AWARE (RQ1)
 Mindfulness
o Preoccupation with failure
o Reluctance to simplify
o Sensitivity to operations
o Situational Awareness:
 Dull alertness
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Monitoring



Misinterpretation
Overload,
Decoys,
Distraction
Mixed Signals (i.e. reward structure)
Vigilance
Warnings
Anomalies
Clues
Neglect (i.e. ‘check the box audit and internal control fantasy docs)



Risk assessment
o Objective Setting
 Reporting
 Compliance
 Strategic
 Operations
ACKNOWLEDGE (RQ2 and RQ3)
o Commitment to resilience
o Leadership qualities
o Focus/Interest
o Communication


Hierarchical Structure
o Chain of command
o Deference to expertise



Risk Response

 Control Activities
o Internal
o External


Information and communication



Monitoring

ACTION (RQ2 & RQ 3)
 Control Activities
o Internal
o External
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o
o
o
o

Culture
Learning orientation - Resilience
Just
Informed – Sharing knowledge
Diverse
 Demographically
 Expertise/knowledge



Inform and communicate



Internal environment



Monitoring


o
o
o

Redundancy
Training
Duties
Procedures


o
o
o

Reward Structure
Incentives based on….
Bonuses based on…
Production pressures
 Stock market performance
 Sales
 Output



Risk Response
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Appendix B: Interview Protocol
Introduction:
I invited you to participate in this study because your organization, by way of analytics,
reputation, or other public information, appears to be financially sound and sustainable,
while managing risk to investors through organizational governance. As you know,
various financial debacles occurred despite rules, regulations and procedures in place to
mitigate financial risk-harm to individuals, yet your organization continues to be
financially sound while sustaining operational success. I want to define the psychological
factors that contribute to this coupled success so that other organizations can promote this
aspect of responsibility. The interview should take no longer than an hour. We are here
because you consented to participating when taking the demographic survey provided to
you via Survey Monkey. Do you have any questions regarding the survey or this
interview for me now? Thank you for assisting me. I am going to record a brief
introduction where you state your name and the date and then I will stop recording, play
the recorded message back to make sure I am getting a quality recording. When we are
satisfied the recording is working well, I will continue with the interview.
{Start the Recorder}
I am Robin B. Ewers, CPA, doctoral student at Walden University. I am here withPlease state your name and today’s date {Insert Name and date}. Do you understand that
this interview is being recorded? {Consent obtained to meet ‘two party consent’ rules of
certain states} {Stop recorder and test the sound quality if in person, not applicable if by
phone or VoIP/phone}
Baseline Screening Questions – designed to determine expertise with regard to regulatory
knowledge.
1.
2.
3.

Please take a moment and tell me your job duties as they relate to financial
reporting?
Can you describe for me how you are involved, if at all, in making sure the
appropriate rules and regs are adhered to?
Please give me some examples of this involvement.
What would you consider your expertise? Or specialty?

Research Question 1 -What HRO constructs applied in ERM are present in reliable
financial reporting?
Interview Prompts:
4. To what do you attribute sustained organizational financial success?
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5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

In passing, I hear some colleagues say you can’t make money by adhering to the
rules, please tell me your experience on how organizations manage to do that?
Please provide some examples.
Please describe any processes or procedures that promote reliability in your financial
reporting.
What do you believe makes employees adhere (or not adhere) to these processes or
procedures?
[Further prompts will depend on the participant’s answers, but will be directed to see
if HRO constructs are present.]

Research Question 2 – How can HRO constructs applied in ERM minimize
organizational stakeholder financial risk-harm?
Interview Prompts:
10. Risk-harm is the harm caused by exposing an individual to risk that prohibits their
best interest. It is in contrast to measured risk you might take to promote a financial
or other operational or strategic position. Please tell me about your experience in
minimizing financial risk-harm to third party stakeholders.
a. Risk-harm is the harm caused by exposing an individual to risk that
prohibits their best interest. It is in contrast to measured risk you might
take to promote a financial or other operational or strategic position.
Please tell me about your experience in minimizing financial risk-harm to
third party stakeholders.
b. Outside of “rules and regs,” what organizational factors do you believe
minimizes risk to those relying on the financial reporting system of this
organization? (This question intends to address the possible reference to
the simple reliance on SOX or the ERM/Internal Control framework to
mitigate risk).
c. How do you assure your human resource will adhere to the process and
procedures in place to operationalize the rules and regs?
d. How do you motivate employees to promote reliability in the financial
reporting process while also striving for financial success of the
organization?
e. Describe your executive compensation or reward plans? (I am trying to
find out if reward structures are tied to EPS or some other financial
success measurement, or if there is compensation tied to admitting and
fixing mistakes or errors).
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f. Describe your employee bonus or reward plans? (I am trying to find out if
reward structures are tied to just financial or output success measurement,
or if they are tied to admitting and fixing mistakes or errors).
Research Question 3 – How can HRO constructs applied in ERM inform other
organizations to motivate leadership and employees to promote fiscal fiduciary
responsibility within their organization while maximizing profitability?
Interview Prompt:
11. Describe the enterprise risk management framework you work in.
12. How does your organization maintain sound financial practices among risk and
reporting actors? (e.g., training, redundancy, learning…)
13. What types of programs have you seen help the people do what they are supposed to
do? (Training, redundancy, learning….)
14. What human factors that promote financial responsibility can be transferred to other
organizations so they too can succeed but also limit risk to their stakeholders?
15. How would you take your experiences of promoting an environment of fiduciary
fiscal responsibility and apply it to another organization?
That’s it for my questions, do you have any questions for me? If not, as a reminder, I will
be sending you the transcript to review and my interpretation of the data for you to
provide feedback if necessary. In the meantime, I will be in contact with you if I have any
questions. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions. Thank you so
much for participating in this interview.
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Appendix C: Demographics Survey
*1. Do you agree to participate in the study based upon the information outlined in the
Informed Consent? By clicking Yes, you are providing your consent and will continue to
the Demographic Survey. Thank you.
o Yes, I agree.
2. The industry into which my organization best fits is:
Computer Hardware and Software
Manufacturing
Healthcare/Health Products
Retailers/Wholesalers
Telecommunications/Technology
Other Service Provider
External Accounting Services
o Not Listed

o
o
o
o
o
o
o

3. My organization is...
o Publicly Traded
o Privately held and issues reviewed or audited financial statements
o Privately held and does not issue reviewed or audited financial statements
4. My organization has been in business this many years (for publicly traded
organizations, please include years privately held):
5. My organization averages gross revenue of:
o Under $10 Million
o $10 Million to $100 Million
o Over $100 Million
o I don't know.
6. Organizational position:
o
o
o
o
o
o

Internal: C-Suite
Internal: Management
Internal: Senior
Internal: Staff
Internal: Other
External: Partner
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o
o
o
o

External: Manager
External: Senior
External: Staff
External: Other

7. Please provide your age:
8. Gender:
o Female
o Male
o Not disclosed
9. Please indicate your credentials, if applicable:
10. Career years in Financial Reporting/Management:
11. Career years in Financial Risk Management:
12. Years with your current organization:
13. Compensation basis:
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Salary only
Salary with incentive reward linked to organizational financial performance
Salary with other incentive reward
Hourly only
Hourly with incentive reward linked to organizational financial performance
Hourly with other incentive reward
Fee based
Other

190
Appendix D: Mind Map for “What Do They Do?”
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Appendix E: Mind Map for “How Do They Do It?”
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Appendix F: Mind Map for “Why Do They Do It?”
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Appendix G: Mind Map for “Who Are They?”

